View: Prepack Go-Private Deleveraging for Smart Glass SPAC

View, Inc.’s chapter 11 case is a clean example of what a modern prepackaged “go-private deleveraging” looks like when the capital structure is concentrated and the financing solution is negotiated in advance. The smart-glass company, which went public through a SPAC transaction, filed chapter 11 in the District of Delaware on April 2, 2024 with a deal framework that converted lender claims into the controlling equity of a reorganized holding company and paired that equity outcome with new-money exit funding.

The case also shows the operational logic of a prepack for an advanced-manufacturing and project-delivery business: preserve customer confidence, keep production and installation work moving, and get out quickly. View’s restructuring was publicly framed as a rapid process expected to be resolved in under two months, with the company transitioning to private ownership under a lender-supported plan and continuing operations during the case (The Real Deal and Glass Magazine).

Prepackaged Go-Private Deleveraging: DIP-to-Exit Financing and Lender Equity Allocation

Company background: what “smart glass” means in practice. View’s business proposition is built around electrochromic “smart windows” that can tint under low voltage to manage glare and solar heat gain. View describes its technology as using intelligent windows that automatically tint, with building energy and comfort positioning, and a product model intended for commercial buildings and large institutional end markets (View’s website and View’s investor relations release). In practical terms, smart glass is not a consumer gadget; it is a building product sold into procurement-heavy environments where performance, installation quality, and long-cycle project execution matter as much as the core technology.

Because electrochromic glass sits at the intersection of materials science, manufacturing yield, and construction delivery, the capital intensity and execution risk profile can be hard to reconcile with public-market expectations. One industry-focused article framed 2024 as a difficult year for architectural glass technology companies and described View’s bankruptcy as part of broader smart-glass industry strain (ScienceDirect). That industry context matters for readers because it provides a non-bankruptcy explanation for why a technology-driven building-products company might be structurally prone to high losses and repeated financing events.

Funding, valuation, and the SPAC path to the public markets. View’s capital story runs through a common late-2010s playbook: large private fundraising based on a category-creation narrative, followed by a SPAC transaction as a liquidity route. View was described as having once been valued around $2 billion and having received a $1.1 billion investment from SoftBank in 2018 (The Real Deal). Earlier in its lifecycle, the company raised money from strategic and financial investors, including a 2013 investment round led by Corning in what was described as a $62 million investment (Optics.org).

The SPAC timeline is also useful to keep the restructuring narrative grounded. View announced its planned merger with CF Finance Acquisition Corp. II in late 2020 in a transaction that public communications described as a combination with a Cantor Fitzgerald-sponsored SPAC (PR Newswire). The business combination was announced as closed in March 2021, with shares beginning to trade on Nasdaq under the “VIEW” ticker (GlobeNewswire and View IR).

By 2021, View was already dealing with exchange compliance pressures; it was described as being put on notice by Nasdaq months after going public through the SPAC merger (The Real Deal). For restructuring professionals, this matters because public-company compliance issues can constrain financing flexibility, accelerate governance turnover, and create persistent disclosure and audit costs that are hard to carry during a liquidity crunch.

Why the case filed when it did (grounded in reported facts). View’s external reporting around the filing describes a familiar set of late-stage distress signals for a SPAC-era company: a collapsed equity price, high losses relative to revenue, and compliance or restatement overhangs. The Real Deal reported that View’s stock had declined sharply from its post-IPO levels and summarized losses and revenue figures, and it also described compliance problems and penalties, including a $5 million SEC fine tied to a CFO misstatement and a separate $5 million wastewater discharge fine in Mississippi (The Real Deal). This kind of regulatory and compliance history often shows up in bankruptcy in two ways: (i) it can make new capital more expensive, and (ii) it can weaken the perceived reliability of forward-looking projections, which are critical in a go-forward plan process.

The same reporting described View as having taken cost-reduction actions (including a workforce reduction in 2023) and referenced liquidity and debt figures in the run-up to filing (The Real Deal). Another report described the company’s “outlook” as deteriorating post-SPAC in the context of SoftBank’s investment and broader SPAC market disappointment (Crunchbase News).

What makes the story distinctive is that View was not simply a software business that could shrink to survive. “Smart glass” lives in the world of factories, field installation, and performance warranties. A cash squeeze can therefore hit multiple parts of the system at once: manufacturing throughput, installation capacity, and customer confidence in long-term servicing. That helps explain why a short, pre-negotiated restructuring can be more valuable than a longer, contested chapter 11 for a building-products platform. If customers fear disruption, projects can slip or be canceled; if projects slip, working capital can tighten further; and if working capital tightens further, inventory and production can be disrupted. This feedback loop is a close analog to the “inventory/availability flywheel” in retail, but in View’s case the flywheel is driven by project execution and manufacturing stability.

Several of the public facts summarized around the filing point in the same direction: large reported losses versus revenue, meaningful debt, and liquidity constraints paired with the need to continue operating. The table below consolidates commonly repeated “headline” figures from media reporting. These numbers are not a substitute for bankruptcy schedules, but they are useful to understand how external stakeholders were framing the business and why counterparties might have been sensitive to a longer process.

Public SPAC communications also described large installed-footprint and customer positioning claims that are typical in “platform” narratives. For example, the business combination closing release described View technology as being deployed across tens of millions of square feet of buildings and referenced major end markets (GlobeNewswire). These kinds of scale claims can be important in restructuring because they show the company was positioning itself as a durable building-product vendor, which makes maintaining continuity and trust more central than in a purely transactional consumer business.

For practitioners, the key discipline is to avoid reducing the filing to a single “cause” (e.g., “SPACs failed”). A better reading is that View’s capital structure and liquidity needs likely could not be reconciled with persistent operating losses and a financing environment that became less tolerant of high-burn, venture-style companies. That is consistent with both the smart-glass industry context described by an industry article and the company-specific reporting on losses, penalties, and market pressures (ScienceDirect and The Real Deal).

Debt at filing: reconciling “as-reported” figures with the plan’s equitization number. One reason to use tables in cases like View’s is that different sources can emphasize different measures: total liabilities, funded debt, or just the tranche being converted. Law360 reported View filed with $359.4 million in debt and listed assets and liabilities in the $100 million to $500 million range (Law360). The Real Deal separately reported that the company had $227.6 million in debt as of mid-February 2024 (The Real Deal). Bankruptcy filings described a restructuring transaction that equitized more than $274 million of term loan and convertible note claims and converted those claims into the majority of reorganized equity (bankruptcy filings; also described in Law360’s plan confirmation coverage).

These numbers are not necessarily inconsistent; they may reflect (i) different measurement dates, (ii) different definitions of “debt” (funded debt vs. broader liabilities), and (iii) the fact that the plan’s equitization figure captures a specific creditor subset (term loans and convertible notes) rather than all liabilities. For readers following restructuring economics, the equitization number matters because it is the amount explicitly converted into equity and thus the amount that drove ownership.

The prepack structure: why “go-private” and “prepack” fit together. A prepackaged case typically means the debtor solicited votes and negotiated the plan deal terms before filing, then used chapter 11 to implement the transaction quickly with a court-confirmed restructuring. The public reporting around View’s case emphasized speed and a stakeholder agreement to hand ownership to lenders, which aligns with a prepack posture (The Real Deal and Law360).

The operational rationale for a go-private prepack is often straightforward. Going private reduces public-company reporting burdens and can make it easier to restructure a capital-intensive business around long-cycle execution without the volatility of public markets. The prepack process, in turn, compresses the bankruptcy timeline to reduce the period during which counterparties (customers, suppliers, project partners, and employees) might fear disruption. In View’s case, the plan was confirmed in May and the company emerged in May, consistent with the “short duration” narrative described in external coverage (MarketScreener and Law360).

DIP financing: delayed-draw structure and why it mattered. Bankruptcy filings describe a DIP facility designed as a delayed-draw term loan with staged availability. In a typical retail or commodity case, DIP size is often the headline; in a short prepack, the structure can be more important than the size. A delayed-draw DIP can be framed as a “liquidity backstop” rather than an operating-liquidity engine, especially when it is intended to roll into an exit facility on emergence (bankruptcy filings).

The staged draw mechanics also tell practitioners something about case design: if the debtor expects to emerge quickly, it may only need limited liquidity during the case, but it still needs enough committed capital to keep operating and to reassure counterparties. The Real Deal’s reporting included a cash-on-hand figure and described other fines and liabilities, which underscores why even a “quick” prepack may still require committed financing (The Real Deal).

Final DIP order: lien and adequate protection framework (high level). Bankruptcy filings describe the final DIP order as authorizing the DIP at the $17.5 million maximum principal amount and granting DIP liens and superpriority claims subject to carve-out and adequate protection concepts. The technical takeaway is that, even in a prepack, the DIP is still a secured financing instrument with the usual bankruptcy-layer protections; the difference is that in a short case it is often structured to transition seamlessly into exit financing rather than being repaid in a separate refinancing step (bankruptcy filings).

For sophisticated readers, the more relevant question is “what did the DIP buy?” In a case like View’s, the DIP buys time and stability: time to complete confirmation and implementation and stability to maintain project delivery and vendor terms during the case. That is consistent with external coverage describing continued operations during the restructuring process (Glass Magazine).

Exit financing: new money and the post-emergence capital structure. Bankruptcy filings describe a “new exit facility” structure with additional new-money funding of $32.5 million. The same filings describe mechanics by which DIP obligations are deemed bound into the exit credit agreement on the effective date. This is a defining feature of many prepacks: the DIP is designed not to be a temporary emergency instrument, but to become part of the post-emergence financing package, which allows the company to emerge without a separate refinancing event (bankruptcy filings).

Bankruptcy filings also describe an “RXR consortium” providing at least a minimum Tranche C portion under the exit facility, and external reporting connected stakeholders including Cantor Fitzgerald and RXR to the restructuring support (bankruptcy filings and Law360). The point is not name recognition; it is that exit financing participants often receive equity or other control rights that align them with post-emergence governance.

Equity allocation: who owned the reorganized company. The most analytically important part of View’s prepack is not the duration; it is the ownership split. Bankruptcy filings describe an allocation of new TopCo equity in which 64.2% of equity is allocated to the equitized prepetition term loan and convertible note claims, and 35.8% is allocated to exit lenders providing a Tranche C commitment (bankruptcy filings). In deal terms, this means the reorganized company is owned overwhelmingly by former creditors and by the providers of the go-forward financing package.

This split also shows how “new money” can translate into governance leverage in a prepack. In many restructurings, the largest debt holders own most of the equity; here, the exit lenders’ equity slice is a separate and meaningful piece of the post-emergence capitalization. This can be viewed as aligning control with the parties taking the post-emergence funding risk and potentially incentivizing ongoing support for the operating turnaround.

Creditor treatment: unimpaired GUCs, equity cancellation, and practical implications. One common misconception about “lender takeovers” is that they always imply broad creditor impairment. View’s case illustrates a more targeted approach: bankruptcy filings describe general unsecured claims (including employee and trade claims) as being paid in full in the ordinary course of business. The effective date notice described existing equity interests as canceled and extinguished on effectiveness (bankruptcy filings).

For practitioners, this is the classic prepack trade: the restructuring targets the capital stack (term loans and notes) while minimizing disruption to operating counterparties. The company’s ability to keep general unsecured creditors unimpaired depends on the negotiated financing and the ability to fund operations through the exit. That is why the DIP-to-exit structure matters: it provides the liquidity basis to maintain ordinary-course payments and preserve vendor confidence.

Confirmation and effectiveness: what the timeline shows about case design. The timeline is one of the best “signal tables” in any prepack. It shows (i) how quickly the debtor moved from filing to final DIP approval, (ii) how quickly the plan went from initial filing to confirmation, and (iii) whether the effective date followed quickly after confirmation, which can indicate that financing and closing mechanics were largely prepared in advance.

Bankruptcy filings describe a petition-date plan and disclosure statement filing, a final DIP order later in April, plan confirmation in May, and an effective date two days later. The emergence timing was also publicly reported, including an effective date in late May (MarketScreener).

Key professionals and notice administration: who ran the process. In short-duration prepacks, the operational playbook often depends heavily on professional execution and on a claims/notice agent that can handle solicitation and noticing quickly. MarketScreener’s reporting on the filing described a professional lineup that included Cole Schotz as counsel and SOLIC Capital Advisors as investment banker, and it identified Kroll Restructuring Administration as the notice, claims, solicitation, balloting, and administrative agent (MarketScreener).

What this case suggests about “smart glass 1.0” capital structures. View’s chapter 11 is not an indictment of electrochromic technology as a concept; it is an example of a category where the economics can be difficult to sustain through an extended period of losses and repeated capital raises. The ScienceDirect article’s framing of an architectural glass technology downturn in 2024 provides a macro lens, while company-specific reporting on losses, penalties, and stock collapse provides a micro lens (ScienceDirect and The Real Deal).

For restructuring professionals, the transferable insight is that a prepack is most feasible when the capital structure is compressible: the debtor can negotiate with a small number of lenders and noteholders, convert them into equity, and provide a clean exit financing package without a long contested process. View’s case, as described in public reporting and bankruptcy filings, fits that profile: lender agreement, a short timeline, and a governance reset through private ownership (Law360 and MarketScreener).

Frequently Asked Questions

When did View file for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and where was the case filed? View filed chapter 11 on April 2, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

Why was View’s chapter 11 structured as a prepackaged case? The case was framed publicly as a stakeholder-negotiated plan intended to move quickly and transition the company to private ownership (The Real Deal and Law360). Bankruptcy filings describe a petition-date plan and disclosure statement filing consistent with a prepack structure.

Who was the judge in View’s bankruptcy case? The case was assigned to Judge Craig T. Goldblatt, as listed in BKData.

How much DIP financing did View obtain and how did the delayed-draw structure work? Bankruptcy filings describe a $17.5 million delayed-draw DIP term loan with $10.0 million available at the interim stage and the remainder available after final approval.

What exit financing supported emergence and what was the new-money amount? Bankruptcy filings describe $32.5 million of additional funding under a new exit facility, structured alongside the DIP-to-exit transition.

How much debt was converted to equity, and who owned the reorganized company? Bankruptcy filings and reporting described converting more than $274 million of debt into equity and transitioning View to private ownership (Law360). Bankruptcy filings describe a 64.2% / 35.8% equity split between equitized prepetition term loan/convertible note claims and exit lenders providing a Tranche C commitment.

What happened to general unsecured creditors and existing shareholders? Bankruptcy filings describe general unsecured claims (including employee and trade claims) as paid in full in the ordinary course, while existing equity interests were canceled on the effective date.

When was the plan confirmed and when did View emerge from chapter 11? View’s emergence was publicly reported on May 22, 2024 in MarketScreener, following court approval of the plan and disclosure statement on May 20, 2024 (also described in MarketScreener).

Who is the claims agent for View?

Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC serves as the claims and noticing agent. The firm maintains the official claims register and distributes case notifications to creditors and parties in interest.

For more chapter 11 case research, see the ElevenFlo blog.