Akoustis: Litigation Shock Drives 363 Sales and a Liquidating Chapter 11 Plan
Akoustis (filed as ATech (Parent) Resolution Corp.) entered chapter 11 in Delaware in December 2024 after major trade-secret litigation outcomes, pursuing cash collateral, section 363 asset sales, and a confirmed liquidation/wind-down plan.
Akoustis Technologies, Inc. (later renamed ATech (Parent) Resolution Corp.) filed chapter 11 petitions in the District of Delaware on December 16, 2024. The filing followed a major trade secret and patent dispute with Qorvo that produced a final judgment “of approximately $59 million” in damages, fees, and interest, and it pushed the company into a court-supervised sale process rather than a conventional going-concern reorganization.
For restructuring professionals, the Akoustis case is a clean example of a litigation-driven filing where (i) the key operating risk is an adverse IP record (including an injunction) and (ii) the restructuring strategy is a value-preservation sale designed to deliver “free and clear” business continuity to a buyer. Management publicly framed the case as a way to sell the business “free and clear of any Qorvo infringement,” underscoring how the bankruptcy process can function as a title-clearing and risk-allocation mechanism in IP-heavy situations.
The process culminated in a sale of substantially all Akoustis assets to Tune Holdings Corp., a wholly owned SpaceX subsidiary, in a transaction announced as approximately $30.2 million of cash plus assumed liabilities, with a court auction held April 25, 2025 and a closing announced May 15, 2025 (sale announcement; additional coverage). The remaining debtor estate later proceeded to confirmation of a wind-down plan.
Case Snapshot
| Debtor(s) | ATech (Parent) Resolution Corp., et al. (f/k/a Akoustis Technologies, Inc.) |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware |
| Case Number | 24-12796 (LSS) (jointly administered) |
| Judge | Hon. Laurie Selber Silverstein |
| Petition Date | December 16, 2024 |
| Core catalyst | Qorvo litigation judgment and injunction consequences |
| Primary case funding | Cash collateral (budgeted operations + adequate protection) |
| Stalking horse (initially announced) | Gordon Brothers Commercial & Industrial, LLC |
| Main asset sale buyer | Tune Holdings Corp. (SpaceX) |
| Auction date (announced) | April 25, 2025 |
| Sale closing (announced) | May 15, 2025 |
| Announced sale price (headline) | ~$30.2M cash + assumption of certain liabilities |
| Plan posture | Confirmed liquidation / wind-down plan with plan administrator |
| Confirmation order entered | December 19, 2025 |
Litigation-Driven Restructuring: Cash Collateral, 363 Sales, and Liquidating Plan Structure
What the company did (and what it owned). Akoustis positioned itself as an integrated device manufacturer of patented bulk acoustic wave (BAW) high-band RF filters used in wireless and adjacent markets, including Wi‑Fi and 5G infrastructure (company description at filing; company overview). Its manufacturing “hard asset” anchor was a wafer-manufacturing facility in Canandaigua, New York that the company highlighted as a key differentiator, and that it had earlier acquired as a strategic platform for consolidated wafer fabrication (facility acquisition history).
Akoustis also marketed the business as an IP-forward RF filter developer, with a technology story centered on high-frequency BAW filter design. A founder/CEO interview in Microwave Journal described an “XBAW” process and target frequency ranges aligned with Wi‑Fi 6/6E and 5G bands (technology background). That combination—specialized manufacturing capability plus a patent portfolio—helped explain why the chapter 11 strategy favored a section 363 sale: the value proposition was in the operating platform and the ability to keep shipping product, but the business needed a buyer that could assume execution risk and separate itself from an adverse IP litigation history.
| Asset / capability | Why it matters in a sale | What was publicly described |
|---|---|---|
| Canandaigua, NY wafer fab | Hard-to-replicate manufacturing capability; supports continuity | A 120,000–125,000 sq. ft. facility acquired in 2017 (acquisition release; chapter 11 sale release) |
| RF filter product line | Determines whether the buyer is acquiring “real operating value” vs. a shell | BAW high-band RF filters for wireless / Wi‑Fi / 5G applications (company description) |
| IP portfolio | Key to buyer diligence, freedom-to-operate, and future R&D | Industry coverage later tracked patent transfers to SpaceX (industry patent note) |
The Qorvo litigation: what happened and why it forced a filing. The most important fact pattern is the litigation record. Qorvo announced that a federal jury returned a verdict on May 17, 2024 finding willful and malicious trade secret misappropriation and patent infringement and awarding damages that Qorvo summarized as more than $31.5 million of compensatory damages plus $7 million of punitive damages (Qorvo release; Semiconductor Today summary). A law-firm announcement in the same period framed the outcome as roughly $38.6 million total damages and described findings involving “over 36” trade secrets and BAW resonator filter patents (trial announcement).
After the verdict, the matter quickly moved from “damages” to “operating injunction risk.” Morris Nichols reported that the court granted a permanent injunction in October 2024, including relief that blocked infringement of two patents and required removal of trade secret information from Akoustis systems (injunction announcement). Bloomberg Law later reported a $11.7 million attorneys’ fee award entered September 9, 2024 and described the award as being authorized under the Defend Trade Secrets Act in light of willful and malicious misappropriation findings (fee award coverage).
The litigation arc matters because it defines the “why now” of the filing: a significant cash judgment is one problem, but an injunction that constrains manufacturing, design, or data hygiene creates a second-order operational problem that can suppress third-party bidding and increase the cost of capital. That is why Akoustis framed the chapter 11 sale strategy as a path to reassure buyers and customers about what is being sold and how it can operate post-closing.
| Date | Litigation milestone | What was publicly reported |
|---|---|---|
| May 17, 2024 | Jury verdict | Willful/malicious trade secret findings; damages announced (Qorvo; Semiconductor Today) |
| May 2024 | Trial counsel announcements | Damages framed as ~$38.6M; trade secret/patent scope described (Sheppard Mullin) |
| Sep 9, 2024 | Fees order | $11.7M attorneys’ fees award (Bloomberg Law) |
| Oct 2024 | Permanent injunction | Injunction entered; remediation directives described (Morris Nichols) |
| Dec 16, 2024 | Chapter 11 filing | Filing announcement cites ~$59M judgment; sale process announced (GlobeNewswire) |
Capital structure and liquidity: why the case ran on cash collateral. Akoustis was not a typical asset-based borrower with a large secured revolving facility. Public reporting and filings described a balance sheet funded largely through equity and convertible debt rather than traditional working-capital structures. A 2024 10‑Q described $44.0 million of 6.0% convertible senior notes due 2027 outstanding, with semi-annual interest payments that could be made in cash or stock, and it also described a $4.0 million promissory note outstanding (SEC filing). Earlier company materials also show a history of secured convertible financing as the business moved from R&D into commercialization (2018 note offering).
This capital structure context matters because it helps explain why the chapter 11 moved forward without a marquee DIP facility. When a debtor has limited secured working-capital debt and is already facing litigation-driven uncertainty, a negotiated cash-collateral framework can be the faster tool: it preserves operating runway under a budget, provides the secured party with replacement liens and other adequate protection, and avoids the underwriting and negotiation friction of a new-money DIP lender that must price injunction and IP-transfer risk.
| Liability / funding item | What it typically implies for case strategy | Public support |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0% convertible notes due 2027 | Unsecured or lightly secured public-style debt; can be hard to “DIP out” | $44.0M outstanding as of the filing period (SEC 10‑Q) |
| Litigation judgment + injunction | Can compress timelines and increase buyer diligence burdens | Filing announcement ties chapter 11 to ~$59M judgment (GlobeNewswire) |
| Limited traditional secured debt | More likely to see cash collateral or smaller DIP | Case proceeded on cash collateral rather than a large DIP |
Cash collateral terms: how the estate kept operating. In the early phase, the debtors sought authority to use cash collateral subject to a budget and line-item variance controls, with adequate protection packages for the prepetition secured party. In practice, these agreements function like “operating guardrails” while the sale process runs: what can be spent, how quickly variances trigger defaults, what events terminate consent, and what liens or superpriority claims the lender receives in return. The cash collateral structure also matters because, when a case is sale-centered, the secured creditor’s leverage is often exercised through budget control and termination rights more than through long-dated covenants.
| Term | What it does in practice | Typical stakeholder focus |
|---|---|---|
| Approved budget | Defines runway, burn rate, and sale process affordability | U.S. Trustee and committee scrutiny for realism |
| Variance limits | Creates objective default triggers based on receipts/disbursements | Debtors focus on flexibility; lender focus on early warning |
| Adequate protection | Lien/priority package for value erosion risk | Drives fight over priming, valuation, and carve-outs |
| Termination events | Gives lender an exit if case deviates from plan | Often negotiated around sale milestones and hearings |
Bidding procedures and sale architecture: designing around the litigation record. The company’s initial filing announcement described a stalking horse agreement with Gordon Brothers Commercial & Industrial, LLC (chapter 11 announcement), signaling a sale framework intended to set a floor bid and solicit topping offers. Subsequent disclosures reflect that Tune Holdings (SpaceX) ultimately won and closed, but the stalking horse label is useful for understanding deal mechanics: the estate sought a baseline buyer willing to bear diligence and execution risk while the court process facilitated competitive tension.
The final result was a SpaceX-affiliate acquisition of “substantially all” Akoustis assets. The company announced that Tune Holdings acquired assets for approximately $30.2 million in cash plus assumption of certain liabilities, and that Tune would continue operations and “team infrastructure” (Business Wire; Space Daily). Law-firm coverage described the sale as a section 363 transaction in Delaware and again confirmed the buyer and the headline cash price (K&L Gates matter summary).
| Milestone | What happened | Public source |
|---|---|---|
| Chapter 11 filing announced | Sale strategy announced; stalking horse disclosed | GlobeNewswire |
| Court auction | Auction held | Business Wire |
| Winning bidder | Tune Holdings (SpaceX) selected | Business Wire |
| Closing announced | Transaction completed; buyer continues operations | Business Wire; K&L Gates |
What SpaceX was likely buying: capability, not just patents. Industry commentary after the closing emphasized the IP transfer dimension. Microwave Journal reported that 40 U.S. patents transferred to SpaceX by the end of Q2 2025 and described the patents as covering key technologies related to high-frequency BAW filter design (industry patent transfer note). Standing alone, “patents” can be an incomplete explanation for a bankruptcy acquisition; the more meaningful framing for a buyer like SpaceX is that RF front-end components and high-frequency filters can be strategic inputs for communications systems. That framing is consistent with the reporting emphasis on continuing operations and preserving the team and infrastructure post-closing.
Additional asset dispositions: separating what was sold from what remained. The SpaceX transaction was described as “substantially all” Akoustis assets, but other reporting made clear that some assets sat outside the main sale perimeter. Space Daily noted that assets held by Grinding and Dicing Services, Inc. (GDSI) were excluded from the Tune transaction (Space Daily). In a multi-debtor structure, that is a standard design: sell the “core operating” package to a buyer while separately disposing of auxiliary assets or service units to maximize value.
| Asset package | What it broadly represents | Public clue |
|---|---|---|
| Core Akoustis assets sold to Tune | Operating platform and IP-heavy business sold through 363 | $30.2M cash + assumed liabilities; operations continue (Business Wire) |
| Excluded GDSI assets | Separate asset pool not included in Tune perimeter | Exclusion noted in coverage (Space Daily) |
Plan confirmation: what “value” was left for creditors after the sale. After the operating assets were sold, the remaining chapter 11 question was governance and distributions: how to convert the post-sale estate into a claims-reconciliation and distribution process, and what recoveries were realistic given the remaining asset pool, administrative costs, and the claim stack. The confirmed plan structure was a wind-down framework with a plan administrator, professional fee escrows, and a class-based distribution scheme. The disclosure statement model projected recoveries for general unsecured claims at the parent/operating entities (Class 4A in the plan structure) in a low-double-digit range, while smaller classes tied to specific debtor entities were projected to be paid in full. Those projections reflect a familiar post-363 dynamic: the sale can preserve operations and deliver a clean buyer outcome while leaving the legacy estate with limited cash to distribute after fees and priority claims.
| Claim class (selected) | Who sits there | Projected recovery (disclosed) |
|---|---|---|
| Secured/priority classes | Taxes and other secured/priority | 100% for the smaller secured/priority buckets |
| General unsecured (core debtors) | Convertible notes and other GUCs | Low-double-digit range for the main GUC pool |
| General unsecured (smaller debtor entities) | Limited claims at specific debtor subsidiaries | Projected 100% for de minimis pools |
Releases and exculpation: how the plan handled third-party protections. As in many wind-down plans, the plan included release and exculpation concepts. The key structural point is that third-party releases were framed as consensual via an opt-in mechanic (as opposed to a broad opt-out release model). In practice, opt-in structures reduce confirmation friction because they allow parties to self-select into releases rather than forcing a presumed release subject to procedural hurdles. The confirmation order also preserves the familiar “fraud, gross negligence, willful misconduct” carve-outs for exculpation, aligning the plan with mainstream Delaware chapter 11 norms for estate fiduciaries and professionals.
Key professionals: who ran the process. The chapter 11 filing announcement identified the core advisor team: K&L Gates as legal advisor, Raymond James as investment banker, Getzler Henrich as financial advisor, and C Street Advisory Group as communications advisor (filing announcement). Post-sale public summaries identified the buyer and again highlighted the SpaceX affiliation and the continuation of operations, while the law-firm announcement described the closing and transaction structure (K&L Gates).
| Role | Professional / entity (publicly disclosed) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legal advisor (debtors) | K&L Gates LLP | GlobeNewswire |
| Investment banker | Raymond James & Associates, Inc. | GlobeNewswire |
| Financial advisor | Getzler Henrich & Associates LLC | GlobeNewswire |
| Communications advisor | C Street Advisory Group | GlobeNewswire |
| Buyer | Tune Holdings Corp. (SpaceX) | Business Wire; K&L Gates |
Public-company endgame: delisting and liquidation framing. Post-closing coverage treated Akoustis as a liquidation rather than an operating reorganization, with TheStreet noting that the common stock was delisted from Nasdaq on May 23, 2025 and framing the outcome as an “essential” U.S. space/defense-linked brand being liquidated through chapter 11 (TheStreet). This matters for stakeholder expectations: once the operating assets are sold, remaining equity value is typically a function of residual claims and estate reserves, not future operating performance.
Consolidated timeline: putting the case into one table. For readers tracking the transaction through the docket and press coverage, the case timeline is easier to understand when the litigation events and bankruptcy milestones are merged into a single view.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| May 17, 2024 | Qorvo litigation verdict announced |
| Sep 9, 2024 | Fee award coverage (attorneys’ fees) |
| Oct 2024 | Permanent injunction coverage |
| Dec 16, 2024 | Chapter 11 petitions filed; sale strategy announced |
| Apr 25, 2025 | Court auction held (announced) |
| May 15, 2025 | Sale closing announced (Tune / SpaceX) |
| Dec 19, 2025 | Confirmation order entered (wind-down plan confirmed) |
FAQs
When did Akoustis (ATech) file chapter 11, and where was the case filed?
Akoustis filed chapter 11 on December 16, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
What was the Qorvo litigation outcome and why did it matter to the bankruptcy?
Qorvo announced that a federal jury returned a verdict on May 17, 2024 awarding damages in a trade secret and patent dispute (Qorvo). Follow-on coverage included a reported $11.7 million attorneys’ fee award (Bloomberg Law) and a permanent injunction in October 2024 (Morris Nichols). The filing announcement tied the chapter 11 directly to a final judgment of roughly $59 million and framed the sale as a way to deliver a business “free and clear” of infringement issues (GlobeNewswire).
Did the debtors obtain DIP financing, or did they proceed on cash collateral?
The case proceeded on a cash collateral framework rather than a large new-money DIP facility, using a budgeted structure to fund operations through the sale process.
How did the 363 sale process work and who bought the main business?
The company announced a court-supervised section 363 sale process at filing and later announced that Tune Holdings Corp., a wholly owned SpaceX subsidiary, acquired substantially all assets (Business Wire; K&L Gates).
What did the Tune (SpaceX) sale include and when did it close?
Akoustis announced that Tune acquired “substantially all” assets for approximately $30.2 million in cash plus assumed liabilities and that the transaction closed May 15, 2025 after a court auction on April 25, 2025 (Business Wire; Space Daily).
What did the SpaceX acquisition signal about the asset base?
Microwave Journal reported that 40 U.S. patents transferred to SpaceX by the end of Q2 2025 and framed the acquisition as a strategic addition to RF front-end capabilities (Microwave Journal).
What recoveries were projected for unsecured creditors under the plan?
The disclosure statement model projected a low-double-digit recovery range for the main general unsecured pool at the core debtor entities, with certain smaller classes projected to be paid in full. Actual recoveries depend on allowed claim amounts, administrative costs, and final reconciliation.
Did the plan provide for third-party releases, and were they opt-in or opt-out?
The plan provided for third-party releases on a consensual opt-in basis rather than an opt-out structure.
For more expert analysis of chapter 11 cases and restructuring mechanics, visit the ElevenFlo bankruptcy blog.