Brightmark Plastics: $260M Facility Sells for $14M After Green Bond Default

Brightmark Plastics Renewal's 58-day chapter 11 case provides a record on advanced plastics recycling economics and green municipal bond financing. The operator of a $260 million "Circularity Center" in Ashley, Indiana—designed to convert 100,000 tons of mixed plastic waste annually into pyrolysis oil—filed for bankruptcy after the facility achieved only 5% of nameplate capacity despite years of commissioning and over $211 million in parent company equity infusions.

The March 16, 2025 petition followed a default on $172.5 million in Indiana Finance Authority green bonds after Brightmark missed a $12.9 million principal and interest payment due March 1, 2025. Through a 26-round auction that drew four qualified bidders, the parent company, Brightmark LLC, reacquired the facility for $14.3 million in cash—less than 7% of original investment—and was selected over bond trustee UMB Bank's higher $17.3 million credit bid that would have liquidated the facility. Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein approved the lower going-concern bid, which preserved more than 100 jobs and left bondholders with $172.5 million in claims against the sale proceeds.

Company Background

Brightmark LLC was founded in 2016 by a group of engineers in San Francisco with the vision of "creating a world without waste." Co-founder Bob Powell brought renewable energy experience as former president of North America for SunEdison, president and CEO of Solar Power Partners, and chief financial officer of Pacific Gas & Electric. A Georgia Tech graduate, Powell had built a career developing renewable energy projects before moving into advanced recycling. Co-founder Zeina El-Azzi served as chief development officer, with experience in project development and environmental technology commercialization. The company acquired RES Polyflow and its proprietary chemical recycling technology, accumulating over $150 million in early equity investments to pursue its pyrolysis-based plastics recycling strategy.

The corporate structure that filed for bankruptcy consisted of three interrelated entities. Brightmark Plastics Renewal LLC ("Brightmark Ashley") served as the holding company for the other two debtors. Brightmark Plastics Renewal Indiana LLC ("Brightmark Indiana") functioned as the operating company that owned the Circularity Center facility. Brightmark Plastics Renewal Services LLC ("Brightmark Services") provided staffing services to the operation. All three entities were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Brightmark LLC, the parent company headquartered at 1725 Montgomery Street in San Francisco.

The Ashley, Indiana Circularity Center was Brightmark's effort to commercialize advanced plastics recycling at industrial scale. The $260 million facility was designed to process 100,000 tons of mixed post-consumer and post-industrial plastic waste annually, converting it into pyrolysis oil (branded as "PyBright"), naphtha, ultra-low-sulfur diesel, and wax through oxygen-free thermal decomposition. Construction began in 2019, with the first sale of pyrolysis oil occurring in 2023. The facility employed 113 workers including salaried employees, hourly workers, and contractors.

Fuel conversion strategy. The original business plan envisioned converting pyrolysis oil into higher-value fuel products through a hydrotreater and fractionator system referred to as the "Upgrade System." The Upgrade System never became operational. The company shifted to producing pyrolysis oil only, moving away from fuel production.

Operational performance. CRO Craig Jalbert's First Day Declaration detailed how various aspects of the Circularity Center did not operate as intended after construction, commissioning, and start-up, requiring re-engineering and re-design. Three years after achieving mechanical completion and two years after producing its first product, the facility operated at approximately 5% of its 100,000-ton annual capacity—processing only about 4 million pounds total since opening rather than the 200 million pounds per year it was designed to handle.

Fires and worker safety. The Ashley facility's operational issues included documented safety incidents early in operations. The Ashley Hudson Fire Department responded to at least 6-7 fires since 2020, including one that produced smoke visible 35 miles away in Fort Wayne. Fires repeatedly broke out during pyrolysis chamber testing, with one incident involving 700-degree vapors igniting and another sending a jet of flames out the end of the pyrolysis reactor.

Worker safety concerns also surfaced publicly, with at least one worker filing suit alleging lung problems from dust exposure at the facility. The fires and safety incidents occurred during early operations at the facility.

Green Bond Financing and Default

The Ashley facility was financed primarily through $185 million in tax-exempt green bonds issued through the Indiana Finance Authority in 2019, with UMB Bank, N.A. serving as bond trustee and collateral agent. By the bankruptcy filing date, $172.5 million remained outstanding. The project also received $4.55 million in grants and tax credits from public sources, bringing total public investment exposure above $189 million.

March 2025 default. The default occurred in early 2025. The parent company stopped making equity contributions in early February 2025, unable to continue funding operations, capital expenditures, and debt service payments after having already invested $211 million. On March 1, 2025, the debtors missed a scheduled principal and interest payment of $12,941,000. UMB Bank issued a notice of default on March 7, 2025. Nine days later, the chapter 11 petitions were filed.

Industry analysis indicated that approximately $1 billion of $9.3 billion in green municipal industrial development bonds were in default at the time, with construction delays, lower-than-projected demand, and inflation cited across recycling projects. The Brightmark green bond default occurred during this period.

Reasons for Filing

The First Day Declaration identified multiple interconnected causes of the company's financial distress, centered on technology performance issues, cash burn, and the end of parent company support.

Technology scale-up issues. Various aspects of the Circularity Center did not operate as intended after construction, commissioning, and start-up, requiring substantial re-engineering and re-design. The Upgrade System—the hydrotreater and fractionator intended to convert pyrolysis oil into fuels—never became operational. With fuel production no longer economically feasible due to changed economic and market circumstances, the debtors shifted focus to producing pyrolysis oil only, changing the original business model.

Capital requirements. Even with the pivot to pyrolysis oil, the debtors projected capital investment needs in excess of $100 million over the next several years to reach operational profitability. Weekly cash burn reached approximately $800,000 to maintain operations and fund capital improvements, exclusive of secured creditor repayment. Monthly operating costs of $3.5-4 million added to liquidity pressure even before debt service obligations.

Parent company funding constraints. Brightmark Parent had funded over $211 million in equity contributions, including $44.6 million in 2024 alone—a year in which the facility remained at 5% capacity. By early February 2025, the parent company concluded it could not continue funding operations without a path to profitability.

Industry-wide technical challenges. Sources describe technical challenges facing pyrolysis technology that have affected advanced plastics recycling. Pyrolysis oil is acidic and oxygen-sensitive, creating corrosion and equipment degradation. Contaminants including calcium, sodium, iron, and magnesium cause fouling that reduces throughput and increases maintenance requirements. Feedstock contamination from mixed plastic waste streams compounds these technical difficulties, as consistent, high-quality feedstock remains elusive for the industry.

Industry analysis from Lux Research documented that Ioniqa, Agilyx (through its Styrenyx brand), and New Hope Energy all shut down plants in 2024. Global advanced plastic recycling capacity reached just under 1 million tonnes per year by 2024, and the expected industry inflection point was delayed by at least two years.

Capital Structure at Filing

The capital structure showed the parent company's $211+ million equity investment behind $178 million in funded debt, while unsecured trade creditors held approximately $1.8 million in claims. Statutory liens were listed at up to $1.8 million.

Parent company investment history. The parent's $211,364,101 in total equity contributions accumulated over the project's life, with $44.6 million invested in 2024 alone while the facility operated at about 5% capacity.

DIP Financing

The debtors obtained debtor-in-possession financing through the DIP Motion from Brightmark Plastics Ashley Holdco LLC, an affiliate of the parent company, providing up to $13 million in postpetition liquidity to fund operations through the sale process.

The facility required approximately $800,000 per week to maintain operations and fund capital improvements, exclusive of debt service payments. The interim DIP amount of $5.6 million provided approximately seven weeks of operational runway to conduct the marketing process.

Case milestones. The DIP facility included milestone provisions that required the debtors to meet specified deadlines for the sale process.

363 Sale Process

Marketing campaign. SSG Capital Advisors served as investment banker for the debtors, conducting a marketing process to identify potential purchasers for the Ashley facility. SSG contacted 287 potential buyers across the chemical recycling, waste management, and energy sectors. The Sale Motion set a bid deadline of May 5, 2025, resulting in four qualified bids.

The four bidders. The auction on May 7, 2025 attracted bidders with different approaches to the asset.

The auction extended through 26 rounds of competitive bidding, moderated by SSG Managing Director Neil Gupta. UMB Bank, as bond trustee holding $172.5 million in claims, submitted the highest bid at $17.3 million (valued at $14.5 million in economic terms). Brightmark's $14.3 million cash bid was designated as backup.

Going-concern vs. liquidation. UMB Bank's credit bid was premised on complete facility liquidation, which would have resulted in termination of all 100+ employees and abandonment of environmental liabilities.

Brightmark's lower cash bid proposed preservation of the going concern, retention of most or all employees, assumption of environmental liabilities, and assumption of executory contracts. The parent company had already invested $211 million in the project and proposed continued operations.

Judge Silverstein determined that Brightmark's bid was the "highest and best offer" despite the lower nominal value. The court found that the going-concern approach benefited employees, vendors, and the community. Environmental liability assumption was noted given the facility's documented history of fires and safety incidents.

Sale approval and closing.

The Sale Order was entered and the sale closed on the same day—May 13, 2025—completing the 363 sale process in 58 days from petition to closing. The case caption was subsequently changed to "Old BPR LLC" to reflect the post-sale status of the debtor entities.

Contested Matters

UMB Bank motion to dismiss. The bond trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 2025, challenging the propriety of the bankruptcy filing. The motion remained contested through the sale process and post-closing proceedings.

Post-sale distribution disputes. Following the sale, disputes arose between UMB Bank and Brightmark affiliates regarding distribution of the $14.3 million in sale proceeds. The disputes centered on competing claims to proceeds between the prepetition bondholders and the postpetition DIP lender (a parent company affiliate).

The court ordered mediation in October 2025 to resolve the distribution disputes, with the parties reaching a stipulation regarding release of undisputed cash proceeds. The sale price of $14.3 million against $172.5 million in bond claims implied roughly 8 cents on the dollar before costs and disputed distributions.

Key Timeline

Professional Retentions

Industry Context: Advanced Recycling

The Brightmark bankruptcy occurred during a period in which multiple advanced plastics recycling operators reported setbacks.

Technical barriers. The pyrolysis oil produced is acidic and oxygen-sensitive, causing corrosion and equipment degradation. Contaminants including calcium, sodium, iron, and magnesium cause fouling that reduces throughput and requires maintenance. The variation in feedstock quality from mixed plastic waste streams compounds these issues, as the technology is sensitive to contamination levels.

Industry setbacks. Brightmark was not alone in its challenges. Ioniqa, which operated PET depolymerization technology in the Netherlands, shut down in 2024. Agilyx, operating through its Styrenyx brand, closed its polystyrene-to-styrene facility. New Hope Energy ceased operations at its Texas pyrolysis plant. The expected inflection point for advanced plastics recycling capacity—projected for 2025—was delayed by at least two years.

Continued expansion plans. Despite the Ashley facility's challenges, Brightmark announced plans in May 2024 for a $950 million advanced recycling facility in Thomaston, Georgia, with 2.5 million square feet of capacity to process 400,000 tons of plastic annually and employ 200 workers. The Georgia project was explicitly described as unaffected by the Indiana bankruptcy.

Frequently Asked Questions

What caused Brightmark Plastics Renewal to file for bankruptcy?

The Ashley, Indiana facility operated at only 5% of its 100,000-ton annual capacity despite years of commissioning and over $211 million in parent company investment. The original business plan—converting pyrolysis oil into fuels through an "Upgrade System"—never became operational because the hydrotreater and fractionator were not operational. When Brightmark Parent stopped making equity contributions in February 2025, the company missed a $12.9 million bond payment on March 1, triggering default and bankruptcy nine days later.

What is pyrolysis and what operational issues were reported?

Pyrolysis is a thermal process that breaks down plastic waste into oil, naphtha, wax, and other products through oxygen-free heating at high temperatures. The Ashley facility's pyrolysis reactors experienced operational challenges including corrosion, fouling from contaminants, and equipment failures that resulted in multiple fires. The intended fuel upgrade capability never materialized, shifting production to pyrolysis oil.

Why did the judge approve a lower bid over UMB Bank's credit bid?

UMB Bank's $17.3 million credit bid was premised on complete facility liquidation, which would have terminated all 100+ employees and abandoned environmental liabilities. Judge Silverstein determined that Brightmark's $14.3 million cash bid was the "highest and best offer" because it preserved jobs and assumed environmental liabilities. The court cited employee retention, community impacts, and vendor relationships in selecting the bid.

How much did investors lose in the Brightmark bankruptcy?

The parent company invested $211+ million in equity that was not recovered. Bondholders held $172.5 million in claims against a $14.3 million sale price—approximately 8 cents on the dollar before considering administrative costs and disputed distributions. Total invested capital exceeded $383 million, not counting the $4.55 million in public grants and tax credits invested in the project.

What happened to the green bonds issued for the facility?

The Indiana Finance Authority issued $185 million in tax-exempt green bonds in 2019, of which $172.5 million remained outstanding at filing. The green bond default is part of a broader pattern—approximately $1 billion of $9.3 billion in green municipal industrial development bonds were in default at the time of Brightmark's bankruptcy.

Did the bankruptcy affect Brightmark's other operations?

The chapter 11 filing was limited to three subsidiaries operating the Ashley, Indiana facility and did not affect other Brightmark operations. The parent company continued pursuing a $950 million advanced recycling facility in Thomaston, Georgia, announced in May 2024. Brightmark stated that the Georgia project was not affected by the Indiana bankruptcy.

What environmental and safety issues affected the facility?

The Ashley Hudson Fire Department responded to at least 6-7 fires since 2020, including one that produced smoke visible 35 miles away in Fort Wayne. Documented incidents included 700-degree vapor ignition during testing and a jet of flames from the pyrolysis reactor. A worker filed suit alleging lung problems from dust exposure. Environmental liability assumption was a key factor in evaluating bids during the sale process.

What is the current status of the Ashley facility?

Brightmark Parent reacquired the facility through the May 2025 sale and retained most of the 100+ employees. Post-sale disputes over distribution of proceeds between UMB Bank and Brightmark remained pending through court-ordered mediation as of late 2025.

How does this case compare to other advanced recycling setbacks?

The Brightmark bankruptcy followed a pattern of 2024-2025 advanced recycling setbacks, including plant closures by Ioniqa, Agilyx (Styrenyx), and New Hope Energy. Industry analysts noted that global advanced plastics recycling capacity reached just under 1 million tonnes per year by 2024 and that the expected industry inflection point was delayed by at least two years.

What public subsidies supported the project?

The facility received $185 million in tax-exempt green bonds through the Indiana Finance Authority plus $4.55 million in grants and tax credits. Total public investment exposure exceeded $189 million on a project that sold for $14.3 million.

Who is the claims agent for Brightmark Plastics?

Omni Agent Solutions serves as the claims and noticing agent. The firm maintains the official claims register and distributes case notifications to creditors and parties in interest.

For more chapter 11 case coverage, visit the ElevenFlo bankruptcy blog.