Burgess BioPower: Biomass Plant Restructures PPA Dispute Through Chapter 11 Plan

Burgess BioPower, LLC and Berlin Station, LLC filed chapter 11 petitions in the District of Delaware on February 9, 2024, with the case centered on a single asset: a 75-megawatt biomass-fueled power plant in Berlin, New Hampshire. The restructuring started as a classic “contract economics” distress story—a project-finance-style asset whose liquidity depends on an offtake contract, and whose capital structure left little room to absorb sustained payment reductions. Local and trade reporting framed the immediate trigger as a dispute under the plant’s power purchase agreement (PPA) with Eversource, including payment withholdings tied to an “over-market” cost-recovery mechanism and the collapse of legislative efforts to forgive large accumulated charges (NHPR; NH Business Review; WMUR).

For restructuring professionals, Burgess is a useful case because it shows how quickly a single-asset debtor can be forced into a binary path once it finances the case with a short-maturity DIP: sell the asset or convert the balance sheet. Early in the case, reporting described a “toggle” approach—run a sale process while also preparing a standalone plan in case the marketing effort failed (NHPR). That is common in power and infrastructure cases where the asset is operationally viable but contract economics and leverage have become unsustainable.

The case ultimately ended as a lender-led recapitalization. Industry coverage of the plan process described a debt-for-equity conversion of roughly $145 million of funded debt, with ownership allocated overwhelmingly to the DIP lender group and a smaller slice to senior noteholders, while general unsecured creditors recovered nothing and operational management transitioned to Olympus Power after confirmation (Chapter11Cases.com; Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review).

Case Snapshot

Debtor(s)	Burgess BioPower, LLC and Berlin Station, LLC
Asset	75 MW biomass-fueled power plant in Berlin, New Hampshire
Court	U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
Judge (reported)	Hon. Laurie Selber Silverstein
Petition date	February 9, 2024
Core dispute	PPA payment reductions / “over-market” cost recovery dispute with Eversource
DIP financing (reported)	$54M total; includes $18M delayed-draw new money component plus roll-up features
Sale process outcome (reported)	No qualifying bids by May 6, 2024 bid deadline
Plan path (reported)	Debt-for-equity plan converting ~ $145M of secured debt
Creditor outcomes (reported)	Secured lenders take ownership; general unsecured creditors recover 0%
Post-confirmation operations (reported)	New manager: Olympus Power; plant continues operating and selling power

Biomass Plant Restructuring: PPA Dispute, Roll-Up DIP, Failed Sale Effort, and a Debt-for-Equity Plan

Asset context: a 75 MW biomass plant with a local supply chain and concentrated offtake risk. Burgess BioPower is commonly described as a 75-megawatt biomass-fueled power plant in Berlin, New Hampshire (often called “Berlin Station”), built on the site of a former Fraser Papers pulp mill on the Androscoggin River (NH Business Review; Stantec; Global Energy Monitor). Trade coverage around development and construction described a project with a roughly $275 million construction cost and a business model designed around converting low-grade wood and sawmill residuals into baseload renewable generation (Biomass Magazine). The underlying restructuring point is straightforward: the plant’s fixed-cost structure is heavy (fuel procurement, maintenance, staffing, environmental compliance), and revenue stability depends on the pricing and payment mechanics of the offtake arrangement.

Attribute	Detail (reported)	Why it matters in restructuring
Capacity	75 MW	Single-asset cases turn on one revenue stream and one cost curve
Location	Berlin, New Hampshire	Local tax base, jobs, and political visibility increase stakeholder pressure
Fuel	Wood and other biomass solids	Fuel supply chain and pricing can create working-capital volatility
Site history	Former Fraser Papers pulp mill site	Brownfield / legacy site context can shape environmental and permitting issues
Development / in-service	Groundbreaking reported in 2011; operations expected in 2013	Long-lived asset with financing structures built for stable offtake economics

Development and contract history: a brownfield redevelopment built around a long-term PPA. Trade and project coverage described Berlin Station as a redevelopment of the former Fraser Papers pulp mill site in downtown Berlin, with construction activity starting after a financing close in 2011 and commercial operations beginning in 2013 (Stantec; CS Solutions). Biomass Magazine’s early coverage described a roughly $275 million construction project, a 20-year offtake contract, and a business model premised on converting low-grade wood into baseload renewable generation (Biomass Magazine). From a restructuring lens, those details are not historical trivia: projects financed for multi-decade offtake economics tend to carry debt sized to stable contracted revenues, so when the revenue formula becomes disputed (or withheld), the asset can move quickly from “operating fine” to “cash flow insolvent.”

Development / contract element (reported)	Detail	Restructuring relevance
Site	Former Fraser Papers pulp mill location in Berlin	Redevelopment sites can carry legacy community expectations and local stakeholder pressure
Construction / in-service timing	Financing close reported in 2011; commercial operations reported in 2013	Aligns with a capital structure designed for a steady-state operating profile
Construction cost	~$275M (reported)	High fixed investment increases sensitivity to contract pricing and debt service
Offtake contract	20-year agreement reported in development coverage	Long-term contracted economics often drive leverage sizing and lender underwriting assumptions

Dispute posture: termination attempt, counterparty resistance, and mediation/ADR framing. The dispute was not portrayed as a simple “utility stopped paying” narrative; coverage included competing positions. NHPR reported that the debtors moved to terminate the contract while Eversource rejected termination and stated the debtors were not in default, with the utility indicating it intended to pursue mediation and alternative dispute resolution (NHPR). For a restructuring audience, this is a core point: when the largest counterparty disputes default and pushes ADR, the debtor’s ability to force a near-term cash outcome can be limited, making DIP runway and case milestones more determinative of the path (sale versus balance sheet conversion).

Wood supply chain exposure: a plant that matters to suppliers and regional forestry economics. Reporting and industry association commentary emphasized that Burgess is a major buyer of biomass wood chips, creating a local market for low-grade timber and sawmill waste. The New Hampshire Timberland Owners Association described annual consumption in the range of 500,000–800,000 green tons and stressed the plant’s role in the “wood supply system” (NHTOA). NH Business Review similarly described the plant purchasing around 800,000 tons annually from more than 115 suppliers (NH Business Review). For practitioners, this supplier ecosystem is not just context—it has bankruptcy consequences. If the plant continues operating, vendors keep extending postpetition trade credit and generate administrative claims. If it shuts down, supplier claims can spike (termination, stored inventory, transportation, demobilization), while the estate’s ability to pay those claims depends on collateral value and liquidity.

Stakeholder group	Reported relationship to the plant	Practical chapter 11 implication
Biomass suppliers / loggers	Hundreds of thousands of tons of annual purchases	Payment continuity becomes central to stabilizing operations and avoiding supply interruptions
Plant workforce	Dozens of direct employees at the facility	Retention and safety/compliance coverage are mission-critical for an operating power asset
City of Berlin	Plant is a meaningful element of the local tax base	Taxes and municipal pressures can become contested, especially when liquidity tightens
Utility/offtaker	PPA counterparty and payment gatekeeper	Contract disputes can become the main driver of liquidity and case posture

Immediate distress story: a payment-withholding dispute and policy risk around “over-market” cost recovery. The filing was widely reported as a response to a dispute with Eversource over payment mechanics under the PPA and Eversource’s efforts to recoup “over-market” costs. NHPR described a history in which the plant sold power above market rates for years, accumulating more than $100 million toward a contractual over-market cost limit, and highlighted a 2023 political fight over proposed legislation that would have forgiven roughly $71 million of over-market costs—a bill Governor Chris Sununu vetoed (NHPR; WMUR). NH Business Review reported that Eversource began reducing payments as part of a recoupment effort, and that the debtors lined up DIP financing to stabilize liquidity while pursuing a plan route in bankruptcy (NH Business Review).

From a restructuring mechanics standpoint, these facts converge into a familiar risk profile for project-financed renewables. A heavily levered asset can operate reliably and still become cash-flow insolvent if the pricing formula changes, payments are withheld, or a dispute blocks cash receipts. When the largest counterparty is also the party applying the payment reduction, the debtor’s short-term options narrow quickly: negotiate, litigate, refinance, or reorganize. In practice, chapter 11 often becomes the venue for stabilizing operations (through DIP financing), centralizing dispute resolution, and forcing stakeholders to choose between a sale of the asset or a recapitalization that right-sizes the capital structure to the new revenue reality.

Why biomass cases are politically and economically “loud.” A key difference between a small industrial debtor and a power asset like Burgess is that the plant is embedded in public policy narratives (renewable energy, forest management, rural employment) and municipal finances. NHPR cited a 2019 independent report estimating the plant supported 240 jobs and delivered a $43 million annual economic benefit to New Hampshire, with an additional note that closure could eliminate 100+ forest and wood products industry positions (NHPR). Later reporting cited economic impact figures of $50+ million to $70+ million annually and job-support estimates in the 230–240 range (Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review). These variances are normal for local economic development studies, but the takeaway is consistent: the plant’s continued operation had constituencies beyond creditors, and that tends to influence strategy (a preference for “keep it running” outcomes) even when economics are tight.

Case financing: a lender-provided DIP designed to force a near-term outcome. Reporting described an $18 million DIP component provided by senior secured lenders (NH Business Review). Bankruptcy filings (as summarized in existing docket extraction for this repo) described a larger total postpetition facility authorized on a final basis—$54 million—reflecting the common pattern in which “DIP size” includes both new-money liquidity and roll-up components that refinance part of the prepetition exposure. This structure matters because it changes who has leverage in the case: a roll-up-heavy DIP can convert prepetition risk into postpetition priority and thereby narrow the room for other stakeholders to negotiate recoveries.

DIP component (reported in filings / coverage)	Amount	What it functionally does in a single-asset case
Delayed-draw new money term loan	Up to $18.0M	Funds operating liquidity, payroll, fuel procurement, and the chapter 11 runway
Roll-up / refinancing elements	Balance of total authorized facility	Elevates part of the prepetition lender exposure into DIP priority and strengthens lender control
Total DIP facility (final basis)	$54.0M	Sets the liquidity budget and the time horizon for sale vs. plan

Bankruptcy filings summarized in the repo’s docket research described the facility economics as high-cost and short-maturity: 12% interest with a +2% default-rate increment, a $250,000 upfront fee, and an “earliest of” maturity construct tied to a 180-day outside date, a sale closing, or a plan effective date. In practice, that is a DIP that monetizes time. It provides the liquidity required to keep the plant operating and preserve value, but it also creates milestones and defaults that can pull the case toward the lender’s preferred path if negotiations stall.

DIP term (selected; described in filings)	Reported economics / control feature	Why it matters
Interest rate	12% per annum	High carry cost increases pressure to reach an outcome quickly
Default rate	+2%	Punishes delays or covenant breaches, reinforcing lender leverage
Upfront / agent fees	Upfront fee + ongoing agency fees	Increases all-in cost and can reduce liquidity runway
Unused line fee	0.50% (reported)	Incentivizes efficient draws but also adds to cost
Maturity	Earliest of 180 days, sale closing, or plan effective date	Forces “sale vs. plan” decision under a defined timeline

Sale process: marketing an operating plant, then living with “no qualifying bids.” Early in the case, the debtors pursued a court-supervised sale process while preserving a plan alternative. NHPR reported that the bid deadline was May 6, 2024 and no qualifying bids were received by that deadline, with the sale hearing rescheduled from May 21 to June 6, 2024 (NHPR). When a single asset is a specialized operating plant, “no bids” often has a simple explanation: the asset may be operationally valuable, but the bidder universe is small, and buyers underwrite the exact contract stack (offtake pricing, permits, fuel supply arrangements, taxes). If the PPA dispute makes future revenues uncertain, bids can evaporate or become deeply discounted—especially if the capital structure is over-levered and the estate needs cash proceeds to satisfy secured claims and administrative expenses.

Coverage of the early sale posture also underscores a typical friction point in regulated-asset restructurings: state agencies may intervene to preserve or clarify their jurisdiction even when the bankruptcy is pending elsewhere. NHPR reported that the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services filed in the case to preserve state regulatory jurisdiction (NHPR). That type of filing is not unusual in single-asset energy cases because a sale or ownership transfer can implicate permit conditions, compliance history, and ongoing reporting obligations. In a buyer-scarce process, additional perceived regulatory complexity can further reduce the number of parties willing to bid under a tight deadline.

This is also where the DIP design matters. If the DIP is structured with tight milestones and short maturity, the sale process becomes a live test of market value under time pressure. A bid process that produces no qualifying bids is not necessarily a failure of marketing effort; it can be a market signal that the asset’s economics (as then understood) did not support an acquisition price that cleared the lien stack. In that situation, a recapitalization plan can preserve operations by converting debt to equity, even if it produces little or no recovery for out-of-the-money creditors.

| Sale milestone (reported) | Date | What it signaled | |---|---| | Bid deadline | May 6, 2024 | Market check for whether the plant could be sold as a going concern under court supervision | | “No qualifying bids” outcome | Reported in late May 2024 | Increased likelihood of a lender-led plan rather than a third-party sale | | Sale hearing rescheduled | June 6, 2024 (from May 21) | Case continued to preserve optionality while plan alternative matured |

: Sale process milestones (reported)

Plan pivot: converting secured debt into ownership rather than selling the asset. Later coverage described a plan track culminating in a debt-for-equity conversion. An industry report on the disclosure statement process described roughly $145 million of debt converting to equity, comprised of about $115 million of senior notes and about $29.7 million of subordinated secured debt, and described a capitalization outcome allocating 99% of reorganized equity to DIP lenders and 1% to senior noteholders (Chapter11Cases.com). Local and regional reporting similarly described senior lender claims around $145 million and confirmed that general unsecured creditors received no recovery, a typical result when secured debt consumes enterprise value and the estate is focused on keeping the plant operating (Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review).

In technical restructuring terms, this is a pragmatic solution in a single-asset case when there is a plausible operating future but no sale proceeds to pay off the lien stack. The senior lenders agree to take ownership risk (equity) instead of fixed debt claims. That can reduce cash interest burden, align incentives to keep the plant running, and create room to address taxes, vendor relationships, and the PPA dispute without an immediate liquidity cliff. The tradeoff is that value for non-consenting junior creditors is typically limited or nonexistent, and the case outcome is driven by secured creditors’ willingness to own and operate (directly or through a manager).

Stakeholder class (high-level; reported)	Reported treatment / outcome	Typical rationale
DIP lender group	Receives controlling ownership stake	DIP provided case liquidity and often gains priming priority and negotiating leverage
Senior secured / senior notes	Receives minority equity stake	Converts funded debt into equity to right-size leverage to revised cash flows
Subordinated secured debt	Described as part of converting stack	Often out-of-the-money or bundled into conversion to simplify structure
General unsecured creditors	0% recovery	Out of the money when secured debt exceeds enterprise value
Existing equity	Canceled	Equity is out of the money in an insolvent capital structure

Governance and operations: lender ownership paired with an operating manager. A recurring challenge in infrastructure reorganizations is that lenders are not long-term plant operators. Reporting described a post-confirmation transition to Olympus Power, a firm based in Morristown, New Jersey, which replaced CS Operations as manager, with a new general manager identified as Mike O’Leary and staff retention in the mid-20s (Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review). The operational takeaway is that the plan outcome was not “plant shuts down”; it was “balance sheet resets, then operations continue,” which is consistent with a recapitalization designed to preserve a functioning asset in a thin-margin sector.

This kind of manager transition also clarifies why the case ran as a longer arc (reported as roughly 16 months). If a sale is not available and creditors want to preserve going-concern operations, the case must resolve governance, management, and operating budgets in a way that is credible to stakeholders and compliant with regulatory obligations. That can be slower than a pure 363 disposition, but it can preserve more long-term value when the asset is viable under a revised capital structure.

Municipal taxes: when the community tax base becomes a bankruptcy issue. Business NH Magazine reported that the plant fought the City of Berlin’s request for tax payments during the bankruptcy, reflecting municipal pressure when a major facility is a meaningful part of a small city’s tax base (Business NH Magazine). Later coverage described negotiated tax payment arrangements, but the reported figures and time periods vary across sources—an important drafting nuance for accuracy. One report described a $1.3 million amount spanning April 2024 to April 2025, while another described a $2.4 million total spanning April 2024 to April 2026 (Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review). The durable point is that municipal tax obligations were negotiated as part of the path to keep the asset operating, which is consistent with how single-asset reorganizations often work: the plant cannot function without stable local relationships, and the city cannot wait indefinitely for payments when its budget relies on the facility.

Reported tax arrangement	Source	What to take from it (without over-precision)
$1.3M for April 2024–April 2025	Conway Daily Sun	Reporting supports that the plan path included a defined tax-payment framework
$2.4M total for April 2024–April 2026	NH Business Review	Confirms the same concept but suggests different sizing and/or duration

How the story fits the biomass sector: contract pricing and policy risk as restructuring drivers. Beyond the immediate PPA dispute, Burgess sits inside a broader policy and pricing debate about biomass economics. NHPR described accumulated “over-market” costs and a political fight over whether ratepayers should bear those costs or whether the contract should be restructured, including the vetoed forgiveness bill (NHPR). For practitioners, this matters because power assets with policy-linked economics can become restructuring candidates even when they are operationally sound. When revenues depend on above-market tariffs or renewable credits and political support shifts, debt capacity can become mismatched to revised cash flows. That mismatch can produce either a “sale to a strategic with a different cost of capital” outcome (if buyers exist) or a “lenders take equity and reset leverage” outcome (if buyers do not).

Key takeaways for restructuring professionals. Burgess combines several practical patterns that show up repeatedly in energy and infrastructure restructurings:

1) In single-asset cases, offtake disputes are liquidity events. The plant’s day-to-day operations can look stable, but if the payment gatekeeper disputes amounts or applies recoupment, the debtor can lose access to operating cash quickly. Chapter 11 becomes a tool to stabilize and impose a timetable for resolution.

2) A roll-up DIP often determines the endgame. A lender-provided DIP that includes roll-up features can compress the case’s bargaining space. It can keep the asset operating, but it also pushes the case toward a path that protects the DIP lender group—often a sale under lender control or a conversion plan that hands ownership to the lender constituency.

3) A failed sale process is still a valuable market test. “No qualifying bids” does not mean the asset is worthless; it often means that, on the schedule and with the contract uncertainty at the time, bids did not clear the lien stack. That market test can support a pivot to a recapitalization plan.

4) Community stakeholders show up as real constraints. When a plant is a major employer, fuel buyer, or tax base, municipal and supply chain pressures can become part of the restructuring package, even though they are not always the largest-dollar creditors.

Case timeline (reported and described in filings). The timeline below consolidates the major milestones described in reporting and the repo’s existing docket extraction (note that post-confirmation “effective date” and similar details should be verified from later docket entries if needed for further updates).

Date	Milestone	What changed
Feb. 9, 2024	Chapter 11 petitions filed in Delaware	Bankruptcy process begins; dispute-driven liquidity crisis becomes centralized
Feb. 2024	Reporting describes DIP support from senior lenders	Case liquidity stabilized to keep the plant operating
March 2024	Final DIP authority reported in filings (repo extraction)	Total authorized DIP described as $54M (new money + roll-up features)
May 6, 2024	Bid deadline in court-supervised sale process	Market check for a going-concern sale
Late May 2024	No qualifying bids reported	Case shifts weight toward a standalone recapitalization plan
March 19, 2025	Plan and disclosure statement process reported	Debt-for-equity plan proposed to convert ~$145M of secured debt
June 2025	Court approval of plan reported	Lender-led ownership and management transition to Olympus Power described

FAQs

When did Burgess BioPower file for bankruptcy, and where was the case filed? Burgess BioPower, LLC and Berlin Station, LLC filed chapter 11 petitions on February 9, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (NHPR; NH Business Review).

What is the “Berlin Station” asset in this case? It is a 75-megawatt biomass-fueled power plant in Berlin, New Hampshire, commonly described as a major renewable generation facility in the state (NH Business Review; Global Energy Monitor).

Why did the company file chapter 11? Reporting tied the filing to a dispute under the plant’s power purchase agreement with Eversource, including payment reductions or withholdings linked to “over-market” cost recovery mechanics and a related political fight over whether large accumulated charges would be forgiven (NHPR; WMUR).

What did “over-market” costs mean in this dispute? Reporting described the plant’s contract as selling power above market rates for years and accumulating large “over-market” charges subject to contractual limits, with Eversource pursuing recoupment and the debtors disputing the resulting payment impacts (NHPR).

How much DIP financing was involved? Reporting described an $18 million DIP component from senior secured lenders, while bankruptcy filings summarized in this repo described a larger total authorized DIP (final basis) of $54 million because the facility included roll-up/refinancing elements in addition to new money (NH Business Review).

Did the debtors try to sell the plant during bankruptcy? Yes. NHPR reported a court-supervised sale process with a May 6, 2024 bid deadline, and reported that no qualifying bids were received by that deadline (NHPR).

What did the plan do for lenders and other creditors? Coverage of the plan process described a debt-for-equity conversion of roughly $145 million of secured debt, with the DIP lender group taking the controlling equity stake, senior noteholders receiving a smaller equity interest, and general unsecured creditors receiving no recovery (Chapter11Cases.com; Conway Daily Sun).

Who runs the plant after confirmation? Local and regional reporting described a transition to Olympus Power as manager (replacing CS Operations) and identified a new general manager, with staff retained in the mid-20s (Conway Daily Sun; NH Business Review).

How did local taxes factor into the restructuring? Business NH Magazine reported a dispute over tax payments during the bankruptcy, and later reporting described negotiated tax payment arrangements tied to keeping the plant operating, although the specific amounts and periods vary by source (Business NH Magazine; NH Business Review).

Read more chapter 11 case research and restructuring analysis on the ElevenFlo blog.