CalAmp: Prepack Chapter 11 Restructures $275M Debt Stack
CalAmp filed a June 2024 prepackaged chapter 11 in Delaware after restructuring negotiations under an RSA, confirming the plan in July 2024 and reaching an effective date later that month to reset funded debt and ownership.
CalAmp Corp. filed chapter 11 petitions in Delaware on June 3, 2024 to implement a prepackaged restructuring that converted its secured noteholder group into the equity owner of a newly private company. The case was marketed as a fast, sponsor-creditor-backed recapitalization rather than a prolonged operational turnaround, with the company emphasizing continued operations and a balance-sheet fix that reduced debt and public-company overhead. CalAmp’s filing and restructuring announcement GlobeNewswire’s version of the announcement
The restructuring thesis, as reflected in the court filings, was that CalAmp’s post-2016 SaaS pivot, customer payment-term programs, and revenue decline created a liquidity and covenant problem that could not be solved through a conventional strategic-alternatives process. The company’s first-day declaration described a multi-year marketing process that produced no actionable offers and a tightening liquidity runway as cash balances fell and credit availability became constrained by minimum-cash requirements. doc:1636468
Case Snapshot
| Debtor | CalAmp Corp. doc:1633273 |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. GlobeNewswire |
| Lead case number | 24-11136. doc:1633273 |
| Petition date | June 3, 2024. doc:1633273 |
| Case posture | Prepackaged chapter 11 plan (votes solicited prepetition; combined disclosure/confirmation hearing). doc:1633395 |
| Restructuring support | RSA executed May 31, 2024 with the consenting creditor group described in filings. doc:1636468 |
| Funded debt (as described in filings) | ~$275 million total: $45 million term loan + $230 million secured notes. doc:1636468 |
| Key creditor concentration | Lynrock Lake Master Fund LP described as term-loan lender and holder of ~99.63% of the secured notes. doc:1636468 |
| Plan economics (high level) | Consenting secured noteholders receive 100% of new equity; term loan amended/restated; general unsecured paid in full; existing equity cancelled. doc:1636467 |
| Confirmation | Plan confirmed July 11, 2024. doc:1662495 |
| Effective date | July 31, 2024 (notice filed Aug. 1, 2024). doc:1675445 |
| Go-private outcome | Lynrock became the owner of the private company post-effective date. CalAmp completion release |
| Claims/noticing agent | Stretto appointed as claims and noticing agent effective as of the petition date (do not rely on a claims portal URL). doc:1636474 |
| Case closing | chapter 11 cases closed by final decree on Sept. 23, 2024; claims/noticing services terminated subject to post-closing deliverables. doc:1703673 |
Prepackaged Go-Private Restructuring
What CalAmp sold (in the product sense), and why it mattered for restructuring strategy. CalAmp described itself in first-day filings as a “connected intelligence” company using a cloud platform (CalAmp Telematics Cloud) to ingest device data and produce targeted operational insights. doc:1636468 In filings, CalAmp grouped its domestic business into four segments: Industrial (hardware/services for large OEM customers), Telematics Solutions Providers (hardware sold to TSPs for resale), Fleet (hardware plus services for transportation/logistics/municipal/commercial customers), and K-12 (hardware/services for school districts and government entities, including through Synovia). doc:1636468 Trade coverage similarly framed CalAmp as a fleet/telematics and connected-vehicle technology provider, with product positioning tied to vehicle tracking, data intelligence, and fleet management. Automotive Fleet
The segment mix matters because it shapes what “restructuring” means in practice. CalAmp’s product is not a single contract or hardware line that can be “sold off” to raise liquidity; it is a set of platforms, devices, and customer relationships whose value depends on continued service, software uptime, and an ability to fund product roadmaps. That reality helps explain why CalAmp pursued a prepackaged recapitalization instead of an extended in-court auction process: the fastest way to preserve enterprise value in a subscription and device-services business is often to de-lever and stabilize cash flow quickly rather than run a months-long sale process that can increase churn and disrupt product development.
The K-12 segment is a useful example. Reporting described CalAmp’s K-12 footprint through school-bus tracking and related solutions and noted Synovia’s role in that market. School Transportation News CalAmp’s filings similarly described Synovia as tied to its K-12 offerings. doc:1636468 For a business with government/school customers, service continuity and vendor reliability are part of the product. A short, controlled restructuring can function as a “credit reset” that reduces counterparties’ concern about long-term support.
A restructuring narrative anchored in strategic shifts and acquisitions (LoJack, Synovia, and the SaaS pivot). CalAmp’s filings and external sources describe a multi-year evolution. First, CalAmp shifted business strategy toward software and services starting in 2016, which it described as a pivot toward a SaaS model. doc:1636468 At the same time, CalAmp’s acquisition history brought in assets that were expected to create new growth vectors but also introduced integration and capital-allocation risk. A notable transaction was CalAmp’s 2016 acquisition of LoJack, which was announced as an all-cash deal valued around $134 million. LoJack acquisition announcement Years later, CalAmp sold LoJack’s U.S. stolen vehicle recovery business to Spireon, while retaining certain international LoJack operations and intellectual property as described in press reporting and transaction announcements. PRNewswire transaction announcement doc:1636468
CalAmp also acquired Synovia in 2019, a transaction widely covered in fleet-technology trade press as a K-12 and school-bus tracking adjacency. Automotive Fleet on Synovia acquisition In the bankruptcy posture, this acquisition history matters less as a narrative flourish and more as a lens into the company’s product-market strategy: CalAmp was building an ecosystem of connected-vehicle applications across different end markets, and that “platform” strategy tends to be capital intensive and sensitive to customer adoption rates.
Documented drivers of distress: revenue, working capital, and liquidity constraints. CalAmp’s first-day declaration described a set of operational and financial drivers that combined into a restructuring trigger.
- Customer adoption and the SaaS transition. Filings described an effort to transition customers to a SaaS model, with the company later describing that customers resisted the transition and revenue continued to decline.
doc:1636468 - Revenue decline and market/operational explanations. The declaration described a sharp revenue drop: fourth-quarter revenue declined from $78.5 million at the end of February 2023 to $43.8 million in February 2024, described as a 44% year-over-year decline.
doc:1636468The declaration attributed the decline to factors including excess inventory at customers and post-COVID market conditions.doc:1636468Trade reporting similarly framed the filing as the culmination of a multi-year transition and “lackluster performance” period. Transport Topics - Working capital strain from extended payment terms. The declaration stated that CalAmp offered three-year payment terms to customers that generated revenue but increased working-capital stress due to delayed billing.
doc:1636468For a hardware-plus-services model, long payment terms can behave like an informal financing product: cash outflows for manufacturing and service support arrive before inflows, making inventory and receivables management a liquidity-critical function. - Cash balance erosion and constraints on borrowing availability. CalAmp’s filings described cash balances falling from approximately $80 million (FY 2022) to about $40 million (FY 2023), and described that the lower cash level prevented access to an asset-backed credit line due to minimum cash balance requirements.
doc:1636468Even without detailing every covenant, the point is operational: when liquidity is constrained, it becomes harder to invest in product development, sustain service levels, and manage supply-chain dynamics, which can feed back into customer churn and revenue volatility. - Imminent covenant/default pressure tied to audited financial statements. The declaration described a near-term default trigger connected to audited financial statements and the risk of a “going concern” qualification, with cross-default implications under the debt stack.
doc:1636468This type of trigger often compresses the timeline for consensual solutions: if a technical default is imminent and could accelerate enforcement rights, a prepack can be the fastest way to preserve value through a controlled process.
Strategic alternatives and the “why not sell the company?” question. The filings described two parallel but related prepetition efforts: a marketing process and a financing process.
On marketing, CalAmp’s declaration stated it engaged Guggenheim Securities in June 2022 to evaluate strategic alternatives, including a sale, and that Guggenheim ran a sales process in summer 2023 but CalAmp received no offers; the company later terminated Guggenheim’s engagement in February 2024. doc:1636468 On financing, the filings described the company engaging Stifel in July 2023 to pursue debt financing concurrently with the sale process, narrowing to two sources as performance deteriorated, and then losing one lender’s interest—leaving Lynrock as the viable liquidity counterparty. doc:1636468
This record is important for restructuring analysis because it anchors the plan’s chosen path: if the company explored a sale process with an investment bank and received no actionable offers, then a debt-to-equity recapitalization supported by the controlling creditor group can be economically rational even if it implies full equity cancellation. The alternative—attempting to sell during liquidity stress—can be value destructive if customers and channel partners perceive instability.
Prepetition capital structure: why creditor concentration can enable a fast prepack. CalAmp’s filings described approximately $275 million of funded debt: a $45 million secured term loan and $230 million secured notes (originally issued in 2018), with Lynrock described as the sole term-loan lender and holder of 99.63% of the secured notes. doc:1636468 The following table summarizes the debt stack as described in the first-day declaration.
| Instrument (as described in filings) | Principal (approx.) | Creditor position highlights |
|---|---|---|
| Secured term loan | $45.0 million | Lynrock described as sole lender; facility documented in 2023 term-loan documents. doc:1636468 |
| Secured notes | $230.0 million | Lynrock described as holding ~99.63% of the notes. doc:1636468 |
| Total funded debt | $275.0 million | Petition-date description in first-day declaration. doc:1636468 |
For practitioners, this concentration is a major driver of case speed. In a diffuse creditor group, a prepack can stall because solicitation and negotiation require broad-based consent. In a concentrated stack, the controlling lender/noteholder can negotiate the plan economics, backstop the go-forward governance, and allow the debtor to run a combined disclosure/confirmation hearing on a compressed schedule.
RSA mechanics and the procedural architecture of a prepack. Filings described an RSA executed on May 31, 2024 with the consenting creditor group. doc:1636468 In a prepackaged case, the plan is typically filed with a disclosure statement and a record of solicitation and voting before the petition date, allowing the court to schedule a combined hearing to address disclosure adequacy and confirmation in one proceeding.
In CalAmp’s case, the court entered an order setting the combined hearing for July 11, 2024, with an objection deadline of July 5, 2024 and a release opt-out deadline at the same time. doc:1633395 This schedule is consistent with a prepack’s design objective: reduce time in bankruptcy, reduce administrative expense burn, and provide counterparties with certainty about when the restructured entity will emerge.
Cash collateral in a prepack: why “fast” does not mean “hands off.” CalAmp’s case included cash collateral controls that functioned as lender governance during the restructuring window. The final cash collateral order, as summarized in docket research, described budget gating, periodic budget updates that required consenting-lender acceptance, and detailed reporting and variance testing. doc:1652469 A practitioner-focused way to view these mechanics is that they substitute for a longer operational turnaround plan: the secured creditor group allows operations to continue, but only within a tightly monitored liquidity envelope.
The table below summarizes selected cash-collateral controls described in the final cash collateral order.
| Control | What it did (high level) | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|
| Budget authority | Authorized limited cash collateral use subject to a court-approved budget and permitted variances. doc:1652469 | Preserved operations while limiting uncontrolled cash burn in the restructuring window. |
| Budget update cadence | Required delivery of updated budgets on a recurring cadence, with effectiveness tied to required consenting-lender acceptance. doc:1652469 | Made the plan timeline and liquidity runway auditable and enforceable. |
| Reporting package | Weekly and monthly variance reporting, A/P reports, and rolling variance testing (as described). doc:1652469 | Converted operational performance into creditor-facing metrics. |
| Rolling variance thresholds | Receipts not less than 75% of budgeted receipts; disbursements not more than 120% of budgeted disbursements (subject to described exclusions). doc:1652469 | Set objective triggers for intervention if the business underperformed the plan’s cash assumptions. |
Carve-out economics: what the cash collateral order implicitly priced. Even in a fast prepack, professionals need to be paid and oversight needs funding. The final cash collateral order included a carve-out structure that, in the docket summary, included statutory fees, a chapter 7 trustee amount (if applicable), and professional fee caps that would apply after a triggering event. doc:1652469 The carve-out is often a negotiated “floor” for estate administration and professional oversight, protecting the process from collapsing into an unworkable state if liquidity tightens.
| Carve-out component (as summarized) | Amount/feature |
|---|---|
| Debtor professionals post-trigger cap | $500,000 doc:1652469 |
| Committee professionals post-trigger cap | $100,000 doc:1652469 |
| Trustee amount (if applicable) | $25,000 doc:1652469 |
Plan economics: the debt-for-equity engine and “unimpaired” creditor management. CalAmp’s plan design is a classic prepack structure: concentrate impairment in a single consenting class (or minimal classes), treat other creditors as unimpaired (paid in full or reinstated), and use the controlling secured creditor to take ownership of the reorganized enterprise.
The plan’s treatment provisions reflect that structure:
- The secured term loan claims (Class 3) were impaired and were amended and restated to reduce the applicable margin from 6.75% to 5.00% and to extend maturity from four years after the term-loan closing date to seven years after that closing date; Class 3 voted on the plan.
doc:1636467 - The secured notes claims (Class 4) were described as paid in full in cash, but consenting noteholders agreed to accept lesser treatment and receive 100% of the new equity interests; Class 4 was unimpaired and deemed to accept.
doc:1636467 - General unsecured claims (Class 5) were unimpaired and generally treated as paid in full in cash if due at/before the effective date, or paid in the ordinary course if not yet due, or otherwise rendered unimpaired by agreement.
doc:1636467 - Equity interests and section 510(b) claims (Class 8) were impaired and cancelled on the effective date with no distribution.
doc:1636467
The table below summarizes the class-level outcome for a restructuring-professional audience.
| Class | Stakeholder group | Impairment/vote | Treatment (high level) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class 3 | Secured term loan claims | Impaired; voting class doc:1636467 | Amended/restated term loan: margin reduction and maturity extension. doc:1636467 |
| Class 4 | Secured notes claims | Unimpaired; deemed to accept doc:1636467 | Consenting noteholders receive 100% of new equity interests. doc:1636467 |
| Class 5 | General unsecured claims | Unimpaired; deemed to accept doc:1636467 | Paid in full in cash if due; otherwise paid in ordinary course or other unimpaired treatment. doc:1636467 |
| Class 8 | Equity + section 510(b) | Impaired; deemed to reject doc:1636467 | Cancelled with no distribution. doc:1636467 |
This structure also explains why the case could move quickly even with cash collateral controls. When most creditor classes are unimpaired, disputes often narrow to (i) the legitimacy of releases, (ii) adequacy of disclosure and solicitation, (iii) equity cancellation and valuation, and (iv) any governance and implementation terms embedded in the plan supplement and financing documents.
Releases, exculpation, and opt-out mechanics: what the confirmation order tells you about negotiation friction. The confirmation order approved release, exculpation, and injunction provisions as part of the plan package and treated plan modifications as not materially adverse, so no re-solicitation was required. doc:1662495 That said, the procedural record indicates that release mechanics were treated with care: the combined hearing order tied the release opt-out deadline to the objection deadline and highlighted that parties who did not object could be deemed to have provided releases under the plan framework. doc:1633395
For practitioners, two confirmation-order details are particularly notable:
- Regulatory carve-out language. The confirmation order stated that nothing precluded the SEC from enforcing its police or regulatory powers (and preserved governmental rights as described).
doc:1662495This is a common feature in confirmation orders where debtors want broad releases but must preserve the government’s enforcement authority and avoid language that could be read as impairing regulatory action. - Equity cancellation mechanics. The confirmation order included explicit cancellation language for prepetition equity and other instruments on the effective date (with exceptions for reinstated instruments and the amended term-loan documents).
doc:1662495In a go-private prepack, the cancellation mechanics are not a detail—they are the restructuring.
External reporting also described that confirmation required plan changes requested by the U.S. Trustee’s office and the SEC, underscoring that even a creditor-consensual prepack can face scrutiny on governance and disclosure issues. Law360
Confirmation and effective date: what happened, when, and what changed. The court confirmed the plan on July 11, 2024. doc:1662495 The plan became effective on July 31, 2024, and the effective date notice stated that discharge, release, injunction, and exculpation provisions were in effect and that executory contracts and unexpired leases not scheduled for rejection were deemed assumed. doc:1675445
From a corporate-outcome standpoint, CalAmp and Lynrock framed the effective date as the completion of a rapid go-private recapitalization. CalAmp’s August 1, 2024 release announced that CalAmp was now privately owned by Lynrock and emphasized speed (“less than 60 days”) and the elimination of $230 million of debt. CalAmp completion release A GlobeNewswire release similarly emphasized governance changes and the economic rationale (reducing interest and public company overhead). GlobeNewswire
For a practitioner audience, the key is to parse “debt eliminated” carefully. The plan structure, as described in filings, converted the secured notes into equity ownership, while the secured term loan remained in place but on amended pricing and maturity terms. doc:1636467 In other words, the post-emergence company exchanged a large fixed claim (secured notes) for ownership, but retained a term loan with modified economics—consistent with a recapitalization rather than a full deleveraging to zero debt.
Asset and liability estimates in media coverage (and what they imply about valuation dynamics). Coverage at filing described CalAmp estimating assets around $281.2 million and liabilities around $355.4 million, and described the restructuring as paying other creditors in cash while secured noteholders took equity. Bloomberg Law Those figures are directionally consistent with a restructuring where equity is out of the money (and therefore cancelled) but where the company can still deliver unimpaired treatment to general unsecured creditors because the controlling secured creditor group is willing to fund the process and accept equity in lieu of cash repayment.
Key professionals and what the docket says they were paid. CalAmp’s docket reflects a targeted professional stack consistent with a short, transaction-focused prepack:
- Claims and noticing agent and administrative advisor. Stretto was appointed as claims and noticing agent effective as of the petition date to handle notice, claim intake, claims registers, and related tasks under clerk-delegated authority.
doc:1636474The debtors also sought to retain Stretto as an administrative advisor for services outside the claims/noticing scope, including solicitation and plan-administration support.doc:1641955 - Investment banker/financial advisor. The debtors sought to retain Oppenheimer as investment banker/financial advisor, with a $75,000 monthly advisory fee and a success-fee structure tied to restructuring or financing transactions, subject to an aggregate fee cap described in the retention application.
doc:1642211 - Counsel. The docket includes retention of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP as counsel to the debtors and debtors in possession.
doc:1641994
Later in the case lifecycle, the court entered an omnibus order awarding final fee applications for certain retained professionals. doc:1703674 The order’s exhibit reflects final allowed amounts that are unusually legible for a short prepack: a large investment banker fee relative to the case duration, and relatively modest administrative advisor fees in the order referenced.
| Professional | Role | Final fees/expenses allowed (as reflected in fee order exhibit) |
|---|---|---|
| Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP | Debtors’ counsel (as retained) | $923,235.50 fees + $10,351.71 expenses. doc:1703674 |
| Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. | Investment banker/financial advisor | $2,812,500.00 fees (no expenses reflected in exhibit). doc:1703674 |
| Stretto, Inc. | Administrative advisor | $4,782.95 fees (no expenses reflected in exhibit). doc:1703674 |
These numbers should be interpreted in context. In a prepack, a substantial amount of transactional work can occur prepetition: negotiating the RSA, crafting plan mechanics, preparing disclosure and solicitation materials, and coordinating governance and financing documentation. A fee order reflects the pricing of that transaction program, not just the time spent between petition date and effective date.
Case closing: how quickly the bankruptcy court chapter ended. Post-effective, the docket reflects a fast path to closure. The reorganized debtors filed a final report stating that the plan had been substantially consummated, all plan distributions had been made or would be made in accordance with the plan, and there were no pending adversary proceedings or contested matters affecting substantial consummation. doc:1696165 The court entered an order and final decree on September 23, 2024 closing the four chapter 11 cases and terminating Stretto’s claims and noticing services (subject to post-closing deliverables like uploading mailing lists and filing a final claims register). doc:1703673
For restructuring professionals, the closing order is operationally meaningful: it signals that the reorganized business moved from “bankruptcy court supervision” into ordinary corporate life quickly, but it also preserved the ability to reopen cases for cause and preserved governmental rights relating to fees and reporting. doc:1703673 That is consistent with how sophisticated prepacks are designed to function: use the court to implement a capital-structure reset, then exit the court’s day-to-day oversight rapidly once the plan is effective and the distribution mechanics are stable.
A condensed timeline of the case. The table below consolidates docket dates and public announcement dates into a single chronology.
| Date | Milestone | Source |
|---|---|---|
| May 31, 2024 | RSA executed (as described in filings). doc:1636468 | doc:1636468 |
| June 3, 2024 | chapter 11 petitions filed; go-private prepack announced. | doc:1633273 and CalAmp announcement |
| June 4, 2024 | Court entered combined hearing/solicitation procedures order. | doc:1633395 |
| June 27, 2024 | Final cash collateral order entered (as summarized). | doc:1652469 |
| July 5, 2024 | Objection deadline and release opt-out deadline. | doc:1633395 |
| July 11, 2024 | Plan confirmed. | doc:1662495 |
| July 31, 2024 | Plan effective date. | doc:1675445 |
| Aug. 1, 2024 | Go-private completion announced publicly. | CalAmp completion release |
| Sept. 23, 2024 | Final decree entered; cases closed; claims/noticing services terminated (subject to deliverables). | doc:1703673 |
Frequently Asked Questions
When did CalAmp file for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and in what court? CalAmp filed chapter 11 petitions on June 3, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. doc:1633273 The company also described the case publicly as a prepackaged chapter 11 designed to implement a go-private restructuring. GlobeNewswire
What does CalAmp do, and what markets did it emphasize in filings? In first-day filings, CalAmp described itself as a connected intelligence company using a cloud telematics platform and grouped its domestic business into Industrial, Telematics Solutions Providers, Fleet, and K-12 segments (including through Synovia). doc:1636468 Industry coverage similarly framed the company in fleet/telematics and connected-vehicle markets. Automotive Fleet
What is a prepackaged chapter 11, and why do companies use it? A prepackaged chapter 11 is typically designed to solicit creditor support before filing so the court can hold a combined disclosure/confirmation hearing on a compressed schedule. In CalAmp’s case, the court scheduled a combined hearing and set objection and release opt-out deadlines early in the case timeline. doc:1633395 The primary value proposition is speed and reduced administrative cost when the controlling creditor group supports the restructuring.
What problems did CalAmp cite as the drivers of the filing? Filings described a multi-year SaaS pivot and customer adoption challenges, working-capital strain from extended payment terms, a sharp revenue decline, shrinking cash balances, and default pressure connected to financial reporting/covenant issues. doc:1636468 Trade reporting similarly described the filing as the culmination of a longer transition and a failed strategic alternatives effort. Transport Topics
How much debt did CalAmp report at filing, and who held most of it? CalAmp’s first-day declaration described approximately $275 million of funded debt (a $45 million secured term loan and $230 million secured notes) and described Lynrock as both the term-loan lender and holder of 99.63% of the secured notes. doc:1636468
What happened to the $230 million secured notes under the plan? The plan treatment provisions stated that consenting noteholders agreed to accept equity and would receive 100% of the new equity interests on account of their secured notes claims. doc:1636467 External reporting also described the restructuring as a debt-for-equity conversion in which secured noteholders became the equity owners of the reorganized business. Bloomberg Law
What changed for the $45 million secured term loan under the plan? The plan stated that the secured term loan would be amended and restated to reduce the applicable margin from 6.75% to 5.00% and to extend maturity from four years after the term-loan closing date to seven years after that closing date. doc:1636467
What happened to general unsecured creditors and other non-voting creditor classes? The plan treatment provisions described general unsecured claims as unimpaired and generally to be paid in full in cash if due on or before the effective date, or paid in the ordinary course if not yet due, or otherwise treated to render the claim unimpaired. doc:1636467 Media coverage at filing similarly described that other creditors would be paid in cash. Bloomberg Law
What happened to existing equity holders? The plan provided that equity interests and section 510(b) claims would be cancelled on the effective date with no distribution. doc:1636467 Confirmation coverage also described that equity was cancelled as part of the restructuring. Law360
Who was the claims and noticing agent, and how should creditors handle claims administration without relying on a claims portal link? Court filings reflect that Stretto was appointed as claims and noticing agent effective as of the petition date and was responsible for notice and claims-processing functions described in the appointment application. doc:1636474 Creditors should rely on official notices and deadlines served in the case, coordinate with counsel on proof-of-claim strategy where needed, and preserve documentation supporting any asserted claim amounts and priority.
For more chapter 11 case research and restructuring analysis, visit https://elevenflo.com/blog/.
