Casa Systems: Telecom Vendor Sells Assets and Confirms Liquidation Plan

Casa Systems’ 2024 chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware are a clean example of a lender-supported, accelerated “sell the business lines, then liquidate the remainder” restructuring for a communications infrastructure vendor. On April 3, 2024, the company entered chapter 11 and framed the filing as a court-supervised sale process supported by senior secured lenders holding a supermajority of its funded debt in its sale process announcement and a case note. Public materials described discrete buyer paths for different parts of the platform: a carve-out acquisition of the Axyom cloud-native 5G core and RAN asset package announced by Lumine Group and a cable business sale process launched with a stalking-horse structure that Vecima described in its stalking-horse announcement.

Casa’s cases executed a multi-asset carve-out sale in a stressed telecom capex environment on an unusually compressed timeline. Public sources tied the filing to an industry-wide pullback in cable and telco capital spending and procurement and to Casa’s continued investment in 5G product development, as described in the company’s chapter 11 announcement and in private 5G reporting. Bankruptcy filings also described strict cash collateral controls with a budget and variance-reporting regime, a defined professional fee carve-out, and a post-confirmation administration framework built around a plan administrator and a preserved-actions administrator.

Chapter 11 Sale Process and Asset Dispositions

Business overview: cable access hardware and software plus a separable 5G core/RAN platform. Casa’s pre-filing identity matters because it explains both the sales perimeter and the distress pattern. Public descriptions framed Casa as a communications infrastructure vendor selling cable access equipment and software as well as cloud-native 5G products, with a customer base of more than 475 Tier 1 and regional service providers across 70+ countries, as described in the company’s chapter 11 announcement. In the cable domain, Casa operated in a part of the stack that is capex sensitive: when cable operators delay network upgrades, vendors feel the impact quickly. In the 5G domain, Lumine’s buyer-side description of the Axyom portfolio emphasized cloud-native core network functions and RAN-related assets, including access and mobility management, session management, user plane, network repository and slicing functions, and security gateway technology in its agreement announcement. That separability is central to the case: rather than trying to sell an integrated “one platform” company, the restructuring path was to carve and sell product families that could stand alone with their own customers and development roadmaps.

Distress drivers: capex and procurement pullbacks plus leverage and R&D spend. The public filing narrative is consistent across sources and is typical for telecom equipment vendors during a downcycle. Casa’s CEO described declining revenue and profits driven “in large part” by industry-wide downward capital investment and procurement trends in the cable and telco markets, and the company described having made significant investments to bring its 5G mobile core and RAN products to market in its sale process announcement. Industry coverage similarly framed the filing against a broader pullback in private 5G and telecom spending in private 5G reporting. In practical restructuring terms, that combination creates a “cash burn plus maturity wall” profile: operators defer orders while fixed costs remain, and the debt stack that financed growth becomes a constraint once revenue normalizes.

Public-market pressure: Nasdaq suspension and delisting sequence. The case also unfolded against a public-market signal that can compress decision-making timelines. Casa’s securities were suspended from trading on Nasdaq as of April 5, 2024 and were later referenced as delisted in a trading suspension notice that noted the securities had not traded since the suspension date. While delisting itself does not determine restructuring outcomes, it can tighten stakeholder deadlines by complicating equity capital raising and by accelerating customer and vendor concerns about continuity.

NetComm (Australia) as a perimeter issue: not every subsidiary was in the U.S. case. Cross-border structure matters in telecom vendor reorganizations because product lines, IP, and customer contracts can sit in different legal entities. Casa disclosed that its NetComm subsidiary entered a separate Australian voluntary administration starting March 11, 2024 and was not included in the U.S. chapter 11 cases in the company’s chapter 11 announcement, a point also highlighted in private 5G reporting. Later, DZS described agreeing to acquire NetComm for $7 million at closing plus up to $3 million earnout in its NetComm acquisition press release. The disclosures indicate the U.S. 363 process covered only part of the enterprise perimeter, with NetComm addressed separately outside the Delaware cases.

Sale process mechanics: a fast calendar with distinct asset packages. Casa’s chapter 11 strategy was to run the case on a clock, using pre-negotiated or quickly executable buyer paths. Bankruptcy filings described a bid deadline of May 24, 2024, an auction on May 29 if needed, and a sale hearing scheduled for June 4, 2024. That schedule aligns with the “fast 363” playbook: deadlines are set early to minimize the period in which customers and counterparties operate under uncertainty, and a near-term sale hearing reduces the risk that the estate’s liquidity runway becomes the binding constraint.

The cable asset package provides a useful public view of that process even without linking to docket materials. Vecima publicly framed its role as setting an initial floor with a $20 million stalking horse bid in its $20 million stalking-horse bid. Following the auction, Vecima reported that its final bid reached $44.95 million and that it was named the backup bidder after a day-long auction process in a Vecima release. CommScope then stated it was selected as the highest and best bid with a $45.1 million winning bid and a May 29 agreement date in its CommScope announcement. The sequence from a $20 million stalking horse bid to a $45.1 million winning bid was reflected in these public announcements.

The Axyom 5G core and RAN assets followed the “carve-out buyer” pattern. Lumine announced an agreement dated April 3, 2024 to acquire the Axyom portfolio and described it as its 14th corporate carve-out in the communications and media sector in a Lumine press release. Lumine later announced closing of that purchase on April 30, 2024 and described the acquired unit as operating under the new brand Axyom.Core in a GlobeNewswire release. That closing release did not disclose the purchase price, while bankruptcy filings described consideration in the sale order.

Bid protections and qualified bid mechanics: what the process terms say about auction incentives. Even when the most likely buyer is a strategic incumbent, the auction framework still needs to create incentives for third parties to diligence and bid. Bankruptcy filings described bid protections in Casa’s cable process including a $600,000 break-up fee and an expense reimbursement structure with a described $375,000 payment component under certain termination scenarios. Those bid protections matter because they compensate the stalking horse for diligence costs and the risk of being “shopped,” while still leaving meaningful room for competitive bidders to win, as the $45.1 million winning bid ultimately demonstrated in the CommScope announcement and in the deal note.

Contract assignment and “free and clear” relief: turning relationships into transferrable value. In telecom vendor carve-outs, the “asset” being sold is often a bundle of contracts and customer relationships as much as it is software or hardware inventory. That is why 363 sale orders typically combine sale “free and clear” of liens and claims, with liens attaching to proceeds, and section 365 assumption-and-assignment mechanics for executory contracts and leases, as described in bankruptcy filings. These provisions are a practical risk allocation tool: counterparties get cure rights and a defined objection process, while buyers get a court-backed pathway to continuity of service obligations and customer contracts. The “good faith purchaser” finding, which is standard in these orders, is also economically meaningful because it limits post-closing unwind risk and can reduce financing friction for the buyer, as described in bankruptcy filings.

Cash Collateral and Liquidity Controls

Budget controls and variance reporting: the operational core of a fast 363 case. A fast 363 process is often won or lost in the cash collateral order. In Casa’s case, bankruptcy filings described a cash collateral regime built around a 10-week cash flow forecast as the approved budget, with rolling budget updates every four weeks subject to secured party consent. That structure creates predictable checkpoints for the secured lender group: if the process extends, the debtor must justify revised assumptions and maintain lender confidence. Filings also described weekly variance reporting with defined thresholds for receipts, disbursements, and net cash flow.

The same filings described a professional fee carve-out that balances estate administration needs against secured lenders’ collateral protections. The cash collateral order described carve-out components including clerk and U.S. Trustee fees, chapter 7 trustee fees up to $25,000, and professional fees with post-trigger caps of $750,000 for debtor professionals and $250,000 for committee professionals. In a sale-driven case, these carve-out ceilings matter because the work is front-loaded: sale motions, auctions, contract assignments, and plan confirmation happen rapidly, and fee certainty reduces the risk that professional compensation becomes a mid-case dispute.

Why the cash collateral runway matters: aligning liquidity controls with bid deadlines. In 363 cases, the relationship between the cash collateral runway and the sale schedule is often the most important “invisible” constraint. If the debtor’s budget assumes a June closing and the sale schedule slips into July, the debtor can face a liquidity cliff that forces a distressed amendment or a lower sale price. Casa’s case avoided that mismatch by building a schedule that delivered an auction on May 29 and a sale hearing on June 4, allowing the plan to be confirmed on June 5 and go effective on June 7, all as described in bankruptcy filings. From a process-management perspective, this sequencing is efficient: sales are approved before confirmation, plan economics can incorporate sale outcomes, and the estate can move quickly to post-effective claims administration without a long “limbo” period.

Liquidation Plan and Post-Effective Administration

Plan of liquidation: what “term loan recovery” means in this case. The confirmed chapter 11 plan was a liquidation plan, not a reorganization plan, and its treatment structure reflects that. Bankruptcy filings described unimpaired classes for certain secured and priority claims paid in cash or reinstated, while the “Term Loan Facility Claims” class was impaired and entitled to pro rata “Term Loan Recovery” on the effective date. For general unsecured creditors, the plan’s economics are best understood as a pool-and-cap structure: filings described a maximum “GUC recovery pool” amount and a maximum percentage recovery construct. That is a common solution in a lender-driven liquidation plan: it preserves a bounded unsecured recovery feature, often negotiated as part of the plan support agreement, without allowing unsecured recovery to expand in a way that undermines secured lender payoff.

Bankruptcy filings described the Term Loan Recovery construct as including sale proceeds and proceeds from liquidation of remaining “net distributable assets,” plus additional dollars from the unsecured recovery pool above specified caps, and then residual cash after funding a set of defined reserves and capped payments. The plan also described explicit caps and reserves that help practitioners quickly model the “top slice” of proceeds:

Plan administrator model: centralized post-effective control with preserved-actions carve-out. Casa’s plan uses a plan administrator model rather than leaving all post-confirmation tasks with reorganized debtors. Bankruptcy filings described appointing a plan administrator to control and manage post-effective assets and to handle claims objections and distributions, while carving out “preserved actions” for separate handling by a preserved-actions administrator. This division of labor is useful in liquidation plans for technology vendors because the post-sale company may have no operating business: what remains is claims reconciliation, tax compliance, contract tail cleanup, and the pursuit or settlement of litigation assets.

The plan supplement described the plan administrator as Gary Broadbent and described a compensation structure combining an initial fee with a monthly retainer that steps down over time, as described in bankruptcy filings. Filings described $45,000 upon execution and effectiveness, $45,000 per month for the first twelve months commencing in June 2024, and $30,000 per month from June 2025 thereafter until he no longer serves. The same plan materials described a preserved-actions administrator, David Dunn, receiving compensation equal to 2% of gross proceeds of preserved actions.

Claims administration timing: effective date bar dates and the claims objection bar date. The effective date triggers are important in fast liquidation plans because they set the “tail” timeline that creditors must monitor even after headline sales close. Bankruptcy filings described an effective date of June 7, 2024 and described bar dates keyed to that effective date, including administrative claims other than professional fee claims and rejection damages claims due July 8, 2024 and professional fee applications for services through the confirmation date due July 22, 2024. The plan also described a claims objection bar date defined as 180 days after the effective date, subject to court-approved extensions by the plan administrator. That 180-day default is common because it gives the estate time to reconcile claims after sales close and after claims are filed, but it still creates a finite window intended to prevent claims objections from becoming indefinite.

Releases, exculpation, and injunctions: opt-in third-party releases with fiduciary carve-outs. Even in a liquidation plan, releases and exculpation provisions can be central to stakeholder alignment, especially when the case is structured around secured lender support and rapid asset dispositions. Bankruptcy filings described debtor releases and exculpation provisions with a carve-out for fraud, willful misconduct, and gross negligence. Filings also described a third-party release framework that was consensual, with opt-in election mechanics for non-voting classes using a release election form.

Equity and stakeholders: why the public-company history still matters. Casa’s case was a liquidation plan, but its public-company arc still provides context for the capital structure and stakeholder expectations. Casa went public in a downsized 2017 IPO, and reporting described a pre-IPO venture funding and ownership base that included Summit Partners in a TechCrunch article. Coverage also described funded debt versus higher total debt figures in reporting on $316 million total debt. A separate Casa press release described Verizon investing approximately $40 million in Casa common stock for a 9.9% ownership stake alongside a multi-year purchase contract in a GlobeNewswire announcement. While equity holders typically have no recovery in a liquidation plan after secured debt is satisfied, these ownership and capital structure facts can still influence governance dynamics and litigation posture around historical transactions and disclosures.

Key professionals: accelerated processes still require full-stack teams. Casa’s public filing announcement identified Sidley Austin as legal counsel, Ducera Partners as financial advisor, Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor, and Epiq as claims agent in its chapter 11 announcement. Sidley’s case note described multi-practice involvement typical of a sale-driven chapter 11, including finance, M&A, capital markets, labor and employment, technology transactions, tax, and other specialties in the matter description. On the buyer side, Latham & Watkins described advising CommScope on the cable business acquisition in its deal announcement, underscoring the legal lift even in an asset purchase that is “just” a sale: court process management, contract assignment, and tax structuring.

Key Timeline

Case timeline: an unusually compressed sale-and-confirmation path. The table below organizes key milestones and shows why sources described the case as fast: the Axyom sale closed within weeks of filing, the cable auction occurred in late May, and the plan went effective on June 7, 2024 as described in bankruptcy filings and in the confirmation announcement.

Frequently Asked Questions

When did Casa Systems file for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and where was the case filed?

Casa Systems filed chapter 11 petitions on April 3, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, as stated in the company’s chapter 11 sale process announcement.

Why did Casa file for bankruptcy (what reasons were stated publicly)?

Management publicly described a sharp decline in revenue and profits driven largely by a downturn in cable and telecom capital investment and procurement trends, while also describing significant investments to develop 5G products in its chapter 11 announcement. Industry coverage similarly framed the filing against a broader sector pullback in private 5G reporting.

What businesses did Casa sell through the chapter 11 process?

Casa pursued discrete going-concern dispositions for its Axyom cloud-native 5G core and RAN software assets, with Lumine announcing the agreement in its Axyom acquisition announcement, and for its cable business assets, with CommScope describing the winning bid in its CommScope announcement.

Who bought Casa’s Axyom cloud-native 5G core and RAN assets?

Lumine Group announced it agreed to acquire Casa’s Axyom cloud-native 5G core and RAN assets in its agreement announcement and later described completing the purchase and branding the business as Axyom.Core in a GlobeNewswire release.

Who bought Casa’s cable business assets, and what was the purchase price?

CommScope described being selected as the highest and best bid in the cable business auction with a $45.1 million winning bid in its press release. Latham & Watkins also described the purchase price as $45.1 million and the closing date as June 7, 2024 in its deal note.

What was Vecima’s role in the cable sale process?

Vecima publicly described itself as the stalking horse bidder at $20 million in its $20 million stalking-horse bid and later described being named the backup bidder after a $44.95 million final bid in its auction update.

When was Casa’s plan confirmed and when did it go effective?

Bankruptcy filings described a confirmation order entered on June 5, 2024 and an effective date on June 7, 2024. Sidley characterized the case as a ~65-day path from filing to confirmation in its confirmation announcement.

Was NetComm included in the U.S. chapter 11 case?

Casa disclosed that NetComm was under a separate Australian voluntary administration and was not included in the U.S. chapter 11 cases in its chapter 11 announcement. DZS later described agreeing to acquire NetComm in its NetComm acquisition release.

Who is the claims agent for Casa Systems?

Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC serves as the claims and noticing agent. The firm maintains the official claims register and distributes case notifications to creditors and parties in interest, as reflected in the company’s chapter 11 announcement.

Read more restructuring case research on the ElevenFlo blog.