CCA Construction: $1.6B Baha Mar Judgment Drives Chapter 11

CCA Construction, Inc. filed for chapter 11 in New Jersey on December 22, 2024 after a New York state court entered a roughly $1.6 billion fraud judgment in the decade-long Baha Mar resort dispute. The debtor described itself as the U.S. holding and shared-services company within China Construction America, a subsidiary of China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), and emphasized that its operating subsidiaries would continue to perform construction and project-management work outside the bankruptcy case. The filing posture made the case less about a collapsing project pipeline and more about controlling litigation leverage and judgment enforcement while preserving an appeal pathway that was constrained by bond requirements and the practical difficulty of obtaining a supersedeas bond at the judgment size.

The chapter 11 case developed into a governance- and litigation-centric restructuring. The debtor obtained an insider DIP facility from CSCEC Holding Company, Inc., sought and received court authority to prosecute the New York appeal notwithstanding the automatic stay, and later became subject to examiner oversight that was ultimately limited to reviewing the process and methodology of a board special committee investigation. In late 2025, the parties reached an undisclosed settlement that cleared the way for a plan process: the debtor filed a disclosure statement and an updated plan that pair a settlement-driven balance-sheet reset with an internal transfer of certain assets to a “purchasing entity” owned by the DIP lender, while proposing cash payment in full to general unsecured creditors and cancellation of existing equity.

Litigation-Driven Chapter 11: Insider DIP, Examiner, and Settlement-to-Plan Track

CCA Construction’s chapter 11 case centered on managing judgment-enforcement risk tied to the Baha Mar litigation while preserving an appeal pathway that was constrained by supersedeas bond requirements. The debtor relied on an insider DIP from its corporate group and later proceeded under examiner and special committee oversight on governance issues. After the parties reached a settlement in late 2025, the case moved onto a plan track that proposed cash payment in full for general unsecured claims while cancelling existing equity.

Company Structure and Filing Scope

CCA Construction, Inc. is not the operating contractor that poured concrete at Baha Mar; it is the U.S. holding and shared-services entity inside the broader China Construction America group. China Construction America describes itself as a U.S. construction and project-management platform with a long operating history and a footprint spanning the East Coast, the Gulf, and the Caribbean, offering services that include program management, construction management, general contracting, design-build, and public-private partnership delivery. The company’s public materials emphasize its role as a U.S. subsidiary within the CSCEC family—CSCEC is frequently described as the world’s largest construction company—and identify New Jersey as a headquarters location for the U.S. group. The platform expanded materially in 2014 when China Construction America acquired Plaza Construction, a New York-based contractor with a long track record in large commercial projects.

This corporate structure matters because the debtor’s economics are tethered to intercompany flows rather than a standalone project book. Bankruptcy filings describe a “Shared Services Program” under which the debtor provides communications, accounting, IT, insurance, HR, legal, and general administrative support to non-debtor subsidiaries and other affiliates, allocating costs among participants. Put differently: the entity in chapter 11 is a shared-services hub and equity holder, while the operating subsidiaries—entities that hold the contracts, employees, and work-in-progress—continued outside chapter 11. Public reporting around the filing tracked that separation as a key talking point: the company’s December 22, 2024 press release emphasized that the filing applied only to CCA Construction, Inc., while subsidiaries and the broader group would continue normal operations.

The debtor’s filings identified specific non-debtor subsidiaries (including Plaza-related entities and regional operating companies) and framed the debtor’s primary assets as equity interests in those subsidiaries. That asset mix is typical for a holding/shared-services debtor: it can make “operations continuing” statements truthful while still leaving the debtor exposed to a judgment creditor, because the debtor’s value is concentrated in ownership interests and intercompany claims that can become the focus of collection and veil-piercing theories. It also explains why the case quickly turned into a governance-and-litigation matter rather than a traditional vendor- and liquidity-driven collapse.

Baha Mar Judgment and Appeal Bond Constraints

The Baha Mar dispute is one of the most prominent construction-and-development blowups of the last decade. The project—widely described as a multi-billion-dollar resort development in the Bahamas—became a litigation battleground after construction problems and financing stress contributed to a 2015 collapse. Coverage of the dispute highlighted a disputed $54 million payment that was alleged to have been diverted away from subcontractor payments and toward the purchase of the British Colonial Hilton. In October 2024, a New York court ordered China Construction entities to pay a Baha Mar developer more than $1.6 billion, describing a damages component of about $845 million plus interest dating back to May 2014. Litigation summaries characterized the result as a $1.6 billion verdict, and the plaintiff’s counsel highlighted the judgment in firm materials describing the outcome Susman Godfrey write-up.

The debtor’s bankruptcy narrative turned on a practical intersection of state-court enforcement and appellate procedure. Large money judgments are often stayed pending appeal only if the appellant posts a supersedeas bond or otherwise satisfies conditions that protect the judgment creditor during the appellate process. In this case, the bond needed to pursue the appeal was described as about $1.9 billion. The filing was framed as a move to preserve appellate rights and avoid immediate enforcement in the shadow of that bond constraint, including in the company’s bankruptcy announcement.

That “bond problem” is a recurring dynamic in litigation-driven chapter 11 cases. When a judgment creditor can immediately pursue collection and the defendant cannot bond, bankruptcy can become the only realistic way to avoid a forced liquidation (or an involuntary value transfer) while appellate rights remain unresolved. The CCA case provides a clear version of that pattern: public statements framed the filing as a measure to preserve appellate rights after the denial of stay relief, with the debtor arguing the decision was flawed and that restructuring protection was needed to prevent enforcement actions that could impair the value of its estate and the operating subsidiaries. The company’s own press release described the filing as a strategic action to address what it characterized as a “wrongful” decision and to protect stakeholders while pursuing an appeal.

Holding-Company Filing Strategy and Subsidiary Operations

The debtor’s core operational message was that only the holding/shared-services company filed chapter 11 while operating subsidiaries continued outside the case. That posture can be attractive for multinational or multi-entity groups: it limits bankruptcy court jurisdiction over operating contracts, avoids cross-defaults tied to operating entities, and reduces the disruption that comes with moving project-level counterparties into bankruptcy. It also matters for bonding and contracting, because many construction contracts and surety relationships are sensitive to bankruptcy filings, even at an affiliate level.

But the posture does not eliminate the economic question: if the debtor’s primary assets are equity in those subsidiaries, the debtor’s capital structure and litigation exposure can still translate into pressure on subsidiary value. Judgment creditors may pursue collection strategies that target equity value, intercompany claims, or allegations of domination/control and fraudulent conduct across entity lines. The debtor’s early messaging suggested an intent to protect the subsidiaries from being pulled into the dispute; the practical path to achieving that goal often runs through either (a) an appeal outcome that reduces or eliminates the judgment, (b) a settlement that caps the liability and resolves enforcement risk, or (c) a restructuring transaction that isolates the operating value and resolves the judgment through an internal reallocation of ownership. In the CCA case, the later settlement and plan filings indicate the case moved toward option (b) and then (c): a settlement to extinguish the judgment risk, followed by a plan that transfers certain assets to a purchasing entity owned by the DIP lender and restructures equity ownership.

The case’s schedules underscore why these distinctions matter. Schedules reported liabilities in the $1.77 billion range against assets under $100 million, with unsecured liabilities dominating. That balance-sheet picture is consistent with a litigation judgment (and related claims) being the main liability driver, rather than a conventional secured lending stack. It also contextualizes why the DIP could be relatively modest ($40 million) while still being case-critical: the DIP is not refinancing a large operating debt load; it is financing the litigation-and-governance process and maintaining the shared-services backbone while the case resolves the judgment overhang.

Insider DIP Financing

CCA’s case financing was anchored by an insider DIP from CSCEC Holding Company, Inc. The filing was paired with a proposed $40 million DIP facility in the company’s bankruptcy announcement and in industry coverage of the filing. Bankruptcy filings described the facility as a term loan with staged availability—an initial tranche available on an interim basis and additional availability after final approval—along with a fixed interest rate and a payment option that allowed interest to accrue as PIK or be paid in cash at the debtor’s election.

The DIP’s economic terms were notable for what they omitted. Bankruptcy filings described the facility as excluding commitment fees, exit fees, and many of the negative covenants and milestone packages typical of third-party DIP deals. This pattern is common in insider DIP financings where the lender’s priority is preserving enterprise value (and controlling outcomes) rather than extracting incremental economics. The filings also described a 12-month term and a structure in which the DIP lender insisted on a secured facility. Importantly for conflicts analysis, the filings described the DIP as not rolling up prepetition insider claims and as not requiring broad releases of prepetition claims against the DIP lender; the release language was described as limited to claims arising under or related to the DIP financing itself.

The DIP also included a mechanism tied directly to the debtor’s shared-services role. Bankruptcy filings described a downward adjustment to the DIP principal balance based on the debtor’s payment of shared services costs allocable to affiliates outside the “CCA Group,” coupled with an assignment that allowed the DIP lender to pursue those affiliate claims directly. In a typical operating-company DIP, this kind of adjustment would be unusual; in a shared-services holding-company context, it reflects an attempt to prevent the DIP from being used to subsidize affiliates that are not within the debtor’s core economic perimeter.

Another feature that illustrates the “keep subsidiaries operating” strategy: bankruptcy filings described separate, unsecured financing commitments of $20 million by CSCEC Holding directly to the non-debtor subsidiaries. This is a way to stabilize operating subsidiaries (and their project performance) without pulling them into chapter 11. In effect, the restructuring can ring-fence operating liquidity and keep counterparties paid, while the debtor uses the chapter 11 process to manage litigation, governance review, and plan negotiation.

DIP term sheet (as described in bankruptcy filings).

Interim order professional fee carve-out mechanics.

From a restructuring-professional perspective, the key question is not whether the DIP terms are “market,” but what they signal about control and exit path. An insider DIP can reduce liquidity risk and lower transaction friction, but it can heighten governance scrutiny because the lender is often a conflicted stakeholder with the ability to steer outcomes. In the CCA case, the existence of “investigation claims” against affiliates and later examiner involvement suggests that stakeholders and the court treated governance processes—how the debtor evaluated claims against insiders, how independent oversight was structured, and what information was available—as central to legitimacy. The DIP’s light covenant profile also increases the importance of other oversight tools (special committee governance, examiner scope, and court supervision) as substitutes for a third-party lender’s milestone regime.

Examiner Oversight and Special Committee Process

Examiner fights in chapter 11 typically reflect one of two dynamics: (1) a creditor group or the U.S. Trustee believes there are serious governance issues requiring independent investigation; or (2) a debtor wants to cabin litigation risk while still moving the case forward, and an examiner becomes a procedural compromise that produces a court-supervised record. The CCA case moved into examiner territory relatively early, reflecting the combination of insider financing, intercompany relationships, and potential claims among affiliates.

The court entered an order directing the U.S. Trustee to appoint an examiner under Bankruptcy Code section 1104(c), but deferred the precise scope to a later scope-and-budget process. That sequencing is a way to separate “whether an examiner is needed” from “what the examiner will do,” and it gives parties a venue to negotiate a narrower investigation that supports forward motion without a fully open-ended (and expensive) forensic inquiry. In June 2025, the court approved an examiner scope and budget that limited the authorized investigation to reviewing the scope and process of the debtor board’s special committee investigation—effectively making the examiner a procedural auditor of governance rather than a substitute prosecutor.

The scope order’s mechanics are important. It capped examiner and professional fees and expenses at $100,000 unless increased by agreement or further court order, and it built a two-stage reporting cadence: the special committee report due 45 days from order entry, and the examiner report due 45 days after that outside date. It also adopted a sealing-and-publication mechanism that is increasingly common in sensitive governance investigations: the examiner report would initially be filed under seal, with a publicly available version due within a short window subject to redactions and sealing motions. That design recognizes that special committee investigations often involve privilege assertions, sensitive intercompany issues, and potential litigation posture, while still committing the case to some degree of transparency.

The disclosure statement later reported that the special committee issued its report on July 31, 2025. Even without the report’s details, the process signals something about what the case needed to resolve: it was not enough to finance the case and prosecute an appeal; the debtor also needed a defensible governance record around potential claims involving insiders and related parties. The examiner structure (limited scope, capped budget) suggests the case balanced that need against the desire to keep investigation costs proportionate to the restructuring endgame.

Examiner and special committee milestones (from bankruptcy filings).

Claims Process and Bar Date

For a case where liabilities are dominated by a mega-judgment and related disputes, the claims process still matters because it creates the universe of stakeholders that must be resolved by settlement or plan. The court entered a bar date order setting July 30, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time as both the general claims bar date and the governmental bar date. The order also required section 503(b)(9) claims to be filed by the general bar date, and it established the standard rejection damages timing framework: the later of the applicable bar date or a deadline set in a rejection order.

This alignment is often a signal about anticipated claim mix. When a debtor expects material trade claims and potential 503(b)(9) exposure, explicitly bundling 503(b)(9) claims into the bar date order prevents a “surprise admin claim” dynamic later in the case. In a holding/shared-services debtor with limited external vendor exposure, the practical effect may be more about creating procedural closure than about managing a large trade creditor population. Still, the bar date provides a key waypoint for plan feasibility: it allows the debtor to quantify the non-judgment, non-insider claims that must be resolved, and it forces stakeholders to show up.

Claims deadlines table.

Settlement and Plan Structure

In late 2025, the case reached the kind of endpoint litigation-driven chapter 11 cases often seek: a settlement that eliminates the judgment-enforcement crisis and provides a basis for a confirmable plan. The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in November 2025 that was positioned as a critical step toward concluding the chapter 11 case in bankruptcy coverage.

Bankruptcy filings around the settlement provide extensive mechanical detail even when dollars are confidential. The publicly filed settlement agreement refers to a “Settlement Amount” that is redacted, and it includes broad mutual releases among the debtor, the insider DIP lender, the non-debtor Bahamas entities, and the judgment creditor. It also includes a set of restructuring-relevant deliverables:

• Withdrawal of the judgment creditor’s proof of claim with prejudice upon effectiveness.
• Dismissal (or commercially reasonable efforts to dismiss) pending proceedings between the parties, including litigation related to the judgment and related disputes.
• Cessation of enforcement and collection activity, coupled with steps to mark the New York judgment satisfied and to release any judgment liens.
• Release of “investigation claims” by the debtor against specified released parties (a critical governance and value-allocation element in a related-party case).
• Confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions, with mediation communications treated as privileged.

The settlement approval order layered in enforcement protections pending payment. It required payment within a specified window after entry of a final approval order, included an injunction against collection activity pending payment, and directed the parties to stay or continue related proceedings while the settlement went effective. This structure addresses the core question judgment creditors ask when settling in bankruptcy: “How do I know I will be paid?” The answer here was not a disclosed escrow, but an order-backed process that (a) enjoined enforcement while payment was pending and (b) preserved remedies if payment did not occur, with the agreement designed to unwind if the settlement amount was not funded.

The disclosure statement reports a clear sequence: mediation on November 20, 2025; agreement on principal terms on November 21, 2025; a hearing on December 2, 2025; and effectiveness on December 22, 2025 when the settlement amount was paid. The difference between “order entered” and “effective” is consequential: it is common for settlements to be approved but not effective until funding occurs. Here, the effectiveness date—tied to payment—provides the real turning point for plan feasibility, because it is when the judgment enforcement risk and the claim itself are described as extinguished (via satisfaction and claim withdrawal).

Settlement timeline (public milestones).

What the settlement did (mechanics; consideration undisclosed).

The plan mechanics: DIP-to-equity, a purchasing entity, and cash payment in full for general unsecured claims.

With the settlement reported as effective, the debtor filed a disclosure statement and an updated plan that describe a restructuring with two central planks: (1) a reallocation of ownership and exit financing within the corporate family via the DIP lender, and (2) a plan treatment that pays priority and general unsecured claims in full in cash while canceling existing equity.

The plan’s treatment structure is conceptually simple but strategically meaningful:

• Administrative claims are to be paid in cash in full (subject to timing mechanics tied to allowance and ordinary-course due dates).
• Priority tax claims and U.S. Trustee fees are to be paid in cash in full.
• Priority non-tax claims (Class 1) are unimpaired and paid in cash in full.
• General unsecured claims (Class 2) are impaired for voting purposes but are paid in cash in full under the plan’s described treatment and timing.
• Existing equity interests (Class 3) are cancelled and receive no recovery.

This “impaired-but-paid-in-full” structure for general unsecured creditors is not uncommon when impairment is needed to satisfy technical plan requirements or to manage timing/allowance disputes, but it is nevertheless notable in a case that began with liabilities in the $1.7+ billion range. It underscores how settlement-driven cases can transform the balance sheet: if the mega-claim is resolved, the remaining creditor universe may be small enough to pay in full as part of a clean exit.

The plan’s internal-transaction mechanics do much of the remaining work. The plan defines a “purchasing entity” that is wholly owned by CSCEC Holding (the DIP lender) and contemplates transferring certain debtor assets—described as including the debtor’s interests in certain operating subsidiaries—to that purchasing entity on the effective date, free and clear under section 363. In parallel, the plan defines an “Exit Financing Facility” as the DIP credit agreement as amended and restated on the effective date, with principal equal to the DIP obligations outstanding at emergence, and with the reorganized debtor and the purchasing entity as borrowers. DIP claim holders receive all interests in the reorganized debtor and a pro rata share of the loans under the exit facility in full satisfaction of their DIP claims.

Taken together, these features describe a reorganization that is closer to an internal recapitalization and asset allocation than to a third-party refinancing. The DIP lender funds the case and then becomes the equity owner of the reorganized debtor, while also owning the purchasing entity that receives certain assets. This can be an efficient way to exit a holding-company case: it consolidates control in the entity already providing liquidity, and it can simplify post-effective-date governance. It also raises the usual related-party questions—whether the asset allocation is fair, whether any released investigation claims had value, and whether the process was independent and robust—questions the case appears to have addressed through the special committee and examiner framework.

Plan treatment table (as filed).

Exit facility and asset transfer (high-level).

Releases, exculpation, and opt-out mechanics (as filed).

Large related-party restructurings typically live or die on release architecture. The CCA plan includes both debtor releases and releases granted by holders of claims and interests, and it uses an opt-out mechanism tied to the voting process. As filed, the plan defines “releasing parties” broadly to include not only parties who vote to accept but also parties who abstain or vote to reject and do not opt out (subject to eligibility mechanics). The plan also includes a standard carve-out framework: release and exculpation protections do not extend to acts or omissions judicially determined by a final order to have constituted actual fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence, and they do not release post-effective-date obligations under the plan and related documents.

Operationally, the plan implements third-party release and exculpation provisions through the solicitation process, using an opt-out mechanism and carve-outs for conduct judicially determined by a final order to constitute actual fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence.

Solicitation and confirmation schedule (as noticed in January 2026).

The debtor’s notice and related filings set the case on a combined final disclosure statement approval and plan confirmation track. The combined hearing was scheduled for February 11, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time in Trenton, New Jersey, with a voting and confirmation objection deadline of February 6, 2026 at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time.

Solicitation / confirmation schedule table (noticed).

Key professionals (from case filings).

The case retained a standard set of professionals for a complex, litigation-driven chapter 11: national bankruptcy counsel, local co-counsel, a financial advisor, and a claims agent. Case filings reflect the following core roles:

Key Timeline

Frequently Asked Questions

When did CCA Construction file for chapter 11, and where is the case pending?

CCA Construction, Inc. filed chapter 11 on December 22, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (Trenton). The case is pending before Hon. Christine M. Gravelle under case number 24-22548, as reflected in court filings.

What is CCA Construction’s relationship to China Construction America and CSCEC?

CCA Construction is described in public materials as the U.S. holding/shared-services entity within the China Construction America platform, which operates as part of the broader CSCEC corporate group. China Construction America’s company profile describes a U.S. construction and project management platform with a multi-decade operating history, and industry coverage around the 2014 Plaza Construction acquisition illustrates how the group built a U.S. footprint.

What was the Baha Mar judgment, and why did the appeal bond issue matter to the filing?

The bankruptcy was triggered by a roughly $1.6 billion fraud judgment in the Baha Mar dispute. A New York court decision described damages of about $845 million plus interest, and bankruptcy filings described a $1,642,598,493.15 judgment entered October 31, 2024. Large money judgments are often stayed pending appeal only if the appellant can post a supersedeas bond or otherwise secure the judgment; the bond requirement in the Baha Mar dispute was described as about $1.9 billion, which the debtor argued made a stay pending appeal unattainable as a practical matter and created immediate enforcement risk.

What were the key DIP financing terms, and who provided the facility?

The debtor obtained an insider DIP facility of up to $40 million from CSCEC Holding Company, Inc., the parent entity described as part of the CSCEC corporate group. The company’s press release referenced a $40 million DIP, and bankruptcy filings described a fixed 9.5% interest rate with a PIK-or-cash option and a proposed 12-month term. Bankruptcy filings also described a relatively “light” insider DIP structure: no commitment or exit fees, no roll-up of prepetition debt, releases limited to DIP-related claims, and fewer typical third-party DIP milestones and negative covenants, alongside a shared-services adjustment mechanism and separate unsecured credit support described for non-debtor subsidiaries.

Why was an examiner appointed, and what was the examiner’s scope?

The court appointed an examiner in March 2025 and later approved a scope and budget that limited the authorized investigation to reviewing the scope and process of the debtor board’s special committee investigation, with a $100,000 aggregate budget cap. The structure is consistent with a case where governance process and related-party issues are important, but the court and parties sought to contain investigation costs and avoid a fully open-ended inquiry.

What were the key claims deadlines in the case?

The court set July 30, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time as the general and governmental claims bar date, with section 503(b)(9) claims aligned to the general bar date. Rejection damages deadlines were set to follow standard timing rules tied to rejection orders.

What did the late-2025 settlement do, and why are the dollars not in the public record?

The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in November 2025 that was positioned as a key step toward concluding the chapter 11 case in bankruptcy coverage. Bankruptcy filings show a settlement structure with a confidential “Settlement Amount,” broad mutual releases, withdrawal of the judgment creditor’s proof of claim with prejudice, dismissal of proceedings, and satisfaction/enforcement standstill mechanics for the New York judgment. The confidentiality is consistent with settlements where parties choose to file the economic consideration under seal while making the operative mechanics public.

What does the filed plan propose for general unsecured claims and equity?

The updated plan filed January 8, 2026 proposes cash payment in full for general unsecured claims (Class 2) while cancelling existing equity interests (Class 3). It also provides that DIP claim holders receive the equity of the reorganized debtor and exit financing loans, reflecting a DIP-to-equity/exit facility structure.

When is the confirmation hearing scheduled, and what are the voting/objection deadlines?

The debtor noticed a combined final disclosure statement approval and confirmation hearing for February 11, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time, with a voting and confirmation objection deadline of February 6, 2026 at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time. These dates were scheduled as of the January 2026 filings and may be updated by later court orders.

Who is the claims and noticing agent?

Bankruptcy filings identify Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC d/b/a Verita Global as the claims and noticing agent.

For ongoing bankruptcy case analysis and restructuring intelligence, visit the ElevenFlo bankruptcy blog.