Coach USA: DIP-Funded 363 Sale Process for Bus and Transit Assets

Coach USA—owner of the Megabus brand and a portfolio of commuter, charter, airport, and intercity bus operators—filed chapter 11 petitions in Delaware on June 11, 2024 and immediately pursued a section 363 sale process designed to transfer operating businesses to new owners while stabilizing near-term liquidity. The company framed the filing as a value-maximization process supported by debtor-in-possession financing and multiple stalking horse transactions that could close on different timelines. The company’s filing announcement described the restructuring goal as preserving operations and jobs while selling discrete business units.

The case is also a reminder that “$20 million DIP” headlines can obscure the real mechanics of a leveraged transportation restructuring. Coach’s court papers described a roll-up revolving facility sized around the company’s prepetition ABL/letter-of-credit stack, with $20 million of new money as the incremental cash component rather than the full financing picture. The result was a milestone-driven, multi-package sale program that ultimately transitioned to a chapter 7 liquidation framework for residual assets and claims administration after the core operating businesses were sold.

Case Snapshot

Debtors	Coach USA, Inc. and a large group of affiliates (jointly administered for procedural purposes only). doc:1643932
Court	U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Filing announcement
Lead case	Coach USA, Inc., et al., Case No. 24-11258. doc:1643932
Petition date	June 11, 2024. Filing announcement
Business	North American passenger transportation operator including Megabus and multiple regional/contract bus brands. doc:1643871
Scale (as described in filings)	~2,700 employees (including ~1,600 union employees) and ~2,070 buses across 25 business segments. doc:1643871
Debt (as described in filings)	~$197.8 million funded debt as of the petition date, including an ABL facility, a Main Street loan, and capital lease obligations. doc:1643871
Reported debt (media)	Roughly ~$198 million of acquisition-related/private equity leverage. Smart Cities Dive
DIP financing (headline vs. structure)	$20 million of new money within a larger roll-up revolving facility tied to the prepetition ABL/LC structure. Filing announcement and doc:1643928
Restructuring path	Section 363 sale process with multiple stalking horses and multiple sale orders approving different asset packages. doc:1660065 and doc:1682770
Key buyers (announced)	Affiliates of The Renco Group, Avalon Transportation, and Wynne Transportation. Filing announcement and sale approval announcement
Post-sale status	chapter 11 cases converted to chapter 7 effective December 31, 2024; chapter 7 trustee appointed the same date. doc:1755426 and doc:1769248

363 Sale Process and Chapter 7 Conversion

Business footprint and operating model. Coach USA operated a network of passenger transportation businesses across the U.S. and Canada, with service offerings spanning contract transportation, commuter and scheduled service, intercity retail service (including Megabus), airport service, and charter service. doc:1643871 In first-day filings, the company described approximately 2,700 employees (about 1,600 of whom were union employees) and a fleet of roughly 2,070 buses spread across 25 business segments. doc:1643871 Industry reporting described a similar scale and noted a fleet in the ~2,250 vehicle range (a reminder that “fleet size” can vary based on how equipment is counted and whether inactive units are included). Smart Cities Dive Trade press also described Coach as serving more than 38 million passengers annually and operating from dozens of locations. Bus & Motorcoach News

In the case narrative, a key structural point is that Coach’s enterprise was not a single monolithic operating company but a sprawling set of entities and brands. The debtors sought joint administration for procedural efficiency (without substantive consolidation), and the joint administration record reflects the case’s “portfolio operator” reality: numerous separate subsidiaries held specific operating contracts, fleets, real estate, or administrative functions. doc:1643932 That corporate architecture matters in restructuring because a multi-entity debtor group can more readily sell business units as separable “packages,” but it also complicates cash management, employee/union administration, and the mechanics of closing multiple asset purchase agreements on different timetables.

Ownership history and the pre-filing setup. Coach USA’s recent ownership arc is closely tied to its eventual restructuring posture. The company was acquired by Variant Equity from Stagecoach Group in April 2019 for approximately $271.4 million, shortly before the COVID-era collapse in commuting and discretionary travel reshaped demand patterns for intercity and commuter transportation. Coach USA acquisition announcement Multiple contemporaneous sources summarized the broad acquisition narrative and later leverage issues: Variant’s 2019 deal closed months before the pandemic, and Coach entered 2024 still carrying a large debt stack relative to its post-pandemic revenue base. NJBIZ Smart Cities Dive

Why the capital structure broke (documented drivers, not speculation). Several data points repeated across filings and reporting explain why Coach’s capital structure became unstable rather than “recovering” into its leverage. First, ridership collapsed during the pandemic, and the recovery lagged peers: one industry report stated Coach’s 2023 ridership was about 45% of pre-pandemic levels while the broader industry reached roughly 85–90%. Smart Cities Dive CNN similarly reported a ~90% commuter ridership decline in 2020 and a roughly 45% level in the most recent year cited. CNN Business Second, operating costs were rising at the same time volumes were constrained: trade reporting pointed to higher fuel, insurance, and labor costs as compounding pressures. Bus & Motorcoach News

Coach’s first-day declaration framed the distress through a liquidity lens: slow ridership recovery, ongoing operational challenges such as driver shortages, and covenant pressure under its secured credit documents. doc:1643871 In that framing, chapter 11 was not primarily a long-form plan-confirmation process; it was a sale-and-transition mechanism to keep buses running while the company transferred lines to buyers that could operate them with a different capital structure.

Prepetition funded debt and why it mattered for DIP structure. In first-day papers, Coach described approximately $197.8 million of funded debt obligations as of the petition date, including (i) secured debt under a prepetition ABL facility, (ii) unsecured debt under a Main Street loan, and (iii) amounts owed to capital lessors secured by liens on specific assets. doc:1643871 The ABL facility also supported letters of credit, which are common in transportation businesses because insurance, terminal leases, and commercial contracts often require letter-of-credit backing. doc:1643871

The following table summarizes the debt stack as described in the first-day declaration. Amounts are as of the petition date and reflect filing-era rounding and category definitions.

	Amount (approx.)	Notes
ABL facility (secured)	$146.6 million	ABL loans; letters of credit outstanding separately below. doc:1643871
ABL letters of credit (outstanding)	$35.6 million	LC exposure under the ABL structure. doc:1643871
Main Street loan (unsecured)	$37.7 million	Term debt under Main Street facility as described in filings. doc:1643871
Capital lessor obligations (secured by assets)	$13.5 million	Liens on capital assets. doc:1643871
Total funded debt (filing-era total)	$197.8 million	Stated total funded debt in first-day papers. doc:1643871

This capital structure context is essential to understanding the DIP. In many chapter 11s, the DIP is “new” money financing. In a roll-up structure like Coach’s, the DIP can be sized to incorporate existing secured exposure (including ABL loans and letter-of-credit obligations) in order to keep liquidity available for operations and to align the secured lender group’s postpetition position with the sale process.

Prepetition runway actions and the start of a sale process. Coach’s sale process started before the bankruptcy filing. The first-day declaration stated that the debtors began a marketing and sale process on December 4, 2023 and had 16 parties provide indications of interest as of the petition date. doc:1643871 The same declaration described multiple stalking horse pathways in progress at filing, including two going-concern stalking horse bids for substantially all assets of a large subset of business segments and a separate stalking horse bid for liquidation of 143 double-deck buses. doc:1643871

The filings also described a forbearance environment and milestone management. The declaration referenced a forbearance framework with restructuring milestones that included governance steps (the appointment of independent directors) and a sale-leaseback transaction involving a New Brunswick property that generated net proceeds. doc:1643871 Taken together, the prepetition record reads like a lender-supported “runway extension” plan: address immediate covenant/default pressure, create collateral and governance comfort for the secured lenders, and run an accelerated sale process for discrete operating units.

DIP financing: why the new-money number is only part of the story. Public reporting and press releases repeatedly described Coach’s DIP financing as $20 million. Filing announcement Trade coverage likewise framed the DIP as $20 million. Bus & Motorcoach News Court papers, however, described a revolving DIP facility sized around the secured lender ecosystem and the letters-of-credit stack—effectively a roll-up. doc:1643928

From a restructuring-professional standpoint, the key is not which figure is “right,” but what each figure actually represents:

• The $20 million number corresponds to the incremental new-money liquidity component.
• The larger “around $200 million” facility size reflects the revolving commitments and roll-up/LC structure that kept the secured financing architecture intact while the debtors executed a section 363 sale process.

The table below summarizes selected DIP terms as described in the DIP motion.

	Term (high level)	Notes
Facility type	Superpriority revolving credit facility	DIP motion described a superpriority revolver with LC capacity. doc:1643928
Commitment size	Up to ~$200.0 million	Motion described total commitments up to $199,969,560.45. doc:1643928
LC sublimit	Up to $40.0 million	Letter-of-credit sublimit stated in DIP motion. doc:1643928
New-money component	$20.0 million	New-money revolver availability in DIP motion. doc:1643928
Roll-up component	Up to ~$180.0 million	Roll-up commitments described in DIP motion. doc:1643928
Agent/lenders	Secured lender group led by Wells Fargo	DIP motion described Wells Fargo as agent and the lender group including banks involved in the ABL ecosystem. doc:1643928
Milestone orientation	Sale-driven timeline	Maturity/milestones tied to sale consummation and chapter 11 case events. doc:1643928

This structure is particularly common in cases where the primary restructuring path is an expedited sale rather than a plan. The lenders’ goal is typically to keep the business operating long enough to run a competitive sale, while ensuring that postpetition funding does not erode secured position without adequate protection. Coach’s DIP structure, as described in filings, fits that pattern: preserve the ABL/LC architecture, provide incremental cash, and condition the case on an accelerated transaction calendar.

Bidding procedures and a multi-track sale calendar. The debtors moved early for bidding procedures that supported multiple stalking horses and multiple asset packages. The company’s initial announcement described two stalking horse bidders: (i) a Renco affiliate for a set of bus lines and (ii) Avalon Transportation affiliates for another set of lines. Filing announcement Court orders subsequently set a sale schedule with bid deadline, auction, and sale hearing dates (with the auction conditional on receiving multiple qualified bids). doc:1660065

The sale cadence matters because it shapes liquidity management. In a case where the DIP’s maturity and milestones are tied to a sale closing, the sale timeline is effectively the business’s “clock.” When the timeline is multi-track—multiple separate APAs, multiple buyer diligence processes, multiple required approvals—the coordination burden increases, and so does the risk that a delay in one asset package affects the overall case posture.

The table below summarizes selected case-process dates as reflected in the bidding procedures framework described in filings and contemporaneous announcements.

	Date (calendar as set early in the case)	Source
Petition date	June 11, 2024	Filing announcement
Bid deadline (set by court schedule)	August 1, 2024	doc:1660065
Auction (if needed)	August 6, 2024	doc:1660065
Sale hearing	August 13, 2024	doc:1660065
Court approval for key asset-package sales (announced)	August 14, 2024	Megabus announcement

Asset-package strategy: why multiple sales can be rational (and when they’re risky). Coach did not attempt to sell “the company” as one block. The core strategy was multiple going-concern sales of distinct business segments to different buyers—effectively a portfolio carve-up. For a passenger transportation operator with numerous regional lines and contract businesses, this can be economically rational:

• Some lines may have different ridership profiles, labor arrangements, and contract terms, making them more valuable to specialized regional operators.
• Certain buyers may be willing to assume specific contract obligations or labor arrangements that others cannot price.
• A portfolio carve-up can maximize value if the market for a whole-company buyer is thin.

The trade-off is complexity: each sale needs diligence, regulatory/contract consents, labor planning, and closing mechanics, and the debtor must maintain service continuity during the interim.

Who bought what: Renco affiliates, Avalon, and Wynne. Coach’s announcements and industry reporting described multiple buyers.

• A November 2024 announcement stated that an affiliate of The Renco Group completed a transaction to acquire a list of Coach business units and brands, including multiple commuter lines and the Megabus retail business and intellectual property. PRNewswire transaction completion
• The same announcement stated that Avalon Transportation acquired Lenzner, Kerrville, All West, and American Coach Lines of Atlanta, and that Wynne Transportation acquired Powder River and a Butler Motor Transit body shop. PRNewswire transaction completion
• A Megabus-branded release stated that the court approved sales to affiliates of The Renco Group, Avalon Transportation, and Wynne Transportation on August 14, 2024 with a closing deadline shortly thereafter. Megabus announcement

The table below consolidates the “who bought what” record into an operator-facing view. The buyer-and-asset lists below track the public announcements and should be read as “announced transaction scope,” which may be refined in schedules and closing certificates in the underlying transaction documents.

Buyer (announced)	Businesses/assets described publicly	Notes and timing
Renco affiliate (Bus Company Holdings US, LLC)	Multiple bus lines including Dillon’s, Elko, Megabus retail operations (including Megabus IP), Montreal operations, and additional commuter brands.	Stalking horse announced at filing and completion announced Nov. 1, 2024. Filing announcement Transaction completion
Avalon Transportation affiliates	Lenzner, Kerrville, All West, and American Coach Lines of Atlanta (ACL Atlanta).	Stalking horse announced at filing; court approval for sales announced Aug. 14, 2024. Filing announcement Megabus announcement
Wynne Transportation	Powder River and Butler Motor Transit body shop (as described publicly).	Transaction referenced in November 2024 completion release. Transaction completion

Debt assumed and stakeholder protections: why the buyer’s “assumed debt” matters. Industry reporting stated that Renco assumed approximately $130 million of Coach’s debt as part of the transaction and positioned the deal as stabilizing service continuity on commuter routes. Bus & Motorcoach News A creditor-side recap similarly described a structure in which the Renco bid assumed a large portion of debt and included negotiated protections for unsecured creditors. Brown Rudnick recap

From a restructuring standpoint, “assumed debt” can be a meaningful value lever because it can:

• Increase total consideration to the estate by shifting obligations off the debtors’ balance sheet.
• Change the relative recoveries between secured and unsecured constituencies depending on which obligations are assumed and which remain behind.
• Reduce the administrative burden of post-closing wind-down if fewer operational obligations remain with the debtor estates.

At the same time, assumed-debt mechanics can be legally and economically subtle. The key questions are always: which debt is being assumed (secured vs. unsecured vs. assumed executory contract obligations), what releases or waivers accompany it, and what happens if the deal fails to close. In Coach’s case, the public record indicates that unsecured-creditor protections were a point of negotiation during the DIP/sale process, and that the final structure included negotiated adjustments. Brown Rudnick recap

Operational continuity and public-transit interfaces. Coach’s commuter operations intersected with public transit systems, especially in the Northeast. Industry reporting stated that NJ Transit assumed control of certain bus routes previously operated by Coach USA and that some terminals were scheduled for auction as the case progressed. American Bus Association This is a reminder that a transportation bankruptcy is rarely just a balance-sheet event: it often has a direct service-continuity and regulatory interface dimension that influences deal urgency and buyer selection.

Follow-on dispositions: auctions and “tail” asset sales. After the major operating package transactions, the docket reflects additional disposition activity. Court orders approved an auction agreement with Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers and additional de minimis asset sale orders for remaining assets. doc:1704237 doc:1711222 doc:1731684 These later-stage dispositions are typical in a multi-package case: the “core” sales transfer operating contracts and brands, while residual fleets, real estate, or miscellaneous assets are monetized through auctions or small transactions during wind-down.

Professionalized case management. Coach’s public announcements identified key advisors early, including Alston & Bird as counsel and Houlihan Lokey as financial advisor. Filing announcement The docket reflects a professionalized posture consistent with a sponsor-owned, transaction-centric bankruptcy: specialized debtor counsel, local Delaware counsel, investment banker, CRO support, and an administrative/claims agent to handle the volume of notices and service lists. doc:1646705 doc:1646704 doc:1646643 doc:1644598

One practical implication of this advisor stack is speed: where a debtor can assemble a full “first-day” suite and present a sale calendar quickly, the bankruptcy can function as a court-supervised transaction platform rather than a prolonged operational turnaround.

The endgame: chapter 7 conversion after core sales. Not every large chapter 11 sale case ends in a confirmed plan. In Coach’s case, the court entered an order converting the chapter 11 cases to chapter 7 effective December 31, 2024. doc:1755426 A separate filing reflects the U.S. Trustee’s appointment of Alfred T. Giuliano as chapter 7 trustee on the conversion effective date. doc:1769248

Several features of the conversion framework are worth highlighting for practitioners:

• The conversion order preserved prior sale orders and related orders entered during the chapter 11 cases, meaning the transaction structure and good-faith purchaser protections remained intact after conversion. doc:1755426
• The order contemplated the operational reality of a post-sale estate: turnover of records and property to the chapter 7 trustee, post-conversion reporting (including outstanding monthly operating reports), and cash disposition mechanics tied to the DIP budget and agent. doc:1755426

This is a common pattern in multi-asset sale cases where the “operating” businesses are sold, leaving behind an estate focused on reconciliation of claims, residual asset monetization, potential preference/fraudulent transfer analysis, and final distributions. For creditors and counterparties, the shift to chapter 7 often changes who is making decisions (a trustee rather than debtor management) and can affect the pace and litigation posture of claim resolution.

What this case illustrates for restructuring professionals. Coach’s chapter 11 is a useful study in how transportation restructurings can become transaction programs:

• Roll-up DIP economics. A “$20 million DIP” framing can coexist with a much larger revolving/roll-up financing architecture that is primarily about preserving the secured lender ecosystem and letter-of-credit support. doc:1643928
• Portfolio carve-up sales. Multi-segment operators can maximize value by selling multiple packages to specialized buyers, but the approach increases diligence/consent complexity and demands strong project management. Filing announcement
• Milestones as governance. When a debtor’s liquidity is constrained, sale milestones function like governance mechanisms: they align stakeholders around a shared timeline and reduce optionality. doc:1643928
• Service continuity as a constraint. Commuter and contract operations can implicate public agencies and riders, pushing the case toward going-concern transfers rather than slow liquidation. American Bus Association
• Chapter 7 conversion as a clean finish. Converting after closing core sales can be a pragmatic way to transition from operating-company management to estate administration, especially if a confirmable plan is not the efficient tool for the remaining work. doc:1755426

Frequently Asked Questions

When did Coach USA file for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and where was the case filed? Coach USA filed chapter 11 petitions on June 11, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Filing announcement The joint administration record reflects a lead case captioned Coach USA, Inc., et al., Case No. 24-11258. doc:1643932

How large was Coach USA at filing (employees, fleet, and business segments)? First-day filings described a network employing approximately 2,700 employees (including about 1,600 union employees) operating about 2,070 buses across 25 business segments in the U.S. and Canada. doc:1643871 Industry reporting similarly described more than 2,700 employees and a fleet in the low-thousands of vehicles. Smart Cities Dive

How much debt did Coach USA report going into bankruptcy, and what were the main facilities? In first-day filings, the company described approximately $197.8 million of funded debt as of the petition date, including an ABL facility (with letter-of-credit exposure), a Main Street loan, and capital lease obligations secured by specific assets. doc:1643871 Media coverage frequently summarized the debt as approximately $198 million. Smart Cities Dive

Why did the company cite COVID-era ridership impacts as a continuing issue in 2024? Multiple sources described a pandemic-era ridership collapse and an unusually slow recovery for Coach relative to peers. One industry report stated Coach’s 2023 ridership was about 45% of pre-pandemic levels while the broader industry reached roughly 85–90%. Smart Cities Dive CNN also described a ~90% commuter ridership decline in 2020 and a roughly 45% level in the most recent year cited. CNN Business

How much DIP financing did Coach obtain, and why do some sources say “$20 million” while filings describe a much larger facility? Public announcements described $20 million of DIP financing, which aligns with the new-money component. Filing announcement Court papers described a larger revolving DIP structure sized around the prepetition ABL/letter-of-credit ecosystem, with the $20 million new-money revolver as the incremental liquidity component and the remainder effectively reflecting roll-up and LC support. doc:1643928

Who were the stalking horse bidders and what was the overall sale strategy? The filing announcement identified a Renco affiliate and Avalon Transportation affiliates as stalking horse bidders for different asset packages and framed the case as a section 363 sale process designed to preserve service continuity. Filing announcement The court’s bidding procedures order set the schedule for bids, a conditional auction, and a sale hearing to approve the transactions. doc:1660065

Which assets did affiliates of The Renco Group acquire, including the Megabus brand? A transaction completion announcement stated that Bus Company Holdings US, LLC (an affiliate of The Renco Group) acquired a set of Coach USA businesses and brands, including Megabus intellectual property and retail operations and numerous regional/commuter bus lines. PRNewswire transaction completion Industry coverage described the transaction as assuming a significant portion of Coach’s debt and stabilizing commuter operations. Bus & Motorcoach News

What did Avalon Transportation and Wynne Transportation acquire? Public announcements stated that Avalon Transportation acquired multiple businesses including Lenzner, Kerrville, All West, and American Coach Lines of Atlanta, and that Wynne Transportation acquired Powder River and a Butler Motor Transit body shop. PRNewswire transaction completion A Megabus-branded announcement also stated that the court approved sales to Avalon and Wynne (along with Renco affiliates) on August 14, 2024. Megabus announcement

Why were the chapter 11 cases converted to chapter 7, and what does that change? The court entered an order converting the cases to chapter 7 effective December 31, 2024, a common transition after closing operating-asset sales when the remaining work is estate administration and residual asset liquidation. doc:1755426 The U.S. Trustee appointed Alfred T. Giuliano as chapter 7 trustee on the conversion effective date. doc:1769248

Who is the claims agent, and how should creditors handle claims administration without relying on a claims portal link? Court filings reflect that Kroll was retained in claims-administration roles in the case. doc:1644598 Creditors typically monitor official notices served in the case (including bar date notices and chapter 7 meeting notices), coordinate with counsel, and ensure claim forms and supporting documentation are filed by the applicable deadlines stated in those notices.

For more chapter 11 case research and restructuring analysis, visit https://elevenflo.com/blog/.