CURO Group: $1B Debt Cut in Prepackaged Chapter 11

CURO Group Holdings Corp. operated a large North American consumer finance platform with storefront and online installment lending brands. The company filed a prepackaged Chapter 11 case on March 25, 2024 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas after signing a restructuring support agreement that targeted roughly a $1 billion debt reduction and a DIP financing commitment of $70 million. The filing aimed to preserve customer lending operations while reducing interest costs and refinancing risk across a complex secured capital stack. The matter proceeded as a fast-track prepackaged filing.

The case moved quickly. The plan was confirmed on May 16, 2024 and became effective when CURO emerged on July 19, 2024. The restructuring transferred control to senior secured stakeholders, preserved general unsecured claims, and left the reorganized business operating as a private company with a recapitalized balance sheet.

The First Day Declaration describes CURO as an omni-channel consumer finance business with a large storefront lending network in the United States and a substantial Canadian storefront presence. At the petition date, the company reported roughly 400 U.S. store locations across 13 states and about 150 Canadian stores across eight provinces, with the largest U.S. footprints in Texas, Tennessee, and Alabama and the largest Canadian footprint in Ontario. The company employed approximately 2,856 people across the U.S. and Canada, including around 1,781 in the U.S. and 1,075 in Canada, with corporate offices in Chicago, Greenville, and Wichita.

The financial backdrop combined leverage from acquisition-driven growth with elevated interest costs and securitization debt tied to storefront lending portfolios. Filings described about $2.1 billion of funded debt split between corporate term loans and notes and separate non-debtor funding facilities that financed customer loan receivables. Liquidity metrics were tracked closely, including weekly minimum liquidity thresholds that required specified cash levels and access to undrawn DIP commitments during the case.

Debtor	CURO Group Holdings Corp.
Court	U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (Houston Division)
Case Number	24-90165 (MI)
Judge	Marvin Isgur
Petition Date	2024-03-25
Plan Type	Joint prepackaged Chapter 11 plan
Confirmation Date	2024-05-16
Effective Date	2024-07-19
Debt Reduction	Approximately $1 billion
DIP Financing	$70 million commitment
Claims Agent	Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC
Headquarters	Chicago, Illinois
Employees	Approximately 2,856 at filing
Primary Footprint	U.S. storefront lending with Canadian operations

Prepackaged Restructuring Overview

Restructuring support and sponsor control. CURO entered Chapter 11 with support from lenders representing more than 74 percent of the first lien term loan and substantial positions in the 1.5L and 2L notes under the restructuring support agreement. Reporting on confirmation described Oaktree, Caspian, and Empyrean as the investor group assuming control through the plan. The debt reduction and interest savings narrative was reinforced in the emergence announcement, which cited relief of approximately $1 billion in debt and at least about $75 million of annual interest expense.

Prepack cadence and negotiated outcomes. The restructuring support agreement contemplated a fast prepackaged timeline, with the plan expected to be completed in roughly 120 days. That structure meant key economic terms and governance outcomes were negotiated before the filing, allowing the debtors to seek confirmation quickly once the case commenced. Prepack cases often emphasize minimal disruption to operations, and the CURO case followed that pattern by combining a DIP facility with a pre-negotiated plan that converted secured debt into equity and preserved general unsecured claims.

Liquidity bridge through DIP financing. The debtors obtained a DIP facility up to $70 million from prepetition secured stakeholders to fund operations during the prepack process. The facility was structured as a priming, superpriority multi draw term loan with an initial draw and later draws available under the final order. The DIP agent was Alter Domus (US) LLC, and the DIP Motion authorized cash collateral use subject to a carve out and adequate protection framework.

DIP draw mechanics and cash collateral discipline. The Final DIP Order capped the initial draw at $25 million and allowed a second draw that brought total borrowings to $50 million. A delayed draw of up to $20 million was permitted in up to two $10 million tranches, with total availability capped at $70 million. The order also required cash collateral use to stay within an approved budget and permitted variance framework, and it tied adequate protection to any diminution in value of prepetition collateral.

Exit financing and equity fees. The plan contemplated an Exit Facility providing first out and second out exit term loans incurred on the effective date. The DIP Exit Fee was defined as 10% of the DIP commitment, paid 5% in kind as additional exit term loans and 5% in new equity at a 25% discount to plan equity value. The DIP Backstop Commitment Fee added another 5% of the commitment, also payable in new equity at a 25% discount, which collectively meant that DIP-related fees created material equity issuance alongside the debt-funded exit facility.

Treatment framework. The Confirmed Plan preserved ordinary course payment for general unsecured claims and reinstated or otherwise treated securitization facilities as unimpaired. The capital stack was recapitalized by converting the 1.5L secured notes into the bulk of the new equity, providing the 1L term lenders with new exit term loans, and allocating a defined distribution to the 2L notes. Existing equity received contingent value rights subject to minimum distribution mechanics.

Equity distribution mechanics. Under the Disclosure Statement, holders of the 1.5L notes received the bulk of new equity, net of the 2L notes distribution and the equity portion of DIP-related fees. The 2L notes distribution provided 10.1% of the new equity plus warrants to acquire an additional 15% of the new equity, with both distributions subject to dilution by a management incentive plan. The management incentive plan reserved up to 10% of new equity on a fully diluted basis, and existing equity holders received contingent value rights on the effective date under a CVR agreement, with cash-in-lieu mechanics available if recipient limits applied.

General unsecured and securitization claims. The prepackaged plan treated general unsecured claims as unimpaired and paid in full, a notable outcome given the leverage in the capital stack. Securitization facility claims tied to non-debtor funding vehicles were reinstated or otherwise treated as unimpaired, preserving those financing structures that supported ongoing customer lending. This treatment framework allowed the reorganized company to focus on operational continuity while shifting ownership to the secured stakeholder group.

Governance and incentive alignment. The plan’s equity package combined a creditor-led ownership transition with management incentives designed to support performance after emergence. The management incentive plan reserved up to 10% of the new equity on a fully diluted basis, while the warrant package issued to 2L noteholders introduced additional dilution over time. These provisions were intended to balance creditor recoveries with management retention and post-emergence execution incentives.

CVR mechanics for legacy equity. Existing equity did not receive ongoing ownership in the reorganized company, but it did receive contingent value rights intended to provide limited upside if value thresholds are reached under the CVR agreement. The distribution framework includes eligibility screens and a cash-in-lieu option when recipient caps apply, which is common in large prepackaged cases where compliance and distribution mechanics can be complex. In practice, this structure ensures that legacy equity participates in a defined, contingent pool rather than receiving ongoing voting control.

Capital Structure and Financial Pressure

Debt load at filing. The First Day Declaration described roughly $2.1 billion of funded debt obligations at the petition date, split between corporate level term loans and notes and a separate set of non debtor funding facilities housed in special purpose vehicles. Public coverage at filing referenced more than $2 billion of debt and noted that assets and liabilities each exceeded $1 billion. The corporate stack included a first lien term loan, 1.5L notes, and 2L notes, while the funding entities carried multiple high cost securitization facilities supporting storefront lending.

The declaration provided a detailed view of the secured stack. The corporate debt included approximately $178 million of 1L term loans, about $682 million of 1.5L secured notes, and roughly $318 million of 2L secured notes, each with August 2027 or August 2028 maturities. The non-debtor funding side included multiple SPV facilities tied to customer loan portfolios, including a Heights SPV facility of about $301 million, a Heights SPV II facility around $136 million, a First Heritage SPV facility around $155 million, and two Canadian SPV facilities of about $252 million and $80 million. Those facilities carried a mix of fixed and floating rates, with some tranches priced at 7.5% to 18% and Canadian facilities tied to CDOR.

Earnings pressure and ratings stress. Media coverage leading up to the filing highlighted heavy recent losses and high interest costs. CURO reported nearly $267 million of losses in 2023 and $185.5 million in 2022 and faced credit rating pressure, with S&P citing liquidity strain. Those trends, combined with refinancing risk across the securitization facilities, set the stage for the prepackaged solution.

Liquidity covenants and borrowing constraints. The credit documents described minimum liquidity requirements, including a month-end liquidity threshold under the 1L credit agreement and weekly minimum liquidity tests during the case. The weekly covenant required at least $40 million of liquidity measured as unrestricted cash plus undrawn DIP commitments, or $30 million of unrestricted cash alone. These thresholds framed the operational runway and reinforced the importance of DIP availability and cash collateral access.

Rate structure and maturity profile. The corporate debt stack included a mix of floating and fixed rate instruments. The 1L term loan and 1.5L notes carried SOFR-based pricing with additional spreads, while portions of the 1.5L and 2L notes also referenced fixed 7.5% coupon terms. Several SPV facilities carried higher fixed rates, including tranches priced at 7.5% to 18%, with maturities clustered in 2025 and 2026. This combination of near-term maturities and relatively high pricing for certain facilities amplified refinancing risk and made interest expense a central driver of the restructuring thesis.

Regulatory overhang. The company also faced a continuing regulatory matter tied to a CFPB lawsuit against Heights Finance Holding alleging illegal loan churning and abusive practices. The CFPB action remained a visible risk factor during the restructuring period and underscored the operational scrutiny faced by the storefront lending industry.

Interest expense and refinancing risk. Beyond absolute leverage, the company faced elevated interest costs and refinancing risk across both corporate debt and SPV facilities. Reporting before the filing cited semiannual interest payments of about $37.5 million and pointed to a dramatic equity value decline as investors anticipated higher funding costs. For a lender relying on securitized funding, any disruption in credit markets or covenant compliance can quickly constrain originations and cash flow, which helps explain the speed and structure of the prepackaged case.

How the SPV funding stack worked. The non-debtor funding entities provided liquidity for customer lending by issuing secured facilities against loan receivables. Because those entities are typically bankruptcy-remote, the plan focused on reinstating or otherwise preserving their obligations so that customer loan portfolios could continue to generate cash flow. Maintaining access to that funding base was central to CURO’s ability to keep branches open and preserve the installment lending model during and after the restructuring.

Business Footprint and Brand Portfolio

CURO’s storefront lending model relied on a large physical footprint combined with online origination and servicing. In the United States, the company operated under multiple established brands, including Heights Finance, Covington Credit, Quick Credit, and Southern Finance, as well as First Heritage Credit. These brands focused on installment loans and related financial services for consumers who often have limited access to traditional bank credit. The multi-brand structure allowed CURO to maintain regional market recognition while operating under a centralized corporate platform.

The Canadian business operated through LendDirect and Cash Money, which provided storefront lending and online services in multiple provinces. Filings described the Canadian footprint as a meaningful part of the enterprise, with online services extending beyond the store network and a concentration of branches in Ontario. The company’s approach in Canada mirrored its U.S. strategy, using a combination of in-person and digital channels to support installment lending relationships over longer terms than traditional payday products.

Storefront lending is operationally intensive, with branch staffing, compliance oversight, and credit monitoring across a large geographic footprint. CURO reported approximately 2,856 employees at the petition date, reflecting both branch-level staffing and corporate support functions. Corporate offices in Chicago, Greenville, and Wichita coordinated underwriting policy, technology, compliance, and finance. This scale helped the company diversify across regions but also meant that liquidity constraints could quickly impact staffing, branch coverage, and customer acquisition.

CURO’s footprint also reflected a strategic shift away from short-term payday products and toward longer-term installment loans. The company sold its legacy U.S. payday lending business in 2022 and expanded its installment lending reach through acquisitions, including First Heritage Credit. That pivot helped reposition the business toward higher-balance, longer-duration products but also increased the leverage and integration complexity that ultimately contributed to the restructuring.

For consumer finance platforms, branch density and underwriting consistency are critical drivers of performance. CURO’s operating model blended in-person servicing with centralized underwriting and analytics, allowing it to manage credit performance across diverse markets. The scale also provided opportunities for cross-selling and customer retention, but it required reliable access to funding and stable liquidity. The prepackaged restructuring was designed to stabilize that funding base and allow the company to continue servicing customer loans without interruption.

Multi-state storefront lenders also operate under a patchwork of licensing regimes, state rate caps, and consumer protection rules. Maintaining compliance across dozens of jurisdictions requires dedicated legal, risk, and compliance resources, especially when the loan portfolio is funded through securitization facilities that rely on predictable collections. In CURO’s case, the combination of regulatory oversight, high funding costs, and a leveraged capital stack created a narrow margin for error, which helps explain why the restructuring emphasized liquidity controls and a rapid confirmation timeline.

Plan Confirmation and Effective Date

Confirmation and vote results. The plan was confirmed on May 16, 2024 with unanimous support from the 1L term loan and 1.5L notes classes and more than 99.9 percent support from the 2L notes class. Existing equity interests that voted also supported the plan. The court approved debtor releases, third party releases, and exculpation provisions as part of the confirmed plan package.

The Confirmation Order also approved an injunction to enforce the releases and exculpation provisions and included carve-outs for claims based on actual fraud, willful misconduct, criminal conduct, or gross negligence as determined by final order. The opt-out deadline for third-party releases was extended to May 7, 2024 at 4:00 p.m. Central Time, aligning with the voting timeline for the prepackaged plan.

Effective date milestones. The Notice of Effective Date set July 19, 2024 as the effective date. The notice also established administrative claims and professional fee deadlines to close out the case. A Final Decree entered July 25, 2024 closed numerous affiliate cases and left a remaining case open for continued administration and claims reconciliation.

Administrative claims (other than professional fee claims) were required to be filed by August 19, 2024, and the final professional fee deadline was set for September 3, 2024. The final decree closed many affiliate cases while leaving one remaining case open to resolve retained matters, including claims reconciliation and any remaining plan administration steps.

Release and injunction context. The confirmation order treated debtor releases as integral to the plan and characterized the third-party releases as consensual and essential to confirmation. The injunction was designed to prevent actions that would undermine the release and exculpation framework, subject to court authorization where a colorable claim is shown. These provisions are common in large prepackaged cases, but the opt-out mechanics and carve-outs for fraud and willful misconduct were important guardrails for non-consenting parties.

Voting outcomes and class treatment. The plan received unanimous support from the secured voting classes and overwhelming support from other voting classes, reflecting the pre-negotiated nature of the restructuring. Unimpaired classes were deemed to accept the plan, while impaired classes voting in favor enabled the fast confirmation timeline. This alignment between the RSA parties, the debtor, and key creditor classes helped compress the case timeline to just under four months from filing to emergence.

Emergence and ownership transition. CURO emerged on July 19, 2024 as a private company and stated that the plan relieved it of approximately $1 billion in debt and at least about $75 million of annual interest obligations. The company also highlighted recognition by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to support its Canadian operations.

Post Emergence Strategy

Brand consolidation and footprint. After emergence, the company rebranded as Attain Finance and began consolidating its U.S. storefront brand under Heights Finance while maintaining the LendDirect and Cash Money brands in Canada. The rebrand reflected a shift toward a unified retail identity as the reorganized company scaled down public company reporting obligations.

In October 2025, Attain Finance announced that all 388 U.S. branches had been rebranded under the Heights Finance name, completing the U.S. brand consolidation while keeping Canadian brands intact. The post-emergence strategy emphasized a simpler brand architecture, continuing access to installment lending products, and a focus on operational consistency across geographies.

Operations focus. The plan paid general unsecured creditors in full and left customer loan relationships intact, allowing the reorganized business to maintain storefront lending operations during the transition. Management emphasized responsible growth and long term profitability following the recapitalization.

The recapitalized balance sheet also positioned the company to lower interest expense and pursue operational efficiencies. By converting secured notes into equity and layering an exit facility alongside management incentives, the plan aimed to reduce cash interest burden while preserving liquidity for lending operations. The result was a capital structure more aligned with the company’s goal of stable, long-term installment lending growth rather than short-term, high-cost funding cycles.

Frequently Asked Questions

What does CURO Group do? CURO provides consumer finance products through a large U.S. storefront lending network and a Canadian storefront business. Its platforms offer installment loans and related financial services to underserved borrowers.

How large was CURO's storefront footprint at the petition date? Court filings describe roughly 400 U.S. store locations across 13 states and about 150 Canadian stores across eight provinces, with the largest U.S. footprints in Texas, Tennessee, and Alabama and the largest Canadian footprint in Ontario.

Why did CURO file for Chapter 11? The company pursued a prepackaged Chapter 11 to reduce leverage, lower interest expense, and address liquidity pressure while keeping operations running. The restructuring support agreement targeted about $1 billion of debt reduction and included a DIP financing commitment of $70 million.

How was the DIP facility structured? The DIP facility was capped at $70 million and structured in three tranches: an initial draw of up to $25 million, a second draw that brought total borrowings to $50 million, and a delayed draw of up to $20 million in two $10 million tranches. The Final DIP Order also tied cash collateral use to an approved budget and permitted variance framework with adequate protection for prepetition secured parties.

When was the plan confirmed and when did it go effective? The plan was confirmed on May 16, 2024 and became effective when CURO emerged on July 19, 2024.

Who took control after the restructuring? Control shifted to the senior secured stakeholder group, including funds managed by Oaktree, Caspian, and Empyrean, which received new equity through the plan.

What did existing equity holders receive? Existing equity interests received contingent value rights on the effective date under a CVR agreement and distribution framework. The framework included cash-in-lieu mechanics for recipients who could not receive CVRs due to distribution limits.

What happened to general unsecured creditors? The plan treated general unsecured claims as unimpaired, providing payment in full in the ordinary course or on the effective date.

How did the plan allocate new equity and warrants? The 1.5L notes class received the bulk of new equity, net of the 2L notes distribution and DIP equity fees. The 2L notes distribution included 10.1% of new equity plus warrants to acquire an additional 15% of new equity, and all new equity distributions were subject to dilution by a management incentive plan that reserved up to 10% of new equity.

What was the role of the DIP facility? The DIP facility provided liquidity during the court supervised process and was funded by prepetition secured stakeholders. It was structured as a priming, superpriority term loan with multiple draw options.

What exit financing did the plan contemplate? The plan called for an exit facility with first out and second out exit term loans incurred on the effective date. The exit facility served as the primary funded debt at emergence and was paired with equity distributions to secured noteholders, creating a combination of debt-funded liquidity and creditor-led equity ownership.

What liquidity thresholds applied during the case? Court filings described weekly minimum liquidity thresholds of $40 million (unrestricted cash plus undrawn DIP commitments) or $30 million (unrestricted cash only), reinforcing the need for both cash collateral access and available DIP capacity.

Did CURO face regulatory issues during the case? Yes. The CFPB lawsuit against Heights Finance Holding remained a regulatory overhang. The allegations related to practices before CURO's acquisition but were part of the risk environment during the restructuring.

Were customer loans and branch operations disrupted? The restructuring was structured as a prepack, and reports at filing indicated that customer loan relationships and branch operations were expected to remain intact throughout the process. The DIP facility and cash collateral framework were designed to provide liquidity while the plan moved to confirmation, helping keep storefront operations running during the compressed case timeline.

What were the key administrative deadlines? The effective date notice set July 19, 2024 as the effective date, with an administrative claims deadline of August 19, 2024 and a final professional fee deadline of September 3, 2024. A final decree entered July 25, 2024 closed many affiliate cases while leaving one case open for continued administration.

What changed after emergence? CURO emerged as a private company, later rebranding to Attain Finance, and began consolidating its U.S. storefronts under the Heights Finance name while continuing Canadian operations under existing brands.

How long was CURO in Chapter 11? The case ran from the March 25, 2024 filing to the July 19, 2024 effective date, for a total of about 116 days. That timeline reflects the pre-negotiated nature of the plan and the high level of creditor support established before the filing.

What were the DIP exit fee and equity fee terms? The plan defined a DIP Exit Fee equal to 10% of the DIP commitment. Half of that fee was payable in kind as additional exit term loans, and the other half was payable in new equity at a 25% discount to plan equity value. The DIP Backstop Commitment Fee added another 5% of the commitment, also payable in new equity at a 25% discount. Together, these provisions meant the DIP lenders and backstop parties received a mix of debt and equity consideration beyond repayment of DIP principal.

Who is the claims and noticing agent? Epiq Corporate Restructuring, LLC is listed as the claims and noticing agent for the cases.

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