First Brands Group, LLC and 75 affiliated debtors filed chapter 11 petitions on September 24 and 28, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (lead case 25-90399, Hon. Christopher M. Lopez), centered on allegations of fraud at the global aftermarket automotive parts supplier and owner of brands including FRAM, Raybestos, Autolite, and Cardone. The company filed with approximately $9.3 billion in total obligations amid allegations of fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and billions of dollars in missing funds.
Within weeks of filing, the U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation, founder and CEO Patrick James resigned and was subsequently sued by the company for "grievous misconduct," and an examiner was appointed with a $7 million budget to investigate alleged factoring fraud totaling $2.3 billion. The company secured a $4.4 billion DIP financing facility approved in the Final DIP Order, including a $3.3 billion roll-up of prepetition debt that DIP lenders themselves characterized as having an "impossible to price" risk profile.
By mid-May 2026 the case had resolved into a wind-down architecture. The debtors filed a on May 15, 2026 and a on May 18 — but the plan is a liquidating plan for a single debtor, Premier Marketing Group, LLC, built on a "Global Settlement" that routes estate claims into a Litigation Trust while all other First Brands debtors are slated to convert to chapter 7. The U.S. Trustee responded with a the cases, calling the settlement an "artifice" that strips the estate of its most valuable assets, and Judge Lopez approved a section 363 sale of the Toledo Molding & Die business line for an expected $80 million.
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston Division)
Case Number
25-90399 (lead case)
Judge
Hon. Christopher M. Lopez
Petition Date
September 24 & 28, 2025 (staged filing)
Type
Freefall Chapter 11 with Fraud Investigation
Debtor(s)
75 affiliated entities
Employees
~26,000 worldwide; ~6,000 in U.S.
2024 Revenue
~$5 billion
On-Balance Sheet Debt
~$6.1 billion
Off-Balance Sheet Obligations
~$2.3 billion
Alleged Factoring Fraud
~$2.3 billion
DIP Facility
$4.4 billion ($1.1B new money + $3.3B roll-up) (agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB)
Former CEO
Patrick James (resigned October 13, 2025)
Interim CEO
Charles M. Moore (Alvarez & Marsal)
Plan Status
Liquidating chapter 11 plan filed May 15, 2026 for one debtor (Premier Marketing Group, LLC); confirmation hearing targeted for June 17, 2026
Current Posture
Global Settlement wind-down; all FBG debtors other than the Plan Debtor slated to convert to chapter 7
Case Snapshot
Company Background and the First Brands Enterprise
First Brands Group emerged as an aftermarket automotive parts supplier in North America through a debt-fueled acquisition strategy. The company assembled a portfolio of brands that supply both do-it-yourself consumers and professional automotive repair facilities worldwide, generating approximately $5 billion in annual revenue and employing roughly 26,000 workers globally.
The Brand Portfolio.
The First Brands portfolio includes FRAM filters, Autolite spark plugs since 1935, Raybestos brake components, and Trico windshield wipers.
Brand
Category
Heritage
FRAM
Oil & Air Filters
Since 1934
Autolite
Spark Plugs
Since 1935
Raybestos
Brake Components
Brand
Trico
Windshield Wipers
Brand
Cardone
Remanufactured Parts
Largest remanufacturer
StopTech
Performance Brakes
Performance segment
Centric
Brake Products
Professional market
Luber-finer
Heavy-Duty Filtration
Commercial fleet
The acquisition strategy extended beyond consumer-facing brands. Cardone became the largest remanufacturer of automotive parts in North America, while StopTech focused on the performance brake segment. The company's heavy-duty filtration brand Luber-finer served commercial fleet operators, and Centric supplied professional brake products to repair shops nationwide. This diverse portfolio made First Brands a supplier in the automotive aftermarket supply chain.
Growth Through Acquisition.
First Brands' business model centered on acquiring established aftermarket brands and consolidating them under one corporate umbrella. The strategy produced revenue growth but accumulated significant debt with each transaction. The company's corporate structure eventually encompassed 75 affiliated entities, multiple special purpose vehicles, and off-balance sheet financing arrangements that later became central to the fraud allegations.
Patrick James founded and led the company through its acquisition strategy, serving as CEO until his October 2025 resignation. The ownership structure included private equity sponsors and institutional investors who provided capital for the roll-up strategy. The complexity of the corporate structure—particularly the SPV arrangements and factoring facilities—is a focus of the fraud allegations and related analysis in the private debt market commentary.
The Fraud Allegations
At the center of First Brands' chapter 11 case are allegations of fraud involving fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and billions of dollars that cannot be accounted for. The allegations have drawn comparisons to the Greensill Capital collapse in supply chain finance markets in 2021.
Fabricated Invoices and Double-Pledged Receivables.
The core fraud allegations center on approximately $2.3 billion in factoring liabilities that the company accrued through what court filings describe as fabricated invoices and double-pledging of receivables. In supply chain financing, companies sell their accounts receivable to factoring counterparties at a discount in exchange for immediate cash. First Brands allegedly created invoices for goods or services that did not exist and pledged the same receivables to multiple factoring parties—collecting cash multiple times on the same (or fictitious) underlying transaction.
The allegations extend to multiple SPV structures within the First Brands corporate family. As factoring counterparties attempted to collect on their purchased receivables, they discovered that the underlying invoices either did not correspond to actual transactions or had already been pledged to other parties. The reconciliation of these claims has become a central issue in the bankruptcy case, with factoring procedures motions seeking to establish a framework for sorting legitimate from fraudulent claims.
DOJ Criminal Investigation.
The U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal inquiry in October 2025, with the Southern District of New York leading the investigation. The DOJ investigation runs parallel to the bankruptcy proceedings.
CEO Resignation and Lawsuit.
Patrick James resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025, approximately two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The resignation followed reports of pressure from creditors and board members as the scope of the alleged fraud emerged.
The company moved quickly from accepting James's resignation to suing him. On November 3, 2025, the debtors filed an adversary proceeding against James and related entities asserting claims for fraud, misappropriation of funds, turnover, and fraudulent transfer. The court granted a temporary restraining order against James that same day, though a preliminary injunction was subsequently denied on November 12 after the court found insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.
The lawsuit against James alleges "grievous misconduct" that damaged the company and its stakeholders. Reports indicate allegations that more than $700 million was transferred to insiders prior to the bankruptcy filing. The adversary proceeding remains pending as the examiner investigation proceeds.
Examiner Investigation.
The court appointed Martin De Luca of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP as examiner on November 19, 2025, with a $7 million budget to investigate the factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions. The court approved the examiner's Work Plan in January 2026. The examiner's appointment followed motions from Raistone and the U.S. Trustee seeking independent investigation of the alleged fraud.
The scope of the examiner's investigation has itself become a contested issue. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors seeks a broader inquiry than the debtors originally proposed, arguing that a comprehensive investigation is necessary to understand the full extent of potential claims against insiders and third parties. Discussions regarding information sharing between the examiner and governmental agencies, including the DOJ, remain part of the record.
Pre-Petition Capital Structure
First Brands' capital structure included on-balance sheet debt, off-balance sheet obligations, and factoring liabilities.
On-Balance Sheet Funded Debt.
The company's disclosed funded debt totaled approximately $6.1 billion at the petition date according to the First Day Declaration, distributed across multiple secured facilities:
Debt Instrument
Amount Outstanding
ABL Facility
$227 million
First Lien Term Loan
$3,886.9 million
Additional First Lien Term Loan
$763 million
Second Lien Facility
$540 million
Side-Car Term Loan (accelerated)
$276 million
Total On-Balance Sheet
~$6.1 billion
The first lien term loans alone exceeded $4.6 billion, reflecting the company's reliance on leveraged lending to fund acquisitions. The side-car term loan had already been accelerated prior to the filing, adding to the company's liquidity crisis. The First Day Declaration describes annual debt service costs exceeding $900 million alongside the operational issues that preceded the filing.
The Onset master leases represent the largest single off-balance sheet exposure at approximately $1.9 billion. These obligations were accelerated prior to the bankruptcy filing, converting what had been structured as periodic payments into immediate claims against the estate. The Evolution, CarVal, and Aequum facilities together contributed roughly $470 million more. The filing lists approximately $800 million in unsecured supply chain financing liabilities separately from the off-balance sheet total.
The alleged factoring fraud added another layer of obligations. The company accrued approximately $2.3 billion in third-party factoring liabilities—though the legitimacy of these claims is precisely what the examiner has been appointed to investigate. The double-pledging allegations mean that multiple parties may have claims to the same underlying receivables, and fabricated invoice allegations suggest some portion of the factoring liabilities may be disputed.
Major Creditor Exposure.
Several major financial institutions face exposure from the First Brands case:
UBS: Exposure exceeding $500 million through its O'Connor hedge fund unit
Jefferies: Approximately $715 million via Leucadia/Point Bonita investment vehicles
Onset Financial: ~$1.9 billion in master lease obligations
Bank of America: ABL facility agent with exposure
SouthState Bank: Working capital lending facilities
The UBS exposure through O'Connor has drawn attention. The fund reportedly held 30% concentration in First Brands-related financing, prompting UBS to announce it would wind down the O'Connor funds.
Liquidity Crisis and Filing Triggers
The immediate trigger for the bankruptcy filing was a liquidity crisis precipitated by multiple pressures. New U.S. tariffs implemented in April 2025 increased First Brands' landed inventory costs, with court filings indicating approximately $99 million in additional costs between April and August 2025. The tariff announcement forced First Brands to pre-buy inventory before higher rates took effect, accelerating cash outflows and exacerbating working capital challenges.
These pressures escalated when Bank of America, acting as agent under the ABL facility, refused a draw request and established a $200 million reserve for what it alleged was an overadvance on the facility. The bank also threatened to implement cash dominion remedies, which would have given it control over the company's cash receipts. Simultaneously, SouthState Bank exercised setoff rights against approximately $27 million in First Brands' working capital deposits. The combined effect created an immediate cash crisis that left the company unable to meet payroll and vendor obligations without filing for bankruptcy protection.
Before resorting to bankruptcy, First Brands attempted to address its capital structure through out-of-court refinancing. The company marketed a global refinancing process seeking $6.2 billion in new financing to address debt maturities and liquidity needs. The process failed as potential lenders, confronted with the complex capital structure, limited unencumbered assets, and emerging concerns about the factoring arrangements, declined to participate. A subsequent bridge financing marketing process also proved unsuccessful. With refinancing options exhausted and lenders taking adverse action, First Brands secured a $24.5 million pre-petition bridge loan to fund payroll and vendor payments while preparing for a bankruptcy filing.
Compounding these challenges, the company's growth-through-acquisition strategy had created ongoing integration costs that burdened operations. Court filings indicate nearly $160 million in upfront integration costs over the twelve months preceding the filing. Combined with the leverage burden, these integration costs reduced liquidity flexibility when tariff pressures and lender actions created acute liquidity stress.
$4.4 Billion DIP Financing
The DIP financing secured by First Brands reflects the scale of the enterprise and the risk profile created by the fraud allegations.
Facility Structure.
The senior secured superpriority DIP credit facility totals $4.4 billion, structured as a combination of new money and roll-up debt:
Term
Details
Total Facility
$4.4 billion
New Money DIP Loans
$1.1 billion
Roll-Up Obligations
$3.3 billion (creeping roll-up)
DIP Agent
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
DIP Lenders
Ad Hoc Group of First/Second Lien Cross-Holders
Maturity
270 days from initial funding (extendable)
The new money component provides $1.1 billion in fresh liquidity. At the interim stage, $500 million was available—$175 million immediately accessible and $325 million held in escrow under the Interim DIP Order. The remaining $600 million became available upon entry of the final DIP order. These funds support ongoing operations, professional fees, and the restructuring process.
The $3.3 billion roll-up converts prepetition first and second lien debt into superpriority DIP obligations, implemented through a "creeping" structure: $1.5 billion rolled up upon entry of the interim order, with the remaining $1.8 billion rolling up under the final order. This approach, rather than rolling up all prepetition debt simultaneously, provided some accommodation to objecting parties while improving the DIP lenders' position in the capital structure.
Pricing and Premiums.
The DIP facility pricing reflects the risk profile of lending to an enterprise under fraud investigation:
Component
Rate/Amount
New Money Interest
SOFR + 1.55% cash + 8.45% PIK
Roll-Up Interest
SOFR + 7.0% PIK
Anchor Premium
10.0% PIK
Upfront Premium
5.0% PIK
Exit Premium
5.0% cash
Carve-Out Cap
$25 million
The combined pricing on new money—SOFR plus 10% (split between cash and PIK)—plus the anchor, upfront, and exit premiums, reflects the terms approved in the Final DIP Order. The DIP lenders justified the pricing by characterizing the facility as "wholly unprecedented" with an "impossible to price" risk profile given the fraud allegations and complex collateral disputes.
DIP Financing Objections.
The DIP facility faced objections from the Unsecured Creditors Committee and SPV lenders including CarVal, Aequum, Evolution, and Onset. Key objections centered on:
The $3.3 billion roll-up, which improved the DIP lenders' position at the expense of other stakeholders
Fees and premiums that objectors characterized as excessive
Priming liens that subordinated existing creditors' collateral positions
Broad releases and waivers that limited the estate's ability to pursue claims against the DIP lenders
After negotiations and stipulations, the court approved the DIP facility with some modifications in the Final DIP Order. However, certain disputes—particularly regarding SPV collateral—remain unresolved. The $24.5 million pre-petition bridge loan that funded payroll and vendor payments in the days immediately before filing was repaid from DIP proceeds upon interim funding. At the First Day hearing, counsel described the filing as a "mad dash into Chapter 11" that left the company with virtually no cash on hand. The bridge loan allowed First Brands to make payroll and fund vendor payments before filing.
SPV Collateral Disputes
The special purpose vehicle structures that facilitated First Brands' off-balance sheet financing have become a source of litigation in the bankruptcy case. Multiple SPV lenders assert claims to collateral that the debtors and DIP lenders also claim, creating priority disputes in the case.
Complex SPV Structure.
First Brands utilized multiple SPVs to structure its off-balance sheet financing arrangements. Each SPV typically held specific assets—inventory, equipment, or receivables—that secured the SPV-level financing. The SPV lenders, including CarVal, Aequum, Evolution, Onset, and UMB Bank, assert that their collateral remains separate from the debtors' estates and should not be available to satisfy DIP or other creditor claims. The debtors and DIP lenders take a different view, arguing that the SPV structures were part of an integrated enterprise and that alleged fraud in the SPV transactions may invalidate the SPV lenders' claims to priority. These disputes involve questions of corporate separateness, fraudulent transfer, and lien priority.
The Onset master leases represent the largest SPV dispute at approximately $1.9 billion. Onset has filed motions for stay relief, asserting that its collateral should be released from the automatic stay so it can pursue its remedies. The debtors have opposed these motions, arguing that the lease collateral is essential to ongoing operations and that Onset's claims may be subject to challenge based on the fraud allegations. Multiple SPV-related motions remain pending, including stay relief motions seeking to lift the automatic stay and permit SPV lenders to pursue collateral, trustee appointment motions seeking independent trustees for certain SPV debtors, enforcement actions that were automatically stayed upon filing, and professional retention objections based on conflicts from simultaneous representation of FBG debtors and SPV debtors. The court has suggested appointment of independent conflicts counsel for the SPV debtors to address the conflicts in having the same professionals represent both the parent debtors and the SPV entities whose interests may diverge.
April 2026 Sale Process, SPV Conversion, and Wind-Down
The case shifted into an active sale and wind-down phase in April 2026, with three material orders entered in eight days.
Evolution SPV Debtors converted to Chapter 7 (April 9, 2026). Judge Christopher M. Lopez signed Order (I) Converting Chapter 11 Cases of Evolution SPV Debtors to Cases Under Chapter 7 at docket 2396 on April 9, 2026, granting Evolution Credit Partners' March 11 emergency motion for conversion of certain SPV debtors. The order followed an agreed settlement among the debtors, Evolution, and the SPV Conflict Manager memorialized in the debtors' April 8 emergency settlement motion and supported by Charles Moore's declaration. The conversion is partial — only the Evolution-related SPV debtor entities move to chapter 7 wind-down; the main First Brands Group estate and the other affiliated debtors remain in chapter 11. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Ad Hoc Group of Lenders, and the SPV Conflict Manager all filed responses or joinders in the run-up to the order.
Jefferies stock falls 7.9% on $715M Point Bonita exposure (April 15, 2026). Jefferies Financial Group's shares lost 7.9% in a trading session after fresh disclosure of its 6% equity interest in the Point Bonita fund, which carried roughly $715 million in exposure to First Brands. Jefferies had previously taken a $30 million pre-tax loss tied to First Brands in its January 2026 quarterly earnings, and a Point Bonita fund investor lawsuit was filed in February 2026 over the disclosures Jefferies made around the time of the bankruptcy.
Global Settlement and the Premier Marketing Group Plan
The case moved from an open-ended wind-down to a defined plan structure in late April 2026. The debtors filed an initial Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization on April 28, 2026 and a Disclosure Statement the following day, then filed a further Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization on May 15, 2026 alongside a Notice of Filing Revised Chapter 11 Plan attaching a redline against the prior version. Despite being filed under the First Brands Group lead-case caption, the plan is a liquidating plan for a single debtor — Premier Marketing Group, LLC, case number 25-90420 — and not a reorganization of the operating business. It provides for the wind-down and dissolution of Premier Marketing Group and routes estate assets into three liquidating trusts. Following the plan's effective date, all First Brands debtors other than the Plan Debtor are slated to convert to chapter 7 liquidation cases.
The plan is built on a "Global Settlement" among the debtors, the Ad Hoc Group of lenders, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Disclosure Statement filed May 18, 2026 frames the settlement as the only path to any recovery for junior creditors: absent the settlement, the debtors state, administrative, priority, and general unsecured creditors might receive zero recovery because senior secured obligations — DIP claims and prepetition term loans — total approximately $7.5 billion and hold senior liens on the estate claims.
Class structure. The plan classifies claims and interests in eight classes. Class 1 (Other Priority Claims) and Class 2 (Other Secured Claims) are unimpaired and presumed to accept. Class 3 (Roll-Up Claims), Class 4 (First Lien Claims), Class 5 (Second Lien Claims), Class 6 (ABL Claims), and Class 7 (General Unsecured Claims) are impaired and entitled to vote. Class 8 (Plan Debtor Interests) is impaired and deemed to reject.
The three trusts. The Litigation Trust holds estate claims and causes of action and is to be funded with at least $75 million — $25 million in cash from the First Brands debtors' balance sheet plus $50 million in Initial Litigation Trust Funding Commitments from Class 1 Funding Contributors. The plan also authorizes up to $37.5 million of Additional Class 1 Litigation Trust Funding, raised by majority vote of the Litigation Trust Oversight Board. Distributions follow a Litigation Trust Waterfall under which holders of administrative, priority, and general unsecured claims — excluding "Ineligible Creditors" — receive distributions before the new-money DIP A claims are paid in full; after aggregate distributions reach $400 million, holders of Roll-Up, First Lien, Second Lien, and Eligible Creditor claims begin sharing. The ABL Collateral Trust holds ABL Priority Collateral where no bona fide dispute exists over the ABL Secured Parties' perfected lien, amounts in the Factored Receivables Account subject to court determination, and certain insurance rights, with the ABL Agent or its designee as trustee. A DIP Collateral Trust completes the structure.
Eligible versus Ineligible Creditors. Under the plan, administrative, priority, and general unsecured creditors of the First Brands debtors are collectively defined as "Eligible Creditors" and receive Class 3(b) Litigation Trust Interests. Participation does not discharge or compromise the underlying claims, which remain preserved against the First Brands debtors. Parties named in the "James Complaint" or "Onset Complaint," and parties found to have engaged in "Adverse Conduct," are designated Ineligible Creditors and excluded from the Global Settlement benefits. The revised plan redline defines the $37.5 million Additional Class 1 Litigation Trust Funding and a separate Additional Waterfall Litigation Trust Funding, restructures the DIP Collateral Trust into three classes with a $500 minimum participation threshold for DIP A and Roll-Up claim holders, ties the Ad Hoc Group steering committee to the case Mediation Order rather than a plan support agreement, and deletes the former Article IX Direct Claims Trust entirely.
The debtors are pursuing a conditional disclosure statement approval approach, seeking an order that conditionally approves the Disclosure Statement under section 1125, sets a combined hearing on final approval and plan confirmation, and establishes solicitation and voting procedures. The disclosure statement hearing originally set for May 13, 2026 was adjourned to May 20, 2026. The Amended Declaration of Charles M. Moore supporting the proposed confirmation schedule, filed May 18, sets a compressed timeline: a voting and election record date of May 19, 2026; a conditional disclosure statement hearing on May 20; a voting deadline and release opt-in deadline of June 10, 2026 at 5:00 p.m. Central Time; a combined disclosure statement and plan objection deadline of June 10; and a confirmation hearing on June 17, 2026, subject to the court's availability. Moore states the case must move expeditiously because the debtors rely on week-to-week funding from OEM customers expected to cease within weeks of the closing of the Horizon North America sale, with available liquidity projected to be exhausted less than two weeks after OEM funding ceases — without confirmation on this schedule, the debtors say they would be forced into a value-destructive conversion to chapter 7.
A separate Premier Marketing Group disclosure statement track drew an objection from Total Quality Logistics, LLC, which asserts an administrative claim of $268,499.20 for 114 unpaid post-petition logistics invoices. Total Quality Logistics objected that the disclosure statement fails to provide adequate information under section 1125 — it lacks any valuation of the Litigation Trust or recovery estimate for administrative claims, violates the DIP Order's requirement to pay DIP loan parties' administrative expenses collectively, contains contradictory language about the effect of creditor inaction, and improperly requires irrevocable opt-out elections before the plan's confirmability is determined. A revised Premier Marketing Group disclosure statement was filed May 18, 2026.
U.S. Trustee Motion to Convert or Dismiss
On May 13, 2026, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to convert or dismiss the cases under 11 U.S.C. section 1112(b), seeking an order converting the cases to chapter 7 or dismissing them. The U.S. Trustee argues that the debtors are administratively insolvent and cannot confirm a plan that satisfies the Bankruptcy Code, citing section 1112(b)(4)(A) — substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate combined with the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation — on the grounds that the debtors have negative cash flow, cannot pay current expenses, and have sold or intend to sell all marketable businesses.
The U.S. Trustee characterizes the Global Settlement as an "artifice" and a "sleight of hand" designed to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code. The motion argues the settlement strips the estate's most valuable remaining assets — the Estate Claims — by transferring them to the Plan Debtor without consideration, leaving the First Brands debtors with liabilities but no assets; that the DIP Secured Parties are improperly attempting to credit bid for Estate Claims despite holding liens only on the proceeds of such claims; and that the structure forces administrative claimants into an opt-out procedure that makes them share pari passu with other creditors in violation of the strict priority of section 1129. The U.S. Trustee states the debtors propose to pay over $245 million in professional fees while roughly $223 million in other administrative claims remain unpaid, and that the $3.3 billion of DIP Roll-Up Obligations are subordinated to about $200 million of undisputed administrative claims.
TMD Sale and Wind-Down Expansion
The debtors pursued a section 363 sale of the Toledo Molding & Die business line, an automotive plastics and components operation. SB360 Capital Partners, LLC, marketing the wind-down assets, began contacting potential bidders and stakeholders in late January 2026; by February 5, 2026 the debtors had received roughly 40 non-binding indications of interest across several business units, including five going-concern indications specifically for Toledo Molding & Die. After negotiations with a previous lead bidder stalled, the debtors reengaged the eventual buyer in April 2026, and in mid-April SB360 re-contacted 42 parties that had previously expressed interest, none of which submitted a proposal exceeding the value of the proposed transaction. SB360 concluded that the sale represented the highest or otherwise best available alternative for the business and that an auction was unlikely to yield a better result.
A sale hearing was held on May 13, 2026, and Judge Lopez entered the TMD sale order on May 14, 2026, authorizing the sale of the Toledo Molding & Die assets free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests to TNJ Ohio LLC, with WMC – KSA Holdings LLC as guarantor under the asset purchase agreement. The sale is expected to generate approximately $80 million of proceeds for the debtors' stakeholders. The order approves the assumption and assignment of executory contracts, unexpired personal-property and non-residential real-property leases, and customer purchase orders, and authorizes assumption and assignment of two collective bargaining agreements. A Notice of Closing of Sale Transaction was filed May 15, 2026.
The debtors also expanded the slate of wound-down brands. A Notice of Expansion of Wind Down Brands filed May 15, 2026 adds the Filters and Plugs unit — Champion Laboratories, Fram Group Operations, Framauto Holdings, and Jasper Rubber Products — the Trico unit of Pylon Manufacturing, Trico Products, and Trico Technologies, the Pumps unit of ASC Industries and Carter Fuel Systems, and Hopkins Acquisition, Inc., implemented under the court's April 16, 2026 wind-down order.
Case Timeline
Date
Event
April 2025
New tariffs implemented; ~$99M additional costs
September 2025
Bank of America refuses draw; SouthState exercises setoff
September 24 & 28, 2025
Petition dates (staged filing for 75 debtors)
October 1, 2025
First Day Hearing; Interim DIP Order approved ($500M access)
October 9, 2025
DOJ opens criminal investigation
October 13, 2025
CEO Patrick James resigns; Charles Moore named Interim CEO
October 29, 2025
Original Final DIP/Second Day Hearing date
November 3, 2025
Adversary proceeding filed against James; TRO granted
November 6-7, 2025
Final DIP Hearing
November 7, 2025
Final DIP Order entered ($1.1B full access)
November 12, 2025
Preliminary injunction denied in adversary proceeding
November 17, 2025
Examiner Appointment Hearing
November 19, 2025
Examiner Appointment Order entered ($7M budget)
December 8, 2025
Professional Retention Hearing; SPV stipulations
December 16, 2025
U.S. Trustee files application to approve examiner
Evolution files emergency motion to convert SPV cases to Ch 7
March 23, 2026
Wind-down sale / Hilco consulting motion filed
March 26, 2026
IP sale motion filed
April 8, 2026
UBS and Financial Institution Fallout
The First Brands case has created losses for financial institutions that provided capital through supply chain financing structures. The UBS situation has drawn comparisons to Greensill.
UBS O'Connor Fund Impact.
UBS's exposure to First Brands through its O'Connor hedge fund unit exceeds $500 million. The O'Connor funds had concentrated capital in First Brands financing arrangements, with reports indicating approximately 30% exposure to the company. Following the bankruptcy filing and fraud allegations, UBS announced it would wind down the affected O'Connor funds.
Private credit market implications. The supply chain financing model that First Brands utilized—selling receivables through SPVs and factoring arrangements—resembled the structures that led to Greensill's collapse.
Labor and Operational Continuity
Despite the fraud allegations and financial distress, First Brands has continued operating its business throughout the chapter 11 case, maintaining employment for its approximately 26,000 global workers. The company employs roughly 6,000 workers in the United States, with the remainder distributed across global manufacturing and distribution operations. The DIP financing has provided liquidity to maintain payroll and vendor payments.
First Brands supplies parts for routine maintenance and repairs. Two UAW locals—Local 1181 and Local 9699—represent portions of the workforce, and the company has negotiated collective bargaining agreement extensions through stipulations approved by the court.
Professional Roster
The First Brands case includes a professional roster reflecting its size and complexity.
Debtors' Professionals.
Role
Firm
Lead Counsel
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Financial Advisor/CRO Provider
Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC
Interim CEO
Charles M. Moore (A&M)
Co-Chief Restructuring Officers
Daniel Jerneycic and Gaurav Malhotra (A&M)
Investment Banker
Lazard Frères & Co. LLC
Appraiser
Hilco Global, LLC
Tax Advisor
Ernst & Young LLP
Claims & Noticing Agent
Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC
Charles Moore, the Alvarez & Marsal managing director serving as Interim CEO, brings restructuring experience to the role, including involvement in the City of Detroit chapter 9 case. Moore replaced Patrick James following the founder's October resignation and has overseen the company's stabilization efforts during the initial months of the case.
The UCC has been active in the case, filing objections to the DIP financing, seeking an expanded examiner investigation, and advocating for unsecured creditor interests in the various collateral disputes.
Examiner.
Role
Details
Examiner
Martin De Luca
Firm
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
Budget
$7 million
Scope
Investigation of factoring and off-balance sheet financing
Path Forward
As of mid-May 2026, the case has moved from an open-ended wind-down into a defined liquidating-plan process. The Evolution SPV Debtors are in chapter 7 wind-down under the April 9 conversion order, the IP estate has been sold to PGI Northstar under the April 10 sale order, the April 16 wind-down sale order authorizes Hilco to monetize wind-down inventory and receivables, and the section 363 sale of the Toledo Molding & Die business line to TNJ Ohio LLC closed in May 2026.
Current Status.
The debtors have filed a chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement built on the Global Settlement, with a conditional disclosure statement hearing set for May 20, 2026 and a confirmation hearing targeted for June 17, 2026. The U.S. Trustee's motion to convert or dismiss the cases remains unresolved, as does the Total Quality Logistics objection to the disclosure statement. Plan voting, the conditional disclosure statement ruling, and the confirmation outcome are the next milestones.
The examiner investigation continues; Martin De Luca and Boies Schiller Flexner are conducting their examination of the factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions under the $7 million budget. The adversary proceeding against Patrick James remains pending; on April 15, 2026 the debtors filed a reply in support of the converted motion for summary judgment at adversary docket 48, advancing the dispute toward summary judgment on the fraud and misappropriation claims.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did First Brands file for bankruptcy?
First Brands filed chapter 11 due to a combination of factors: alleged $2.3 billion factoring fraud created unplanned liabilities; Bank of America refused funding and SouthState Bank exercised setoffs, triggering an immediate liquidity crisis; total obligations of approximately $9.3 billion could not be serviced; April 2025 tariffs added approximately $99 million in costs; and failed refinancing efforts left no out-of-court alternatives.
What is the alleged fraud?
The fraud allegations center on fabricated invoices submitted to factoring counterparties and double-pledging of the same receivables to multiple lenders. The allegations involve billions of dollars that cannot be accounted for. The DOJ opened a criminal investigation in October 2025, and an examiner with a $7 million budget is investigating the factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions.
What happened to CEO Patrick James?
Patrick James resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025, approximately two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The company subsequently sued James in an adversary proceeding alleging fraud, misappropriation of funds, and "grievous misconduct." A temporary restraining order was granted against James, though a preliminary injunction was later denied. Reports indicate allegations of more than $700 million transferred to insiders.
How large is the DIP financing?
The DIP facility totals $4.4 billion. It includes $1.1 billion in new money and a $3.3 billion roll-up of prepetition first and second lien debt. DIP lenders characterized the facility as "wholly unprecedented" with an "impossible to price" risk profile given the fraud allegations.
Will FRAM and other brands continue operating?
Yes, the DIP financing provides liquidity to maintain operations during the chapter 11 case. The approximately 26,000 employees worldwide continue working, and the automotive aftermarket supply chain is being maintained.
Who is exposed to losses?
Major financial institution exposures include: UBS with more than $500 million via O'Connor funds (prompting fund wind-down); Jefferies with approximately $715 million via Leucadia/Point Bonita vehicles; Onset Financial with approximately $1.9 billion in master lease obligations; and Bank of America and SouthState Bank through lending facilities. Additional factoring counterparties and trade creditors face exposures.
What is the examiner investigating?
Examiner Martin De Luca of Boies Schiller Flexner is investigating factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions with a $7 million budget. The investigation will examine the alleged fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and missing funds. The UCC has sought a broader investigation scope than originally proposed.
How does this compare to Greensill?
The First Brands case shares similarities with the 2021 Greensill Capital failure: both involved supply chain financing structures, alleged fabricated invoices, and concentrated fund exposures.
Is there a reorganization plan?
The debtors filed a chapter 11 plan on May 15, 2026 and a disclosure statement on May 18, but it is a liquidating plan for a single debtor — Premier Marketing Group, LLC — not a reorganization of the operating business. Built on a "Global Settlement," it routes estate claims into a Litigation Trust and provides for all other First Brands debtors to convert to chapter 7. A conditional disclosure statement hearing is set for May 20, 2026 and a confirmation hearing is targeted for June 17, 2026. The U.S. Trustee has moved to convert or dismiss the cases, opposing the plan structure.
What are the implications for private credit markets?
The case has focused attention on off-balance sheet financing structures used in supply chain finance.
Who is the claims agent for First Brands Group?
Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC serves as the claims and noticing agent. The court-authorized role in this case anchors creditor notices and claims-register administration to the filed retention and noticing record.
Order (A) Authorizing and Approving Sale of Certain of Debtors' Intellectual Property Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests /documents/1f90cc6c-72cf-44f5-b886-190d5761bd85/
emergency motion at docket 2236 /documents/ec006b4f-d64f-4e8b-b354-80cba294595a/
Order Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (I) Approving and Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into and Perform Under the Consulting Agreement; (II) Authorizing the Sale of Wind Down Assets Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, and Encumbrances; and (III) Granting Related Relief /documents/b36fe32c-b91e-4067-9378-6553c5b3ff03/
emergency motion at docket 2216 /documents/9d7ba6b8-fadc-4dbc-823d-99e9a3b9e2e8/
retention order /documents/46246a5e-f59d-44d1-83da-cef3aba5fa03/
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization /documents/66ed7c73-5589-4ca4-bf11-cdc9d28dd9a5/
TMD sale order /documents/87220718-dc7a-447f-b4f9-21f2fbd3164d/
Notice of Closing of Sale Transaction /documents/efade868-6c15-4e99-a121-e9aaed4046d4/
Notice of Expansion of Wind Down Brands /documents/33193e64-1ed4-4640-a0d6-6f65c22bbde9/
reply in support of the converted motion for summary judgment /documents/4ebdc762-dc24-4c0e-8417-22b4647607a6/
$9.3 billion in total obligations https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-29/auto-parts-supplier-first-brands-files-for-bankruptcy
U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/us-justice-department-opens-investigation-into-first-brands-bankruptcy-2025-10-09/
aftermarket automotive parts supplier https://prod.crainsdetroit.com/manufacturing/who-first-brands-and-why-are-they-bankruptcy
FRAM filters https://thebrakereport.com/confirmed-first-brands-group-files-u-s-chapter-11/
since 1935 https://www.autolite.com/about
supplier in the automotive aftermarket supply chain https://www.motortrend.com/news/first-brands-group-auto-parts-supplier-bankruptcy-spells-trouble-for-everyone-who-owns-car-truck-suv
Greensill Capital collapse https://www.luther-lawfirm.com/en/newsroom/blog/detail/ubs-funds-and-the-insolvency-of-first-brands-a-new-greensill-debacle-for-investors
$2.3 billion in factoring liabilities https://www.funderintel.com/post/the-2-3-billion-vanishing-act-first-brands-and-the-factoring-fraud-that-shocked-wall-street
resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-13/first-brands-founder-patrick-james-resigns-as-ceo
temporary restraining order https://www.dandodiary.com/2025/11/articles/director-and-officer-liability/first-brands-sues-its-founder-for-grievous-misconduct/
wind down the O'Connor funds https://www.advisorhub.com/ubs-winds-down-oconnor-funds-in-sign-of-first-brands-strain/
March 11 emergency motion https://www.law360.com/articles/2405286/spirit-airlines-gets-final-ok-for-1-23b-ch-11-financing
$25 million plus additional payments tied to net sales https://www.just-auto.com/news/first-brands-sell-brand-portfolio-pgi/
given competing bidder NOCO 48 hours to put a competing bid on the table https://www.truckpartsandservice.com/business/finance/article/15821611/judge-grants-noco-48-hours-to-challenge-pgi-bid-for-first-brands-ip
withdrew its objection on April 9 https://www.truckpartsandservice.com/business/finance/article/15821892/noco-withdraws-objection-to-first-brands-ip-sale-to-pgi
shares lost 7.9% in a trading session https://finance.yahoo.com/news/jef-stock-slides-revealing-exposure-145300318.html
taken a $30 million pre-tax loss https://www.bankingdive.com/news/jefferies-30-million-loss-first-brands/809117/
Point Bonita fund investor lawsuit https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-25/jefferies-fund-sued-by-investors-over-first-brands-collapse
slated to convert to chapter 7 https://know.creditsights.com/insights/us-emea-bankruptcy-first-brands-proposes-chapter-11-plan-for-one-debtor-with-chapter-7-conversion-set-for-all-other-debtors/
supply chain financing model https://www.abfjournal.com/middle-market-debt-weekly-first-brands-collapse-spurs-scrutiny-of-off-balance-sheet-financing/
Brown Rudnick LLP https://brownrudnick.com/client_news/brown-rudnick-to-represent-unsecured-creditors-in-first-brands-group-bankruptcy/
This article was researched and written with AI assistance, using court filings, public records, and news sources. AI-generated content can contain errors. Verify all information against primary sources before relying on it. This is not legal or financial advice. See the disclaimer.