LuxUrban Hotels Converts to Chapter 7 in 37 Days Amid 85 Lawsuits

LuxUrban Hotels entered chapter 11 on September 14, 2025 with no operating hotels, no debtor-in-possession financing, no cash collateral motion, and no ordinary first-day relief for wages, utilities, or critical vendors. Thirty-seven days later, the case ended with a conversion order sending the debtors into chapter 7 after management conceded that neither a reorganization nor consensual cash collateral use appeared achievable on reasonable terms.

That short run mattered because the collapse was already visible in the filing record. The U.S. Trustee's motion to appoint a chapter 11 trustee described unpaid wages, unremitted 401(k) contributions, continued hotel bookings at closed properties, and a tax claim that dwarfed the debtors' own revenue disclosures. Public reporting added the consumer-facing dimension: guests arrived at locked hotels and workers were left without pay as the company moved from an asset-light hotel roll-up to liquidation in just over five weeks.

Debtor(s)	LuxUrban Hotels Inc. and LuxUrban RE Holdings LLC
Court	U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York
Case Number	25-12000
Petition Date	September 14, 2025
Judge	Hon. David S. Jones
Debtor at Filing	LuxUrban Hotels Inc. (public parent, Nasdaq ticker LUXH)
Business Model	Master lease hotel operator
Hotels at Filing	Four Manhattan hotels, all non-operational
DIP Facility	None
Conversion Date	October 21, 2025
Chapter 11 Duration	37 days

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LuxUrban Hotels Converts to Chapter 7 in 37 Days Amid 85 Lawsuits

What are the key takeaways from “LuxUrban Hotels Converts to Chapter 7 in 37 Days Amid 85 Lawsuits”?

How the case arrived as a free-fall filing

LuxUrban built its business by signing master leases on hotel properties it did not own, then operating those hotels directly. At its peak, the company controlled more than 1,000 rooms in multiple cities and marketed the model as a way to scale hotel operations without tying up capital in real estate ownership.

By the petition date, that strategy had narrowed to four Manhattan properties. The second application to extend the deadline for schedules identified the remaining portfolio as the Herald, the Tuscany, Hotel 27, and Hotel 46, totaling 446 rooms. The same filing showed that LuxUrban Hotels Inc. and LuxUrban RE Holdings LLC were the only debtors in the jointly administered case.

Public reporting had been flagging stress well before bankruptcy. LuxUrban agreed to vacate Hotel 57 in exchange for a release from roughly $14 million in unpaid rent and union-related obligations, and the company had already been hit with a Nasdaq deficiency notice tied to reporting failures. Its third-quarter 2024 results showed net rental revenue of $13.1 million, down from $31.2 million a year earlier.

What the filing record said on day one

The voluntary petition and joint administration order set the procedural baseline, but the more revealing fact was what the debtors did not file. The U.S. Trustee later emphasized that LuxUrban sought no wage relief, no cash management relief, no critical-vendor relief, no utilities relief, and no DIP financing. For a hospitality business that had already shut its remaining hotels, the absence of those motions signaled that chapter 11 was not being used to stabilize operations.

The debtors' capital structure also looked strained before any contested matter began. The petition listed about $14.9 million outstanding under senior secured notes bearing 18% interest, roughly $5.2 million owed to merchant cash advance lenders, and a broad litigation overhang. The U.S. Trustee said the debtors or their predecessors were facing no fewer than 85 lawsuits at filing.

Cash was scarce. Aareal Capital's later joinder and cross-motion put the debtors' cash at about $50,000 as of the first-day hearing. That mattered because LuxUrban never obtained financing to reopen properties or protect remaining relationships with landlords and vendors.

Four hotels remained, but none were operating

The filing record shows that chapter 11 began after the operating platform had already failed. The Schwartz declaration described the Tuscany as vacated after a September 8, 2025 fire department inspection found numerous issues, including inadequate staffing. The same declaration said the Herald, Hotel 27, and Hotel 46 were also non-operational by the petition date.

That court record matched local reporting. CBS New York reported that workers and guests were left behind when Manhattan properties shut without notice, and Bisnow reported that rooms at the Tuscany were still being offered online even though the hotel was not accepting guests. The Cloudbeds stay-relief motion and later Cloudbeds statement turned that operational failure into a contested bankruptcy issue.

The Aareal record added a physical-property view. In the LeHane declaration, counsel for Aareal said he visited the Herald on September 23 and saw a sign stating that all reservations had been cancelled, a forced-open door, and water damage inside the building. By then, a New York state court had already appointed a receiver over the Herald property on September 9, five days before the petition.

The main drivers were rent defaults, enforcement pressure, and the tax claim

LuxUrban's bankruptcy did not revolve around a single missed payment. The docket research points to several overlapping pressures. Aareal said LuxUrban had not paid rent on the Herald property since December 2024, and St. Giles had already filed a holdover proceeding against LuxUrban RE before the bankruptcy. The Wyndham joinder showed the franchise side was also in active dispute, with Wyndham entities pursuing claims described as worth tens of millions of dollars.

The other major pressure point was New York tax exposure. The U.S. Trustee motion cited an amended proof of claim filed by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance for $118,568,565.23, covering February 2020 through February 2025. In public reporting after conversion, LuxUrban argued the tax bill was implausible because the company said it had generated only about $158 million of net rental revenue across all states since 2020.

The debtors' own October 17 filing tied the liquidity collapse to additional legacy burdens. In the limited objection and consent to conversion, LuxUrban said payments on merchant cash advances, union dues, tax obligations, and other legacy debt had exceeded $10 million between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2025. The same filing said a confession of judgment had cut off online travel agency receivables and left the debtors unable to fund payroll.

Why the U.S. Trustee moved for a chapter 11 trustee

The case turned on October 9, when the motion to appoint a chapter 11 trustee accused management of gross mismanagement and asked the court to install an independent fiduciary. The motion and its supporting Schwartz declaration focused on facts that were unusually concrete for an early chapter 11 fight.

The U.S. Trustee said union employees had gone about five weeks without wages, that the debtors were holding about $57,000 in employee 401(k) contributions that had not been remitted, and that guests continued arriving at closed hotels after making prepaid reservations. The motion also stressed that LuxUrban had sought almost no operational relief from the bankruptcy court despite those failures.

Other parties lined up behind the U.S. Trustee. St. Giles, Wyndham-related entities, the Hotel & Gaming Trades Council, and later Aareal all joined or supported intervention. Their combined position was that there was no credible reorganization path left to protect.

Public coverage picked up the same theme. CBS quoted the U.S. Trustee's office calling a hotel operator that leaves customers stranded while workers go unpaid "untenable, and dangerous". That language mirrored the core point of the motion: this was no longer a case about restructuring an operating hospitality platform.

The Cloudbeds dispute showed how little control remained

One of the clearest windows into the estate's condition came from the fight with Cloudbeds, the software provider behind the debtors' booking engine and property-management system. In the Cloudbeds motion, the company sought relief tied to its hospitality services agreement after closed properties continued to appear bookable online.

LuxUrban later suggested that others should have shut off reservations. Cloudbeds answered in its October 20 statement that it was not an online travel agency, did not control the debtors' business decisions, and had never received instructions from management to disable the booking engine. That filing also said Cloudbeds learned the hotels were closed through news coverage and customer reviews rather than from the debtors.

The Cloudbeds stipulation and so-ordered version reflected that the booking engine had already been suspended effective September 30 and that the hospitality services agreement would terminate on October 24. By that point, one of the debtors' core operating systems was being unwound through stay-relief litigation rather than used in a turnaround plan.

Creditors were already litigating for the exits

The stay-relief docket showed creditors trying to recover property and terminate contracts, not negotiate a longer restructuring runway. The W Financial stay-relief order granted relief over Hotel 46 on October 9. St. Giles had its own pending stay-relief motion tied to the Hotel 27 holdover case. Aareal's cross-motion asked the court to dismiss or convert under section 1112(b), arguing that the debtors were administratively insolvent and lacked any realistic path to rehabilitation.

That posture is part of what made the case a true free-fall filing. The record did not show DIP lenders, plan negotiations, stalking-horse sale talks, or even ordinary first-day stabilization work. It showed landlords, franchisors, labor, software vendors, and the U.S. Trustee all focused on limiting additional damage.

The debtors chose chapter 7 instead of fighting over control

LuxUrban did not mount a full defense of remaining in chapter 11. In its October 17 objection and consent filing, the debtors disputed the scale of the tax claim and argued the U.S. Trustee had not met the standard for a chapter 11 trustee, but they also consented to conversion to chapter 7. That position effectively resolved the core contest before the scheduled hearing.

The court then entered the order cancelling the October 21 hearing and the conversion order. The result was a chapter 11 case that lasted only 37 days. The Real Deal later reported that LuxUrban had collapsed into liquidation, and Bisnow reported that claims had surpassed $123 million.

That post-conversion reporting matters mostly as a check on scale. The court record already established the structural problem: a public hotel operator with no functioning properties, almost no cash, no financing, mounting enforcement actions, and creditors pressing to exit the case rather than support a restructuring.

Key dates in the 37-day run

Date	Event
September 9, 2025	State court appoints receiver over the Herald property
September 14, 2025	Voluntary petition filed
September 16, 2025	Joint administration order entered
September 29, 2025	Cloudbeds motion filed
September 30, 2025	Booking engine suspended at status conference, later reflected in the Cloudbeds stipulation
October 9, 2025	U.S. Trustee trustee motion filed
October 9, 2025	W Financial stay-relief order entered
October 17, 2025	Debtors consent to chapter 7
October 20, 2025	Cloudbeds statement and hearing cancellation order filed
October 21, 2025	Conversion order entered

The hearing cancellation order and the earlier conversion-consent filing show how the case's central dispute ended without a contested evidentiary fight over who would control the estate.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did LuxUrban Hotels file chapter 11?

The filing record points to overlapping pressure from unpaid rent, creditor enforcement actions, a disputed $118.6 million New York tax claim, cut-off receivables, and the collapse of the company's remaining hotel operations. By the petition date, the debtors were down to four Manhattan hotels and none were operating.

Did LuxUrban have DIP financing or cash collateral?

No. The debtors filed no DIP financing motion and did not obtain consensual cash collateral use. Their consent to conversion filing later said those outcomes did not appear achievable on reasonable terms.

Why did the U.S. Trustee seek a chapter 11 trustee?

The trustee motion cited unpaid wages, unremitted 401(k) contributions, continued bookings at closed hotels, the lack of first-day relief, and the tax claim as evidence of gross mismanagement and cause under section 1104.

How fast did the case convert to chapter 7?

Thirty-seven days. Public reporting later described the company as having collapsed into liquidation after filing on September 14, 2025 and converting on October 21, 2025.

Who was the claims agent?

The exported docket research for this case does not identify a claims agent. This appears to have been a short case without a separately identified claims-and-noticing agent in the baseline research record.

What happened to hotel guests and workers?

Court filings and local reporting described guests arriving at shuttered hotels with prepaid reservations, while workers went roughly five weeks without pay and the debtors allegedly failed to remit about $57,000 of withheld 401(k) contributions.

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