Powin: Tariffs Topple Third-Largest US Battery Integrator

Powin, LLC, the Oregon-based battery energy storage company that ranked as the third-largest BESS integrator in the United States, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 10, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey—just eight months after securing a $200 million revolving credit facility from KKR. The company, founded in 1989 as a consumer goods manufacturer before pivoting to battery storage in 2016, had 11.3 GWh of storage projects installed worldwide, including the 1.9 GWh Waratah Super Battery in Australia—then the world's largest. Tariffs on Chinese-sourced lithium iron phosphate batteries that reached 40% or higher, combined with policy uncertainty over Investment Tax Credits, added costs and uncertainty for Powin's China-dependent supply chain.

The case involved trade policy shifts affecting a company dependent on international supply chains. Powin's workforce fell from approximately 500 employees at the start of 2025 to just 85 at filing—an 83% reduction in headcount over a matter of months. Through a 184-day chapter 11 process, FlexGen Power Systems acquired Powin's intellectual property, software, and spare parts inventory, enabling FlexGen to support over 25 GWh of battery energy storage systems across 200 projects in 10 countries. The confirmed plan of liquidation provided for wind-down and distribution rather than reorganization.

Company Background: From Consumer Goods to Clean Energy

Joseph Lu founded Powin Corporation in Oregon in 1989, initially as a manufacturing and logistics company serving consumer goods businesses that were outsourcing production to China and Taiwan. The company's early products ranged from treadmills to gun safes before it moved into utility-scale battery systems. Lu spent three decades managing manufacturing operations in Taiwan and China, developing supply chain expertise that later supported the company's energy storage focus.

The pivot began in 2011, when Powin Corporation started research and development for stationary energy storage applications. The company went public in 2010, consolidated its operations into the energy sector as Powin Energy in 2015, and by 2016 had made energy storage its sole business focus. The transformation was complete by 2017, when the company shifted its entire operational focus to battery storage solutions, establishing its Battery Lab at the Tualatin, Oregon headquarters in 2020 to support performance guarantees through rigorous testing protocols.

Market position. By 2022, the company ranked as the fifth-largest BESS integrator globally. As of October 2024, Powin had 17 GWh of projects deployed and under construction. The company's core products—the Stack and Centipede battery storage platforms—competed for utility-scale and commercial deployments across North America, Australia, Europe, and Asia. The Centipede platform supported large grid-scale storage installations, with modular segments assembled into larger arrays.

Supply chain structure. The company sourced lithium iron phosphate cells from Chinese manufacturers including Hithium, EVE Energy, and Rept. LFP chemistry dominated the utility-scale storage market due to its safety profile, longevity, and cost advantages over other lithium-ion formulations. This reliance on Chinese cell suppliers meant that Powin's cost structure was directly exposed to trade policy decisions in Washington as tariffs escalated.

The Waratah Super Battery: A Flagship That Outlived Its Creator

Powin's largest project was the New South Wales Waratah Super Battery in Australia, developed for Akaysha Energy, a BlackRock portfolio company. When announced in November 2022, the project was positioned as the world's largest battery energy storage system, with a total capacity of 909 MW and 1,915 MWh of storage.

The project's specifications included 2,592 Centipede Energy Segments along with 288 power conversion systems manufactured by EKS Energy, Powin's wholly owned subsidiary. The installation included a 20-year long-term service agreement. Located approximately 100 kilometers north of Sydney at the former 1,400 MW Munmorah coal-fired power station, the Waratah Super Battery was installed on the footprint of retired fossil fuel generation.

Construction commenced on May 31, 2023, and the project reached completion in October 2024. With an active capacity of at least 700 MW and guaranteed usable storage of 1,400 MWh, the system was designed to ensure that Sydney, Newcastle, and Wollongong would have access to additional power generation during demand spikes and supply disruptions. The company filed for bankruptcy less than eight months after completing this installation.

Investment History: From Growth Capital to Bankruptcy

2022 GIC investment. In 2022, the company secured a $135 million investment led by GIC, Singapore's sovereign wealth fund, with participation from existing lead investors Trilantic Energy Partners North America and Energy Impact Partners. At the time, Powin was the world's fifth-largest BESS integrator, and the investment was intended to fuel international expansion as demand for grid-scale storage accelerated globally.

2024 KKR financing. On October 2, 2024, Powin announced it had secured a revolving credit facility of up to $200 million from KKR, with financing primarily sourced from insurance accounts managed by KKR. Guggenheim Securities served as financial advisor for the capital raise. The company's then-CEO Jeff Waters noted Powin's 17 GWh of projects deployed and under construction. Additional equity investors at this point included Greenbelt Capital Partners, Trilantic, and Energy Impact Partners.

The bankruptcy filing came eight months after the KKR financing closed. Court filings and contemporaneous reporting cited tariff escalation and policy uncertainty in early 2025.

The Path to Bankruptcy: Tariffs, Tax Credits, and Workforce Collapse

Tariff Exposure.

Powin relied on Chinese supply chains as U.S.-China trade relations tightened. The company described itself as "navigating a period of significant financial challenge" compounded by tariff developments that added substantial cost and complexity to its operations. The company cited reliance on Chinese LFP batteries—the dominant technology for utility-scale storage but increasingly subject to import duties.

Clean Energy Associates calculated that back-and-forth tariff applications created major cost volatility for BESS integrators. Total duties on Chinese battery imports remained above 40% even during the 90-day tariff pause, with potential escalation to 82% or even 150% depending on how trade negotiations progressed. New tariffs were estimated to increase BESS system costs by 11-16%, eliminating margins for integrators like Powin that could not pass through the full cost increase to customers in competitive procurements.

Companies that had built their supply chains around Chinese manufacturing faced higher duties and cost volatility as tariff policy shifted. Powin cited tariffs as a factor in its financial challenges.

Investment Tax Credit Uncertainty.

The simultaneous emergence of uncertainty over Investment Tax Credits created another headwind. The Inflation Reduction Act had broadened technologies eligible for ITCs to include standalone energy storage, providing 30-50% tax credits for storage systems produced domestically. Bonus incentives for domestic content projects were available through 2032.

The potential rapid elimination of the ITC via the U.S. budget reconciliation process threatened to remove 30-40% of the capital expenditure incentive for Powin's customers. Industry observers described this policy uncertainty as potentially a bigger negative disruptor than tariffs themselves.

The combination of tariff exposure and ITC uncertainty affected both costs and customer incentives as policy shifted.

Workforce Collapse.

At the start of 2025, the company employed approximately 500 people. By late April 2025, layoffs had reduced the headcount by 83% from the beginning of the year. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, only 85 employees remained.

The company notified state and local officials of a potential cessation of business operations, warning that as many as 250 staff including senior executives could face layoffs by July 28, 2025. These WARN Act notifications triggered potential claims that would later be addressed through a class settlement process in the bankruptcy case. The workforce moved from about 500 to 85 in approximately six months.

Chapter 11 Case: 363 Sale and Liquidation

Filing and Joint Administration.

Powin, LLC filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 10, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. Gerard Uzzi's First Day Declaration identified the tariff exposure, cash flow constraints, competitive pressures, and working capital requirements that drove the filing. The cases were jointly administered under Case No. 25-15868 before Hon. Christine M. Gravelle, with multiple debtor entities consolidated for procedural efficiency.

The cases were filed in the District of New Jersey rather than Delaware or an Oregon venue.

DIP Financing.

The DIP structure positioned FlexGen as both lender and potential acquirer. By providing $27.5 million in postpetition financing, FlexGen supported operations through the sale process and served as the stalking horse bidder. Faegre Drinker served as counsel to the Cash Flow DIP Lender, with Latham & Watkins representing both the DIP lender and FlexGen in its acquisition role.

FlexGen Acquisition.

FlexGen was named as the stalking horse bidder in late June 2025, approximately two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The auction was held at the end of July 2025.

On August 6, 2025, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court approved FlexGen's acquisition of Powin's assets. The transaction included:

• All intellectual property, including hardware IP, software IP, and information technology systems
• Significant spare parts inventory
• Assumed contracts and customer relationships

Upon closing, FlexGen would support over 25 GWh of battery energy storage systems across a portfolio of 200 projects in 10 countries.

EKS Energy stake. Separately, Hitachi Energy bid to acquire Powin's remaining 20% stake in EKS Energy, the power conversion systems subsidiary that had supplied equipment for the Waratah Super Battery and other major projects. Hitachi Energy's bid reflected a fixed price of $15 million for the EKS stake—a separate transaction from FlexGen's acquisition of the core Powin IP and inventory.

Post-Acquisition Disputes.

The debtors and FlexGen engaged in post-acquisition disputes related to inventory purchase and valuation, contract assumption issues, and administrative expense claims. These disputes were addressed through the plan process, with stipulations extending deadlines for responses and providing procedural mechanisms for resolution.

Plan of Liquidation

Confirmation Timeline.

Unlike a reorganization plan that would have emerged Powin as a continuing operating company, the confirmed plan was a Plan of Liquidation providing for wind-down and distribution to creditors. With the operating assets sold to FlexGen and the EKS stake transferred to Hitachi Energy, there was no ongoing business to reorganize. The plan established a framework for distributing remaining proceeds, resolving disputed claims, and closing the cases.

Creditor Treatment.

The treatment waterfall followed priority rules. Secured creditors—principally KKR through its prepetition credit facility—received payment in full. Administrative expenses including professional fees and the DIP facility repayment came next. General unsecured creditors, represented by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors with Brown Rudnick as counsel, received pro rata distributions from remaining proceeds after senior claims were satisfied. Prepetition equity was cancelled without recovery.

WARN Act Class Settlement.

The workforce reduction that preceded the bankruptcy filing triggered potential claims under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. Employees who lost their jobs without the statutory 60-day notice period could assert WARN Act claims for up to 60 days of back pay and benefits. The case addressed these claims through a class settlement process, with court approval obtained for the settlement terms. WARN Act claims were handled as part of the overall creditor distribution framework rather than through separate litigation.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

An Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors was appointed to represent the interests of trade creditors and other unsecured claimants. Brown Rudnick LLP served as committee co-counsel, with Genova Burns LLC as committee local counsel and Alvarez & Marsal as the committee's financial advisor. The committee participated actively in the FlexGen sale negotiations, monitored claims administration, analyzed potential recoveries for unsecured creditors, and negotiated the WARN Act class settlement.

Brown Rudnick's fee award was $2,265,111.70.

Key Timeline

Professional Retentions

Debtor Professionals.

Committee Professionals.

Lender and Acquirer Professionals.

Industry Context: Market Growth

Powin's bankruptcy occurred as the global BESS market was projected to grow from $50.81 billion in 2025 to $105.96 billion by 2030, representing a CAGR of 15.8%. J.P. Morgan analysis indicated that stationary energy storage battery shipments would rise 50% in 2025 and another 43% in 2026. The United States remained the largest and most developed BESS market globally.

Lithium-ion battery technology captured 99% of the storage market in 2024, and by 2030 BESS applications could account for more than one-third of global lithium demand.

Clean energy sector distress. Powin was part of a wave of clean energy sector bankruptcies in 2025 attributed to tariffs and policy uncertainty. Residential solar installers, clean energy loan providers, and other participants faced policy shifts and trade barriers that increased costs.

FlexGen acquisition. The acquisition of Powin's IP and inventory expanded FlexGen's battery fleet to more than 25 GWh.

Frequently Asked Questions

When did Powin file for bankruptcy?

Powin, LLC filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 10, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases were jointly administered under Case No. 25-15868 before Hon. Christine M. Gravelle.

What was Powin's business?

Powin was an Oregon-based battery energy storage solutions provider, designing and integrating utility-scale and commercial BESS using lithium iron phosphate technology. At filing, the company had 11.3 GWh of projects installed worldwide across 200 projects in 10 countries. Major installations included the 1.9 GWh Waratah Super Battery in Australia.

What caused Powin's bankruptcy?

The company faced a combination of tariffs on Chinese-sourced LFP batteries (40%+ duties, potentially rising to 82-150%), uncertainty over Investment Tax Credits that could have eliminated 30-40% of customer incentives, and competitive pressure.

What happened to the KKR financing?

KKR provided a $200 million revolving credit facility in October 2024, just eight months before the bankruptcy filing. The financing could not overcome the trade policy and market headwinds that accelerated through early 2025. KKR was a secured creditor in the bankruptcy and received payment in full under the confirmed plan.

Who acquired Powin's assets?

FlexGen Power Systems acquired Powin's intellectual property (hardware IP, software IP, information technology systems) and spare parts inventory. The court approved the acquisition on August 6, 2025. The transaction positions FlexGen to support over 25 GWh of battery storage systems across 200 projects.

What happened to EKS Energy?

EKS Energy was Powin's wholly owned subsidiary providing power conversion systems. Hitachi Energy bid $15 million for Powin's remaining 20% stake in EKS as part of the bankruptcy sale process.

What happened to Powin's employees?

The workforce fell from approximately 500 employees at the start of 2025 to just 85 at filing—an 83% reduction over approximately six months. WARN Act claims from employees who lost jobs without adequate notice were addressed through a class settlement as part of the bankruptcy plan.

How long did the bankruptcy take?

The case lasted approximately 184 days, from petition (June 10, 2025) to effective date (December 11, 2025). The timeline covered the 363 sale process followed by a liquidating plan.

Was this a reorganization or liquidation?

The confirmed plan was a Plan of Liquidation providing for wind-down and distribution rather than continued operations under the Powin name. With operating assets sold to FlexGen and the EKS stake transferred to Hitachi Energy, there was no ongoing business to reorganize.

What does Powin's failure mean for the energy storage industry?

Sources projected BESS market growth to about $106 billion by 2030. Reporting on Powin cited Chinese supply chain dependence, policy uncertainty, and competitive pressure as factors in the case.

Who is the claims agent for Powin?

Verita Global (fka KCC) serves as the claims and noticing agent. The firm maintains the official claims register and distributes case notifications to creditors and parties in interest.

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