Saks Global: Multi-Facility DIP Targets Inventory and Availability Stability
Saks Global filed chapter 11 in S.D. Texas on Jan. 13, 2026; filings describe a multi-facility DIP to stabilize inventory flow and availability.
Saks Global’s chapter 11 case is an “inventory-and-availability” restructuring with a capital structure built around multiple borrower groups, a large secured debt stack, and an operational model where liquidity directly determines whether the company can receive, floor, and sell the inventory that supports the borrowing base. Bankruptcy filings describe a newly combined luxury department-store platform (including Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman) entering court with a multi-facility DIP package designed to stabilize excess availability quickly while also imposing tight governance over collateral and cash.
The strategic question is whether the financing architecture is enough to prevent a self-reinforcing dynamic: reduced inventory receipts can reduce sales, which can tighten availability through borrowing base mechanics and reserves, which can further reduce inventory flow. Saks Global described securing $1.75 billion of committed capital in connection with the restructuring, and public coverage of the chapter 11 filing appeared on 2026-01-14, 2026-01-14, and 2026-01-14.
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Debtors | Saks Global Enterprises LLC et al. (multi-debtor filing; bankruptcy filings describe a combined luxury retail portfolio including Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman) |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Texas |
| Lead case number | 26-90103 (ARP) |
| Judge | Alfredo R. Pérez |
| Petition date | 2026-01-13, with public reporting on 2026-01-14, 2026-01-14, and 2026-01-14 |
| Case posture | Multi-debtor chapter 11 filing (bankruptcy filings describe 100+ petitions under a common docket identifier) |
| Portfolio and brands | Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks OFF 5TH, Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman, and Last Call (bankruptcy filings) |
| Store footprint | 33 Saks Fifth Avenue stores; 81 Saks OFF 5TH stores; 36 Neiman Marcus stores; 2 Bergdorf Goodman stores; 5 Last Call stores (bankruptcy filings) |
| Workforce | ~14,610 full-time and ~2,220 part-time employees (bankruptcy filings) |
| Deal context | The Neiman Marcus acquisition was announced in July 2024 press release and the closing was announced in December 2024 press release, with additional coverage in a December 2024 industry article and a December 2024 retail update |
| Claimed committed capital (public) | The company described securing $1.75 billion of committed capital in its January 2026 announcement |
| Stated distress drivers | Borrowing base pressure, inventory receipt disruption, vendor tightening, stepped-up minimum excess availability covenants, and missed interest obligations (bankruptcy filings) |
| Prepetition funded debt (Global Debtors) | ~$3.4B funded debt (bankruptcy filings) |
| DIP structure | Multi-facility DIP package including an ABL DIP, a delayed draw term loan DIP, and an intercompany operating-company DIP (bankruptcy filings) |
| Claims agent | Stretto (bankruptcy filings) |
| Table: Case Snapshot |
Company Overview and Retail Footprint
Business footprint and the operational inventory cycle. A luxury department-store platform has a working-capital structure that can be sensitive to liquidity constraints. Inventory receipts are not simply a merchandising issue; they are a financing issue. Bankruptcy filings describe a combined store portfolio with dozens of full-line luxury stores and a large off-price footprint. That footprint matters to creditors because inventory and related collateral packages are typically the core of ABL and borrowing-base driven facilities.
| Brand / channel as described in bankruptcy filings | Store count as described in bankruptcy filings | Footprint metric as described in bankruptcy filings | Why it matters in chapter 11 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saks Fifth Avenue | 33 | ~4.36M sq. ft. | Full-line luxury stores depend on seasonal buys and vendor confidence; sales and inventory availability feed the borrowing base |
| Saks OFF 5TH | 81 | ~2.39M sq. ft. | Off-price can be inventory- and turn-driven; vendor terms and logistics are cash sensitive |
| Neiman Marcus | 36 | ~5.24M sq. ft. | Scale and leased-store network can produce large fixed costs and landlord dynamics in restructuring |
| Bergdorf Goodman | 2 | Not quantified in filings excerpted here | Flagship brand value can influence stakeholder narratives and real-estate optionality |
| Last Call | 5 | Not quantified in filings excerpted here | Smaller banner but relevant for lease and footprint decisions |
A key dynamic in a retailer restructuring is that inventory, liquidity, and vendor confidence can reinforce each other. When liquidity tightens, inventory receipts can slow; when receipts slow, sales can weaken; when sales weaken, the borrowing base and excess availability can tighten further through lower eligible inventory and increased reserves. Bankruptcy filings describe a large shortfall in inventory receipts in the second half of 2025 versus earlier forecasts, which is the kind of operational interruption that can convert a balance-sheet problem into near-term liquidity constraints. In that frame, the purpose of a complex DIP is not only to fund operating losses; it is to restore predictability to inventory receipts and availability so the business can operate through key selling windows without destabilizing vendor terms.
Saks Global filed chapter 11 petitions for its high-end department-store group, which includes Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman. Public reporting framed the filing as a restructuring intended to maintain operations while addressing leverage in coverage published on 2026-01-14 and 2026-01-14.
Formation: Saks + Neiman Combination
How the platform was assembled (Saks + Neiman Marcus). The case is also a post-combination capital-structure story. Saks Global was established through the acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group announced in 2024 and completed in late 2024. At announcement, the company described the deal as establishing a “technology-powered” luxury retail platform and described the transaction value and strategic rationale in a July 2024 press release. The closing and leadership messaging were described in a December 2024 press release, with additional detail and context in a December 2024 industry article and a December 2024 retail update.
The strategic story told at formation was that a combined platform could achieve scale benefits in merchandising, loyalty, and technology, and then use that platform scale to improve economics. The chapter 11 filing reframes that story through the lens of capital structure and near-term liquidity. A December 2025 analysis framed bankruptcy as an increasingly discussed outcome as the company’s capital constraints tightened.
Bankruptcy filings describe a financing structure built around secured layers, borrowing base mechanics, intercompany funding, and milestone-driven refinancing obligations. In this case, filings describe a near-term maturity at the TopCo level, a large ABL stack, and multiple note layers with different collateral and priority profiles.
Causes of Distress and Liquidity Constraints
Stated causes of distress: liquidity constraints and borrowing base mechanics. Bankruptcy filings attribute the filing to constraints that will be familiar to ABL-driven retail restructurings: availability compression, stepped-up covenants, reserves, and missed financial obligations. Filings describe a year-over-year revenue decline and a significant shortfall in inventory receipts versus forecast during the second half of 2025. Those facts matter because inventory receipts drive both merchandising and collateral.
| Driver (as described in bankruptcy filings) | What it means operationally | Why it matters to lenders |
|---|---|---|
| FY ended Feb. 1, 2025 revenue down 13.6% year-over-year | Lower sales reduce cash generation and can increase promotional intensity | Cash flow pressure raises reliance on borrowing base availability and vendor terms |
| >$550M less inventory receipts in 2H 2025 vs forecast | Under-receipt can create “thin” floors and weaker comps | Inventory shortfalls can reduce availability and tighten vendor confidence simultaneously |
| Minimum excess availability covenant step-ups (to $375M and then $500M in Dec. 2025) | Covenant step-ups can turn normal seasonal swings into default risk | Excess availability covenants effectively force the business to run at a higher liquidity buffer |
| Discretionary reserves of >$50M over 2025 | Reserves reduce borrowing base availability | Reserve flexibility is a control lever; it can accelerate the point at which liquidity becomes critical |
| Missed/unsatisfied interest obligations described at ~$126M at end of Dec. 2025 | Missed payments can trigger default and cross-default dynamics | Default posture compresses refinancing options and increases holdout risk |
The availability covenant step-up described in filings is particularly important because it converts a liquidity “management issue” into a compliance issue. When minimum excess availability requirements rise quickly, a business can be forced into corrective actions that can reduce value in retail: pulling back buys, accelerating promotions, or cutting costs in ways that can affect customer experience. Combined with discretionary reserves, lender-side controls can tighten availability even if gross borrowing base collateral exists on paper. Bankruptcy filings described a DIP architecture intended to adjust these mechanics and increase excess availability.
The filing was framed publicly as a debt-driven restructuring occurring against a backdrop of luxury-market strain and the aftermath of the Neiman Marcus acquisition, including coverage published on 2026-01-14, 2026-01-14, and 2026-01-14, consistent with pre-filing discussion of constrained capital options in a December 2025 analysis.
Prepetition Capital Structure
Prepetition capital structure: who sat where, and why priority mattered. Bankruptcy filings summarize approximately $3.4 billion of prepetition funded debt for the Global Debtors. In a retail borrower, the practical hierarchy is often ABL first, then layers of term loans and notes secured by other collateral packages, with separate TopCo obligations and maturity triggers that can force a restructuring timeline.
| Facility / tranche as described in bankruptcy filings | Approx. principal outstanding as described in bankruptcy filings | Maturity as described in bankruptcy filings | Notes on role in restructuring |
|---|---|---|---|
| TopCo senior secured term loan (seller financing) | $275M (total described as ~ $310M including PIK interest) | Feb. 3, 2026 | Near-term maturity can force a timeline even if operating performance stabilizes |
| ABL facility | $442.16M (plus $56.6M undrawn LOCs) | Dec. 23, 2029 | Borrowing base-driven liquidity; reserve and availability mechanics are central to “day 1” stability |
| SPV Notes | $762.5M | Dec. 15, 2029 | Secured note layer; filings describe roll-up mechanics tied to the DIP structure |
| 2O Notes | $1.439B | Dec. 15, 2029 | Large note layer; stakeholder incentives depend on collateral priority and valuation outcomes |
| 3O Notes | $440.8M | Dec. 15, 2029 | Lower-priority layer; recovery sensitivity is typically high in contested valuation cases |
| Old Notes | $51.2M | Dec. 15, 2029 | Legacy note component; usually aligned with noteholder bloc economics |
Even without making assumptions about recoveries, the maturity profile and collateral layering describe the case’s timing constraints. A near-term TopCo maturity can force restructuring outcomes that are difficult to accomplish through incremental amendments, and it can intensify the need for a comprehensive DIP that “bridges” the company through stabilization, negotiation, and any plan-confirmation process. Debt maturity triggers can set deadlines that are independent of day-to-day operating performance.
This stack also explains why chapter 11 is not simply a “balance sheet reset.” It is also a mechanism to coordinate and enforce changes to financing terms and lien priority that might be impossible to implement consensually across multiple secured layers on a tight timetable.
DIP Financing Structure
DIP package architecture: multiple facilities and availability management. Bankruptcy filings describe a three-part DIP architecture intended to address the distinct liquidity constraints of an ABL-driven retail platform while also creating a pathway to refinance or roll debt inside the chapter 11 framework. The structure described in filings includes (i) a large ABL DIP tied to a borrowing base and excess-availability covenant concepts, (ii) a delayed draw term loan DIP facility with multiple draws and roll-up components, and (iii) an operating-company intercompany DIP that moves funds through the corporate structure.
| DIP facility (as described in bankruptcy filings) | Stated size | New money component as described in bankruptcy filings | Roll-up / refinancing component as described in bankruptcy filings | What it is designed to solve |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABL DIP Facility | $1.5B | Incremental availability described as ~$240M due to reduced reserves/covenant thresholds | Interim/creeping roll-ups plus a final full roll-up of prepetition ABL obligations | Rapid stabilization of excess availability and vendor confidence through a borrowing base structure |
| SGUS delayed draw term loan DIP Facility | $2.6B | $1.0B of new money first-out term loans described as available in three draws | Roll-up components described as tied to SPV Notes and other instruments | Provide additional liquidity and stakeholder alignment through a noteholder-backed facility |
| OpCo intercompany DIP Facility | $1.75B | Delayed draw loans up to $1.0B | Cashless roll-ups of intercompany FILO/NPC on-loans as described in bankruptcy filings | Move funds to operating entities while preserving the capital-structure architecture described in filings |
One reason the ABL DIP design is central is that it attempts to restore a “normal operating” collateral regime quickly. In an availability-driven retailer, the financing objective is not simply to add liquidity; it is to reduce the volatility of availability by changing covenant thresholds and reserves and by establishing a DIP borrowing base that vendors and landlords can trust. Bankruptcy filings describe the ABL DIP as providing incremental availability through reduced reserves and covenant thresholds, which suggests the financing package is explicitly intended to increase excess availability rather than merely replace prepetition funding.
The delayed draw term loan DIP and the intercompany DIP as described in bankruptcy filings address a different problem: the structural complexity of a combined enterprise with multiple borrower entities and multiple secured layers. In practice, delayed draw structures often function as milestone and governance tools as much as liquidity tools. They can stage liquidity into tranches tied to milestones and approvals, and they can align the incentives of specific creditor blocs by rolling their debt into postpetition obligations with enhanced protections. The filings’ description of roll-up components and multiple draws indicates that the financing package was designed to be both a liquidity backstop and a restructuring “rail” that keeps the case moving.
The reason this structure is notable is that it attempts to solve two problems at once: immediate liquidity (the ability to receive and sell inventory under stable vendor terms) and capital-structure positioning (the ability to restructure priority and refinance obligations within the case). In retailer chapter 11 cases, financing often succeeds or fails based on whether the DIP can create “breathing room” quickly enough to keep inventory flowing through the critical selling windows.
The company described securing $1.75 billion of committed capital and announced leadership changes in connection with the restructuring process, reinforcing the stabilization narrative of operational continuity plus a path to address leverage, with additional reporting on 2026-01-14 and 2026-01-14.
First-Day Motions and Operational Continuity
First-day stabilization levers: vendors, payroll, utilities, insurance, and cash management. The first-day package in a large retail chapter 11 is usually an operational continuity package, but the scale of the numbers matters because it indicates where management believes the immediate stability risks sit. Bankruptcy filings describe interim requested authority for critical vendors and 503(b)(9) claims, utility adequate assurance, and insurance/surety/letters of credit mechanics, alongside wages and benefits relief for a large workforce.
| Topic | Headline terms described in bankruptcy filings | Why it matters in this case |
|---|---|---|
| Critical vendors | Interim authority requested: $120M | Vendor confidence and inventory receipts are core “go/no-go” factors for department-store continuity |
| 503(b)(9) claims | Interim authority requested: $6M | 503(b)(9) is often negotiated as a vendor-stabilization tool; amounts signal anticipated pressure in trade claims |
| Utilities | Proposed adequate assurance deposit: $2.9M | Utilities continuity is a table-stakes requirement for multi-store operations and distribution infrastructure |
| Insurance / surety / letters of credit | Annual insurance premiums described at ~$41.25M and aggregate LOC amount described at ~$89.3M | Retailers rely on insurance and LOCs for landlords, vendors, and operational compliance; disruption can cascade into lease and supply-chain defaults |
| Wages and benefits | Workforce described at ~14,610 full-time and ~2,220 part-time employees; filings describe payments subject to a statutory $17,150 priority cap per individual | Continuity for a large labor force is operationally critical and reputationally sensitive in a consumer-facing brand case |
| Cash management | Filings describe ~227 bank accounts across 11 banks and centralized sweeps across legacy systems | Cash governance and intercompany flows determine whether the debtor can execute the DIP budget while integrating multiple business systems |
For a combined retailer, cash management is not just a bank-account detail; it is an integration and control detail. Bankruptcy filings describe centralized sweeps and intercompany transactions across two largely separate systems (legacy Saks vs. Neiman Marcus), and the account count across multiple banks indicates the operational complexity of payments, payroll, landlord remittances, and vendor settlement. This kind of complexity is one reason lenders often insist on budget controls and reporting: without a tightly governed cash system, liquidity can be diverted across business units and undermine stabilization.
| Cash management detail (as described in bankruptcy filings) | Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Bank accounts | ~227 | Indicates complexity in payment systems and legal entities, particularly post-combination |
| Banks | 11 | Multi-bank structures often have bank-fee, sweep, and control agreements that must remain stable during chapter 11 |
| Large concentrations (examples) | Wells Fargo (172 accounts); Bank of America (29); JPMorgan (13) | Concentrations can signal where payment rails sit and where changes would be disruptive |
In retail cases, “critical vendor” is often shorthand for a more specific concept: preserving the inventory pipeline by conditioning payments on continued supply and customary trade terms. Bankruptcy filings describe “trade agreement” mechanics that condition certain payments on continued supply and also address lien/reclamation cleanup, which is a practical governance tool when a debtor needs to stabilize vendors while limiting leakage .
Tax Attributes and Equity Transfer Restrictions
Tax attributes and ownership-change controls: equity transfer procedures as governance. Bankruptcy filings describe tax-attribute protection procedures that impose notice and objection requirements on equity transfers above certain thresholds. The practical effect in large cases is to reduce the risk of inadvertent ownership changes that could impair net operating losses and other tax attributes.
| Procedure as described in bankruptcy filings | Threshold | Practical effect |
|---|---|---|
| “Substantial holder” notice / transfer restrictions | 4.5% | Requires notice/objection procedures for equity transfers above the threshold |
| Worthlessness-related notice threshold | 50% | Establishes additional notice requirements tied to worthlessness positions |
For professionals following trading activity around a chapter 11 filing, these orders often become immediate compliance items because they set process rules that can affect equity and claims trading behavior.
In cases where the debtor asserts meaningful tax attributes, the procedural purpose is usually to preserve optionality. A debtor typically wants to avoid losing tax attributes through a preventable ownership change while the case is still in flux and before a plan structure is finalized. Practically, the procedures put the market on notice that large equity positions are not “free to move” without process, which can reduce surprise value destruction and avoid later litigation about whether an ownership change occurred.
Saks OFF 5TH Debtors (SO5 Digital)
SO5 Digital Debtors: separate capital structure and a different path. Bankruptcy filings describe a separate debtor grouping tied to the e-commerce business of Saks OFF 5TH, described as operating as a standalone company since 2021, with a separate capital structure and a contemplated path focused on an orderly sale process or wind-down. This matters because it introduces a parallel debtor group with its own lenders and cash collateral mechanics.
| Debtor group as described in bankruptcy filings | Business scope as described in bankruptcy filings | Capital structure and first-day posture as described in bankruptcy filings | Practical implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Debtors | Core store and brand portfolio including Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman, and related entities | ~$3.4B funded debt described; multi-facility DIP structure described | Case outcome is likely defined by inventory, borrowing base, and secured stakeholder negotiations |
| SO5 Digital Debtors | Saks OFF 5TH e-commerce business described as standalone since 2021 | ~$20M term loan described with maturity in Aug. 2026; cash collateral motion described with a $2.5M adequate protection payment and a carve-out trigger concept | Parallel process can isolate a digital asset for sale/wind-down while Global Debtors focus on core restructuring |
The SO5 Digital structure is also a reminder that “digital” and “store” assets can sit in different collateral packages depending on how a platform was financed over time. When an e-commerce business is separated and then financed separately, the chapter 11 case can turn into a coordination exercise between (i) operating-company liquidity needs, (ii) secured lender groups with different collateral definitions, and (iii) any intercompany arrangements that move cash or services across the perimeter. Bankruptcy filings describing a separate SO5 term loan and separate cash collateral relief indicate that the case was designed to keep those negotiations structurally distinct rather than treating the whole enterprise as a single collateral pool.
Not every headline distinguished between these debtor groups, but the separate debtor structure can matter to creditors and counterparties because it affects which assets are in which collateral package and which budgets and cash controls apply.
Real Estate Footprint and Strategic Options
Real estate footprint and restructuring optionality. With a multi-banner luxury retail platform, the real estate footprint can become a central driver of restructuring strategy. Bankruptcy filings describe dozens of stores across multiple banners and millions of square feet of retail space. Even absent an immediate liquidation narrative, lease decisions (assumption, assignment, rejection) can become a major tool to reduce fixed costs and reconfigure store economics.
One landlord-focused trade publication emphasized the scale of the retail footprint and the financing commitment framing in a January 2026 article.
In early-stage drafting, the key discipline is to separate what is known (the footprint, the debt stack, the DIP architecture described in filings) from what is not yet known. Immediately after filing, public coverage addressed the store-closure question in reporting published on 2026-01-14 and 2026-01-14, while the restructuring mechanics typically unfold through first-day motions, budgets, and subsequent lease and plan filings.
Near-term case watchlist (first 30–60 days). In the first phase of a retail chapter 11, the highest-signal indicators are often operational and financing-related rather than plan-related.
| Watch item | Why it matters | What to look for in future filings |
|---|---|---|
| Interim-to-final DIP trajectory | Financing terms and governance determine whether the case stays stabilized | Any changes to availability mechanics, roll-up scope, milestones, or adequate protection provisions |
| Vendor and inventory indicators | Inventory flow is the “business oxygen” of a department-store model | Whether critical vendor usage increases, whether vendor payment terms tighten, and whether inventory receipts stabilize |
| Borrowing base and reserves | Availability determines operating flexibility | Any changes in reserve levels, covenant thresholds, or collateral definitions in DIP documentation |
| Stakeholder objections | Objections signal where the plan may be contested | Early objections by lenders, landlords, or the U.S. Trustee, and whether disputes are resolved through DIP modifications |
| SO5 Digital process | Parallel sale/wind-down can create different stakeholder incentives | Any explicit sale process milestones, bidding procedures, or asset-marketing steps for the digital business |
Public discussion around luxury consumer demand has been mixed, with some commentary suggesting consumers are still purchasing luxury goods even as balance sheets are stressed, including a January 2026 article discussing luxury spending alongside the bankruptcy. In the case itself, however, bankruptcy filings frame distress less as a pure demand-driven distress story and more as an availability and liquidity story driven by covenant mechanics, reserves, and inventory receipts.
Frequently Asked Questions
When did Saks Global file for chapter 11, and where is the case pending? Saks Global filed chapter 11 petitions in January 2026 and the case is pending in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. Public reporting on the filing was published on 2026-01-14, 2026-01-14, and 2026-01-14.
What companies and brands are included in the debtor group? Bankruptcy filings describe the debtor group as including a combined luxury portfolio spanning Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Bergdorf Goodman, plus the off-price Saks OFF 5TH banner and related entities. The Neiman Marcus acquisition that formed the platform was described in a July 2024 transaction announcement and a December 2024 closing announcement.
Are stores expected to close immediately because of the bankruptcy? The company’s public messaging around the filing emphasized continuity rather than immediate closures, and early coverage focused on store-closure questions in reporting published on 2026-01-14 and 2026-01-14.
How large is the debt stack and how is it structured (ABL vs notes)? Bankruptcy filings describe approximately $3.4 billion of funded debt for the Global Debtors, including a large ABL facility and multiple layers of notes with different priority and security profiles.
What does the multi-facility DIP financing structure look like (ABL DIP, term loan DIP, intercompany DIP)? Bankruptcy filings describe a multi-facility DIP package that includes a $1.5 billion ABL DIP facility, a $2.6 billion delayed draw term loan DIP facility, and a $1.75 billion intercompany operating-company DIP facility, with both new money and roll-up components.
Why were inventory flow and borrowing base availability central issues in the lead-up to filing? Bankruptcy filings describe a large shortfall in inventory receipts versus forecast in the second half of 2025, stepped-up minimum excess availability covenants, and the use of reserves that reduced availability. In an ABL-driven retailer, those mechanics can create a rapid liquidity squeeze because inventory and availability reinforce each other.
What are the first-day “stabilization” tools (critical vendors, payroll, utilities, cash management) and what were the headline dollar amounts? Bankruptcy filings describe interim requests including $120 million for critical vendors, $6 million for 503(b)(9) claims, and a $2.9 million utilities adequate assurance deposit, alongside wages/benefits relief and cash management authority for a large enterprise.
Who are the SO5 Digital Debtors and why do they have separate motions and a different path? Bankruptcy filings describe the SO5 Digital Debtors as tied to the Saks OFF 5TH e-commerce business operating as a standalone company since 2021, with a separate capital structure and cash collateral terms. Filings describe a contemplated path focused on an orderly sale or wind-down for that digital business.
What are the NOL/equity transfer procedures and who do they affect? Bankruptcy filings describe equity transfer procedures designed to protect tax attributes, including notice and objection rules tied to a 4.5% “substantial holder” threshold and a 50% worthlessness-related notice threshold. These procedures typically affect equity holders and market participants who may buy or sell equity positions during the case.
Who is the claims agent for Saks Global? Stretto serves as the claims and noticing agent. The agent distributes notices and maintains the official claims register for the case.
For more chapter 11 case research, see the ElevenFlo blog.
