Worldwide Machinery Group: 75-Year Family Dynasty Ends in 41-Day 363 Sale

Worldwide Machinery Group, Inc.—a 75-year-old family-owned heavy equipment dealer and rental company headquartered in Houston, Texas—filed for chapter 11 protection on September 11, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas after a dispute with secured lenders over competing sale proposals precipitated the filing. The company, founded in 1949 by Joseph Greenberg and controlled by three generations of the Greenberg family until January 2025 when lenders forced the family off the board, entered bankruptcy with approximately $116 million in assets against $223 million in liabilities. The filing followed what the Debtors characterized as a "lender-liquidator side deal" in which Gordon Brothers and ABL lenders allegedly entered an exclusive arrangement to purchase the lenders' claims at less than par—an arrangement the Debtors contended violated Gordon Brothers' non-disclosure agreement and threatened a liquidation outcome rather than the going-concern sale management preferred.

The case moved swiftly to a $69 million going-concern sale approved just 41 days after filing, preserving the business and majority of jobs through an insider-led acquisition by Diversified Holding, LLC—controlled by the Greenberg family—financed by Macquarie Equipment Capital. The purchase price increased from the initial $52.5 million stalking horse bid after proposed buyers raised their offer to resolve a dispute over the senior lenders' ability to credit bid their claims. A liquidating plan followed the sale, with plan confirmation proceeding through December 2025 amid objections from the U.S. Trustee and secured creditor John Deere. The case illustrates how lender control, family succession dynamics, and disputed sale processes can converge in middle-market heavy equipment bankruptcies—and how insider-led acquisitions can preserve value when family founders lose governance control but retain the operational knowledge to maintain business continuity.

Case Snapshot

Three Generations of Family Ownership

Worldwide Machinery represents one of the longer-running family business stories in the American heavy equipment industry—spanning 76 years and three generations before lender-forced governance changes and the chapter 11 filing brought direct family control to an end. The company's trajectory from post-World War II construction supplier to global energy sector equipment provider illustrates both the opportunities and vulnerabilities of family-controlled middle-market enterprises.

Founding and post-war expansion. Joseph Greenberg founded Worldwide Machinery in 1949, positioning the company to capitalize on the post-World War II infrastructure boom sweeping the United States. The initial focus on supplying heavy construction equipment—dozers, excavators, motor graders, and related machinery—served the massive infrastructure projects of the 1950s and 1960s as the federal highway system expanded and urban development accelerated. The company established a foothold in the civil construction sector that would remain its core business segment for decades.

In 1967, Alan Greenberg (second generation) assumed control and embarked on an international expansion strategy that transformed Worldwide from a regional U.S. operator into a company with global reach. Under Alan's leadership, the company established offices and affiliate relationships in Mexico, Germany, Australia, Peru, and Italy—creating a network that could serve multinational construction and energy projects. This international footprint differentiated Worldwide from purely domestic competitors and positioned the company to capture opportunities in emerging markets as global infrastructure investment accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s.

Third-generation leadership and the energy pivot. When Evan and Adam Greenberg (third generation) assumed leadership in 1991, they executed a strategic pivot that would define the company's identity for three decades. The brothers recognized the growth potential in the energy sector—particularly pipeline construction—and established a Pipeline Division that grew to become a leading global provider of specialized pipeline construction equipment. This strategic reorientation capitalized on the expansion of natural gas infrastructure across North America and energy development in emerging markets.

By the time of the bankruptcy filing, the company's business mix reflected this energy-sector focus while maintaining its civil construction foundation. Approximately 70% of revenue derived from civil infrastructure projects—road construction, site development, and general heavy construction. The remaining 30% came from pipeline construction (approximately 25%) and renewable energy initiatives (approximately 5%). The company operated seven full-service equipment yards in key U.S. markets including Denver, Salt Lake City, Dallas, and Dickinson, North Dakota—the last location serving the Bakken shale formation that became a major production region in the 2010s.

Corporate restructuring and the 2024 default. Despite seven decades of family-guided growth, the company's capital structure became increasingly stressed in the 2020s. In January 2022, Worldwide executed a corporate restructuring under a new Delaware holding company and secured a $50 million second-lien term loan from Caspian Capital to enhance liquidity. Caspian—a mezzanine lender that also acquired a 10% equity stake in the company as part of the transaction—would become a central figure in the capital structure, ultimately holding over $70.9 million in secured claims by the time of filing.

The 2022 recapitalization failed to stabilize the company's financial position. By 2024, Worldwide defaulted on its first-lien credit facility, triggering the beginning of the end of family governance. In January 2025, at the insistence of secured lenders, Alan, Evan, and Adam Greenberg resigned from the Board of Directors. This forced departure ended three generations of direct family governance after 76 years. Management transitioned to a Restructuring Committee and a Chief Restructuring Officer (Scott Avila of Paladin Management Group), with the Greenberg family reduced to equity holders with no formal governance role.

Confluence of Distress Factors

The First Day Declaration identified multiple factors that undermined the company's financial stability during 2020-2021 and cascaded through subsequent years to the 2024 default and eventual chapter 11 filing. The distress narrative combines macroeconomic shocks, industry-specific declines, capital structure challenges, and ultimately a disputed sale process that prompted the bankruptcy filing itself.

COVID-19 and the pipeline industry collapse. The COVID-19 pandemic created construction slowdowns that reduced demand for the company's core civil infrastructure equipment as projects delayed or cancelled across multiple sectors. While this represented a significant near-term revenue impact, the more consequential damage occurred in the pipeline business that the third-generation Greenbergs had spent three decades building. Volatile oil prices during 2020-2021 drove what the First Day Declaration characterized as a "catastrophic decline" in the pipeline industry.

The collapse of oil prices in early 2020—with West Texas Intermediate briefly going negative in April 2020—devastated the economics of new pipeline projects. Major infrastructure cancellations followed, including the Keystone XL pipeline and other projects affected by federal policy changes in 2021. For Worldwide, which had built its Pipeline Division into a global leader in specialized equipment for these projects, the industry contraction eliminated a growth engine that had driven expansion for decades. The approximately 25% of revenue derived from pipeline construction was suddenly in structural decline rather than expansion mode.

Overleveraged capital structure. The company's debt load relative to its asset base and revenue generation capacity proved unsustainable as industry conditions deteriorated. By August 2025, Worldwide carried approximately $223 million in liabilities against only $116 million in consolidated assets—a liability-to-asset ratio approaching 2:1 that left no margin for error. For fiscal year ending June 30, 2025, the company generated approximately $67 million in revenue, resulting in a debt-to-revenue ratio of roughly 3.3x.

The capital structure's complexity created additional challenges for any workout. Caspian Capital held over $70.9 million in second-lien secured debt while simultaneously maintaining a 10% equity position. This dual creditor-equity role meant Caspian's interests did not align cleanly with either secured lenders seeking maximum recovery on their claims or equity holders seeking to preserve residual value. The ABL lenders holding the first-lien position controlled the senior secured claims but faced potential disputes over adequate protection and credit bid rights.

The lender-liquidator side deal. While COVID-19 impacts, oil price volatility, and excessive leverage created the underlying distress, the precipitating event for the chapter 11 filing was a disputed arrangement between the company's ABL lenders and liquidator Gordon Brothers that the Debtors alleged violated contractual obligations and threatened value destruction.

The sequence began when the company, under its Restructuring Committee, marketed the business for sale. Gordon Brothers participated in that process and, according to court filings, submitted what the Debtors characterized as an "uncompetitive bid." Following that unsuccessful bid, Gordon Brothers approached the Debtors seeking permission to speak with the ABL lenders about a different transaction structure—purchasing the lenders' debt at less than par value, which would give Gordon Brothers standing to control the senior secured claims and potentially dictate the sale outcome.

Gordon Brothers and the ABL lenders subsequently entered an exclusive arrangement. The Debtors allege this arrangement was precluded by the non-disclosure agreement Gordon Brothers had signed with Worldwide during the marketing process. More critically from a value perspective, the lender-liquidator side deal threatened to substitute a liquidation outcome for the going-concern sale that management and the Greenberg family believed would maximize value and preserve jobs. Rather than allow a potentially value-destroying liquidation process to proceed outside bankruptcy court supervision, the company filed chapter 11 to preserve its ability to execute the going-concern sale through a court-approved process.

Capital Structure and Key Creditors

The company's debt structure featured a first-lien ABL facility of undisclosed size, a $70+ million Caspian second-lien position, and significant trade creditors whose relationships proved important enough that the going-concern buyer agreed to assume approximately $13.1 million in trade liabilities as part of the purchase price.

The Caspian position merits additional attention given its structural complexity. When Caspian provided the $50 million second-lien term loan in January 2022, it also received a 10% equity stake in the reorganized holding company. This hybrid creditor-equity position meant Caspian's optimal outcome calculations differed from pure creditors or pure equity holders. By filing, the secured claim had grown to over $70.9 million—reflecting either additional advances, PIK interest, or both—while the equity position was likely worthless given the liability-to-asset ratio.

Equity ownership. Adam Greenberg and J. Evan Greenberg (the third-generation family owners) held 82.5% of equity in the holding company. Caspian Capital's 10% stake represented the second-largest equity position, with the remaining 7.5% held by other parties not identified in public filings. Given the company's approximately $107 million equity deficit ($223 million liabilities less $116 million assets), these equity interests were expected to receive no distribution in the chapter 11 case.

363 Sale Process

The company entered chapter 11 with a prepetition stalking horse agreement in place and completed a $69 million going-concern sale in just 41 days—an accelerated timeline reflecting both the urgency of the company's cash position and the substantive marketing work completed before filing.

Prepetition marketing and the restructuring committee. After the Greenberg family departed the Board in January 2025, the Restructuring Committee conducted a marketing process to identify transaction alternatives. That process yielded three competing proposals. First, Diversified Holding, LLC—an entity controlled by the Greenberg family—submitted a going-concern acquisition bid with financing provided by Macquarie Equipment Capital, Inc. Second, Hilco Industrial and Ritchie Brothers submitted a joint bid that the Restructuring Committee deemed competitive with the Diversified/Macquarie going-concern offer. Third, Gordon Brothers submitted a bid the committee characterized as uncompetitive—the same bidder that subsequently entered the disputed side arrangement with ABL lenders.

In August 2025, the Restructuring Committee determined that the Diversified/Macquarie going-concern transaction represented the "highest and best" offer for the company's assets. The committee's analysis valued the business preservation, job retention, and trade creditor relationship maintenance provided by the going-concern bid over the alternative outcomes available through competing bids. This selection occurred before the chapter 11 filing; the bankruptcy process would be used to obtain court approval and sale order protections rather than to conduct a new marketing process.

Stalking horse terms and the insider bid structure. The stalking horse agreement provided for $52.5 million in cash plus assumption of approximately $13.1 million in trade liabilities—a combined value of approximately $65.6 million. The transaction structure preserved the business as a going concern, retained the majority of employee positions, and maintained key trade creditor relationships through liability assumption rather than leaving trade claims in the bankruptcy estate.

The buyer's identity created an insider transaction dynamic that required careful structuring. Diversified Holding, LLC was controlled by the Greenberg family—the same family that had been forced off the Board of Directors eight months earlier at lender insistence. The acquisition thus represented a mechanism for the founding family to regain ownership of the business they had built over three generations, financed by a third-party equipment finance company (Macquarie Equipment Capital) rather than the existing lender group. The insider bid required enhanced scrutiny to demonstrate fairness, including the prepetition marketing process conducted by the Restructuring Committee and the opportunity for competing bids at the chapter 11 sale hearing.

Credit bid dispute and price increase. The sale price increased from the initial $65.6 million to $69 million—an enhancement of approximately $3.4 million—to resolve a dispute over the senior lenders' ability to credit bid their secured claims at the sale hearing. Under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, secured creditors generally have the right to credit bid the face value of their secured claims at bankruptcy sales rather than paying cash. This right can affect auction dynamics by allowing secured lenders to top cash bids without deploying additional capital.

The ABL lenders' credit bid rights created uncertainty about whether the stalking horse could prevail at auction if lenders elected to credit bid. By increasing the cash consideration, the Diversified/Macquarie buyers eliminated the need to litigate credit bid entitlements or risk losing the auction to a lender credit bid. Judge Christopher M. Lopez approved the $69 million going-concern sale on October 22, 2025—41 days after the petition date—with the sale order entered October 27, 2025.

Cash collateral operations. The Debtors funded chapter 11 operations using cash collateral rather than new debtor-in-possession financing. An interim cash collateral order entered September 15, 2025 authorized a $3.4 million four-week operating budget, with adequate protection provided to secured lenders through replacement liens and enhanced reporting requirements. A second interim order followed on October 8, 2025, extending cash collateral access through the sale closing.

The decision to use cash collateral rather than DIP financing reflected several factors. The 41-day sale timeline minimized the need for extended operating funding. The going-concern sale preserved existing supplier relationships rather than requiring new liquidity to fund operations during a prolonged marketing period. And the potential disputes with secured lenders made negotiating a consensual DIP facility challenging—cash collateral allowed the court to authorize operating funds while contested matters proceeded toward resolution.

Plan of Reorganization

Following the asset sale, the Debtors pursued a liquidating plan to distribute the remaining sale proceeds, resolve outstanding claims, and wind down the corporate estates. The plan process generated the typical disputes associated with middle-market liquidating plans—adequate disclosure, claim treatment, and plan feasibility—but proceeded toward confirmation within the compressed timeline the sale had established.

Plan iterations and disclosure statement approval. The initial combined plan and disclosure statement was filed November 14, 2025, approximately three weeks after the sale order was entered. An amended version followed on November 24, 2025 in response to creditor feedback and U.S. Trustee comments. A second amended version filed December 19, 2025 incorporated additional modifications, with a final iteration filed December 24, 2025.

The disclosure statement was conditionally approved on December 1, 2025, allowing solicitation to proceed. A plan supplement filed December 10, 2025 provided additional implementing documentation including form agreements and schedules, with an amended supplement filed December 22, 2025. The voting results filed December 19, 2025 set the stage for confirmation proceedings.

Treatment of claims under the liquidating plan. The second amended plan established a straightforward priority structure consistent with the absolute priority rule:

The unimpaired treatment of ABL Loan Claims reflected their first-lien priority and the credit bid dispute resolution that enhanced the purchase price. The impaired treatment of Caspian's second-lien claims suggested recovery below face value, consistent with the company's significant underwater position at filing. General unsecured creditors received whatever distribution the plan specified after satisfaction of secured and administrative claims. Intercompany claims and equity interests were cancelled without distribution—an expected outcome given the liability-to-asset ratio.

Global settlement and wind-down. The sale order and plan incorporated a "global settlement" resolving disputes among the Debtors, secured lenders, and other parties regarding three primary issues: allocation of sale proceeds among creditor classes, credit bid rights that had been disputed during the sale process, and professional fee reserves necessary to complete case administration.

The plan established a wind-down structure including a Wind-Down Director to administer remaining assets and complete distributions, a professional fee escrow of $2.5 million to fund post-confirmation case administration costs, and provisions for terminating the debtor entities after distributions were complete. This structure is typical for liquidating plans following asset sales—the Wind-Down Director essentially functions as a plan administrator to complete the ministerial tasks of claims reconciliation and distribution without the overhead of maintaining full debtor operations.

Contested Matters

Several disputes arose during the case, though most reached resolution through stipulations, plan modifications, or court rulings prior to plan confirmation. The contested matters reflected the typical tension points in expedited 363 sales—adequate protection for secured creditors, sale process fairness, and plan treatment disputes.

Key Equipment Finance dispute. Key Equipment Finance, a division of KeyBank National Association, emerged as the most active litigant among secured creditors. Key Equipment filed multiple challenges during the case including a cash collateral objection (with a sealed exhibit suggesting confidential terms at issue), an objection to the sale motion, and an objection to the termination fee motion that would protect the stalking horse bidder.

The dispute escalated when Key Equipment sought a protective order to avoid a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition—an attempt to prevent the Debtors from taking discovery about Key Equipment's positions and claims. Judge Lopez denied the protective order motion on October 20, 2025, allowing the Debtors to proceed with discovery. This ruling strengthened the Debtors' negotiating position and likely contributed to resolution. The parties reached a stipulation and agreed order entered October 27, 2025—the same day as the sale order—resolving Key Equipment's objections and allowing the sale and plan to proceed.

U.S. Trustee objections. The Office of the U.S. Trustee raised objections at both the disclosure statement and plan confirmation stages. The disclosure statement objection filed November 21, 2025 raised concerns about adequate information for creditor voting—the typical focus of U.S. Trustee DS review. The plan confirmation objection filed December 17, 2025 addressed plan feasibility, compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, and other confirmation requirements.

The Debtors addressed these objections through plan modifications and formal replies. The second amended plan filed December 19, 2025 incorporated changes responsive to U.S. Trustee concerns, and the Debtors' reply to the confirmation objection addressed remaining issues. The resolution pattern is typical for U.S. Trustee objections—formal objection followed by negotiated modifications rather than contested evidentiary hearings.

John Deere confirmation objection. John Deere Construction & Forestry Company filed a plan confirmation objection on December 17, 2025. As a major equipment manufacturer, John Deere likely had significant claims or contractual relationships with the Debtors, though the specific basis for the objection was not detailed in the docket data reviewed. The objection's filing shortly before the anticipated confirmation date suggested John Deere was seeking specific treatment modifications or protections rather than blocking the plan entirely.

Adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding (No. 25-03791) was filed October 21, 2025 seeking recovery of money or property and addressing the validity, priority, or extent of liens. The adversary nature and timing—one day before the sale approval—suggested disputed claim priorities or fraudulent transfer concerns that required separate litigation treatment. The proceeding remained pending as of the December 2025 docket entries reviewed.

Claim objections. The Debtors filed preliminary objections to Claims 34 through 41 on October 21, 2025, challenging specific claims filed in the case. The bulk claim objection approach is standard for expediting claims reconciliation in liquidating chapter 11 cases.

Professional Retentions and Case Administration

The case retained a sophisticated professional team appropriate for a $100+ million bankruptcy with disputed sale issues and contested creditor claims.

White & Case's engagement as lead bankruptcy counsel reflected the case's complexity despite its middle-market size. The firm's restructuring practice has substantial experience with contested sales, lender disputes, and expedited 363 processes. Piper Sandler's investment banking role included advising on the prepetition marketing process, sale negotiations, and credit bid dispute resolution that led to the purchase price increase.

The appointment of Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors provided representation for the general unsecured creditor constituency. The UCC's formation and active participation indicated sufficient unsecured creditor stakes to warrant committee oversight of the sale and plan process.

The professional fee escrow of $2.5 million established under the plan provides a reserve for post-confirmation case administration and final fee applications. Piper Sandler's final fee application was approved in early December, while White & Case's fee applications remained pending as of the most recent filings.

Key Case Timeline

Industry Context

Worldwide Machinery's distress occurred against a backdrop of otherwise healthy growth in the equipment rental markets the company served. The company's specific challenges—pipeline industry collapse, overleveraged capital structure, and lender disputes—do not reflect broader industry weakness.

Oil and gas equipment rental market. The global oil and gas equipment rental market is anticipated at $343.64 million in 2025, with projected growth to $570.8 million by 2034 at a compound annual growth rate of 5.8%. The United States represents approximately 31% of global demand, driven by unconventional oil and gas development in formations like the Permian Basin, Eagle Ford, and Bakken. Over 18,200 active rigs and 12,400 well-servicing operations rely on rental equipment across the country. Texas, North Dakota, and Oklahoma together contribute 64% of total U.S. rentals—precisely the geographic markets where Worldwide maintained its equipment yards.

The oilfield equipment rental services market, measured more broadly, reached approximately $22.2 billion in 2025 with projected growth to nearly $32 billion by 2034 at a CAGR of 4.15%. North America commands approximately 38% of worldwide market share, reflecting the extensive unconventional oil and gas development across the continent. These growth projections suggest Worldwide's distress was company-specific rather than industry-driven—a function of the pipeline subdivision's collapse, excessive leverage, and governance challenges rather than secular decline in equipment rental demand.

Construction equipment rental market. The broader global construction equipment rental market was estimated at $204.06 billion in 2024, with projected growth to $280.13 billion by 2030 at a CAGR of 5.6%. This market expansion reflects ongoing infrastructure investment globally and contractors' increasing preference for rental over ownership to manage capital expenditures and equipment obsolescence risk. Growing shale gas extraction and offshore exploration have accelerated equipment rental usage by 27% over the past three years, according to industry research.

The healthy industry fundamentals likely contributed to buyer interest in the going-concern acquisition. Diversified Holding and Macquarie were acquiring a business with established customer relationships, experienced workforce, and 560-piece equipment fleet into a growing market—not buying a declining asset in a dying industry. The $69 million purchase price reflected the acquirers' belief that the company's operational platform had value independent of its capital structure problems.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Worldwide Machinery file for chapter 11?

The filing was precipitated by a dispute with secured lenders over competing sale proposals. A "lender-liquidator side deal" between Gordon Brothers and ABL lenders—allegedly in violation of Gordon Brothers' NDA with the company—threatened a liquidation outcome rather than the going-concern sale management preferred. The company also faced underlying financial distress from COVID-19 construction slowdowns, a "catastrophic decline" in its pipeline business from oil price volatility and project cancellations, and an overleveraged capital structure with approximately $223 million liabilities against approximately $116 million assets. The combination of disputed sale dynamics and financial distress prompted the bankruptcy filing.

Who acquired Worldwide Machinery?

Diversified Holding, LLC—an entity controlled by the Greenberg family (the third-generation owners who had been forced off the Board in January 2025)—acquired the company in a going-concern transaction financed by Macquarie Equipment Capital, Inc. This insider-led acquisition preserved the business as an operating enterprise and retained the majority of employee positions. The Greenberg family, despite losing formal governance control eight months before filing, regained ownership through the sale process—a relatively unusual outcome that reflects the family's unique operational knowledge and the preference for going-concern value preservation.

What was the final purchase price?

The final purchase price was $69 million in cash plus assumption of approximately $13.1 million in trade liabilities, for total consideration of approximately $82.1 million. The price increased from the initial $52.5 million stalking horse bid after buyers raised their offer by approximately $3.4 million to resolve a dispute over the senior lenders' ability to credit bid their secured claims. The purchase price enhancement avoided potentially protracted litigation over credit bid rights under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.

How long did the sale process take?

The going-concern sale was approved just 41 days after the chapter 11 filing—from September 11, 2025 (petition date) to October 22, 2025 (sale approval hearing). This expedited timeline reflected substantial prepetition marketing efforts, a stalking horse agreement in place at filing, and the company's constrained cash position that necessitated rapid transaction execution. The sale order was entered five days later on October 27, 2025.

What is the Greenberg family's history with the company?

The Greenberg family controlled Worldwide Machinery for three generations spanning 76 years. Joseph Greenberg founded the company in 1949 during the post-World War II construction boom. His son Alan expanded internationally starting in 1967, establishing offices and affiliates across multiple continents. Grandsons Evan and Adam assumed leadership in 1991 and pivoted the company toward the energy sector, building a Pipeline Division that became a global leader. In January 2025, secured lenders forced Alan, Evan, and Adam to resign from the Board—ending direct family governance—though the family regained ownership through the chapter 11 sale process.

What was the "lender-liquidator side deal"?

After receiving what Debtors characterized as an "uncompetitive bid" during the prepetition marketing process, liquidator Gordon Brothers approached the company's ABL lenders about purchasing their secured debt at less than par value. Gordon Brothers and the ABL lenders entered an exclusive arrangement that would have given Gordon Brothers control over the senior secured claims and potentially the ability to dictate the sale outcome—likely toward liquidation rather than going-concern. The Debtors alleged this arrangement violated the non-disclosure agreement Gordon Brothers had signed during the marketing process. The disputed side deal prompted the chapter 11 filing to preserve the court-supervised going-concern sale.

What is Caspian Capital's role in this case?

Caspian Capital provided a $50 million second-lien term loan in January 2022 as part of a corporate restructuring and also received a 10% equity stake in the company. By the time of filing, Caspian was owed over $70.9 million in secured debt. This dual creditor-equity position created complex incentives—Caspian had interests as both a secured lender seeking recovery and an equity holder whose stake was likely worthless given the company's asset deficit. Under the plan, Caspian's Class 3 claims received impaired treatment with specific recovery terms.

Did the company use DIP financing?

No. The Debtors funded chapter 11 operations using cash collateral rather than new debtor-in-possession financing. An interim cash collateral order authorized a $3.4 million four-week operating budget, with adequate protection for secured lenders through replacement liens and reporting requirements. The short 41-day sale timeline, preserved going-concern operations, and potential disputes with secured lenders made cash collateral a more practical funding mechanism than negotiating a consensual DIP facility.

What contested matters arose during the case?

Key Equipment Finance (a KeyBank division) filed multiple objections to cash collateral usage, the sale motion, and the termination fee motion, and sought a protective order from a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition—which the Court denied. The parties ultimately reached a stipulation resolving all disputes. The U.S. Trustee objected to the disclosure statement and plan confirmation, and John Deere filed a confirmation objection on December 17, 2025. An adversary proceeding addressed lien priority and recovery issues. Most contested matters were resolved through plan modifications and negotiated resolutions rather than contested evidentiary hearings.

What is the current case status?

The second amended plan and disclosure statement was filed December 24, 2025, with plan confirmation proceedings ongoing as of that date. The $69 million going-concern sale closed following the October 27, 2025 sale order, with Diversified Holding and Macquarie Equipment Capital completing the acquisition of substantially all operating assets. The estates are proceeding toward wind-down and distributions under the liquidating plan administered by a Wind-Down Director, with a $2.5 million professional fee escrow reserved for post-confirmation case administration.

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