Fisker: EV Maker Liquidates Through 363 Sales and a Confirmed Plan

Fisker’s chapter 11 case in the District of Delaware is an example of how an asset-light EV brand can lose negotiating leverage when (1) a single secured stakeholder controls liquidity, (2) core operations depend on third parties for mission-critical software support, and (3) the remaining monetizable assets are primarily finished inventory rather than a durable manufacturing platform. The filing came after Fisker’s efforts to pursue strategic alternatives and stabilize funding did not succeed amid an EV demand slowdown and tightening liquidity constraints.

Within weeks, the case centered on a court-approved bulk disposition of thousands of finished Fisker Ocean SUVs to American Lease LLC, followed by confirmation of a liquidation plan that placed residual assets and causes of action into trust vehicles for creditor administration. Reporting around the case also made Fisker unusual for a consumer-facing bankruptcy: the restructuring process intersected directly with questions about warranty coverage, parts availability, and whether owners would keep access to connected services that affected vehicle functionality.

Liquidation Through Fleet Sale and Trust Structure

What Fisker was (and why the brand mattered even after manufacturing stopped). Fisker entered 2024 as a well-known EV startup associated with founder Henrik Fisker and the Fisker Ocean SUV, but it had already encountered severe financial strain and NYSE delisting headlines before the bankruptcy filing. By March 2024, public reporting described the company as facing imminent liquidity constraints and struggling to sustain operations and financing while attempting to sell and service a new vehicle platform. The bankruptcy framing matters because much of the value left at filing was not a continuing manufacturing business—it was a combination of (i) finished vehicle inventory that could be monetized quickly, (ii) intellectual property and residual rights tied to software, designs, and contracts, and (iii) claims and causes of action administered post-effective date. Coverage of the pre-filing deterioration provides useful context for why the case progressed as a liquidation rather than a turnaround Fortune coverage of the pre-filing deterioration.

Why Fisker filed: liquidity constraints plus an operational disruption. The chief restructuring officer described multiple converging catalysts in the First Day Declaration: an EV demand downturn linked to macro conditions (higher interest rates and lower fuel costs), rapidly declining sales, and the failure of an OEM partnership/investment track that had been pursued for months and terminated in April 2024. The filing timeline was then accelerated by an immediate operational issue: a mission-critical software vendor notice dated June 17, 2024 stating that essential services would terminate on June 18, 2024, which the CRO described as forcing a prompt filing to preserve value. Public reporting at the filing similarly emphasized that the company had limited liquidity and entered chapter 11 to pursue a court-supervised path to monetize remaining assets TechCrunch report on the June 2024 filing; Fisker’s SEC Form 8‑K bankruptcy announcement.

The prepetition timeline: why the case couldn’t wait. Fisker’s narrative is useful because it illustrates how a chapter 11 filing can be triggered by more than “running out of cash.” In Fisker’s telling, strategic alternatives were pursued while the balance sheet remained highly levered and sales momentum weakened, but a critical issue was operational: the threatened termination of mission-critical software services within 24 hours. That kind of notice reduces available options. A company can sometimes negotiate time with lenders or vendors for weeks; it is far harder to address a hard stop in software services that affects the ability to deliver or support vehicles. The case record and public coverage also point to an earlier phase where Fisker’s financing terms and collateral structure evolved in a way that increased secured-creditor leverage into bankruptcy.

Capital structure and control dynamics in chapter 11. The CRO described approximately $854 million of aggregate funded debt at filing in the First Day Declaration, spanning small near-maturity secured notes, larger secured convertible notes associated with CVI/Heights, and a substantial unsecured/holdco-only convertible note stack. The secured posture mattered because Fisker did not enter chapter 11 with a conventional new-money DIP facility; instead, it sought short-term authority to use cash collateral, creating a case dynamic where near-term operations and the sale process were heavily influenced by the secured noteholder’s rights and consent.

How Heights (CVI) became central. The “secured-first” narrative in Fisker’s case was amplified by reporting that described a shift from unsecured to secured status through default mechanics and collateral grants that put the Heights/CVI position in front of other stakeholders by the time of filing. The story became a reference point in EV distress coverage because it showed how covenant breaches and collateral pledges can change bargaining power quickly in the months before bankruptcy TechCrunch discussion of Heights/CVI’s position and collateral dynamics; Bloomberg Law item on an event of default with respect to notes.

In practical terms, this kind of secured-position migration tends to produce two downstream effects in chapter 11. First, it increases the probability that the case will be financed through cash collateral rather than new money, because the secured stakeholder’s consent can become the gatekeeper for liquidity. Second, it can shift the case’s key negotiations away from a broad constituency of creditors and toward a smaller set of secured stakeholders and committees negotiating around sale proceeds, lien coverage, and releases. Fisker’s case ultimately included a liquidation plan structure in which the secured notes class was treated through a dedicated trust vehicle (the IP/Austria assets trust) rather than being folded into the same post-effective governance structure as general unsecured creditors.

First-day liquidity: cash collateral as the substitute for a traditional DIP. Fisker's Cash Collateral Motion sought authority to use cash collateral for short-term funding to pay payroll and other critical expenses and avoid a disruptive shutdown. The interim Cash Collateral Order framework included an approved budget, a termination date structure, and an adequate protection package typical of lender-driven chapter 11 cases, including replacement/additional liens and a superpriority administrative claim (subject to a carve-out). The practical implication was straightforward: rather than using a DIP to finance a longer reorganization, Fisker used cash collateral to stabilize the estate long enough to sell the most tangible assets—finished vehicles—and then pursue a liquidation plan.

Adequate protection as a governance tool. In a cash-collateral liquidation, adequate protection is often less about incremental economic protection (the estate may not have meaningful unencumbered value) and more about process and guardrails. The framework typically includes a defined challenge process (who can challenge liens and when), budget variance governance, and carve-out mechanics that determine whether professionals can remain funded if liquidity tightens. Fisker's interim Cash Collateral Order included a carve-out construct and a termination framework, which together illustrate the lender-driven nature of the early case.

Strategic alternatives that didn’t close (and why “finished inventory” became the sale rationale). Bankruptcy filings described a prepetition marketing process and outreach efforts that did not produce a going-concern transaction. That context matters because it explains why the case did not resemble a typical “save the operating business” restructuring: the debtors’ sale strategy in chapter 11 was not a competitive auction for a functioning automaker, but a targeted disposition of finished inventory to a buyer that could absorb and resell vehicles at significant discounts while handling logistics and title/transfer complexity.

The fleet sale to American Lease: structure, economics, and why the court approved a private deal. Fisker's Sale Motion pursued a section 363 sale of 3,321 finished vehicles to American Lease LLC, with consideration described as up to $46.25 million (plus certain incidental costs) and payments tied to deliveries. The Sale Order approved the transaction without a postpetition auction and included typical sale-order protections such as good-faith purchaser findings and free-and-clear relief with liens attaching to proceeds. Public coverage emphasized the practical challenge of finding a buyer willing and able to take thousands of vehicles at once and handle resale or deployment logistics in a distressed auto context TechCrunch coverage of the sale approval hearing. The key economic point is that the transaction monetized vehicles at bulk-sale prices far below original retail positioning; that spread is what made the deal viable for a fleet buyer rather than an individual retail channel.

Bulk-sale pricing: translating the headline number into per-vehicle economics. The public reporting around the sale provided concrete benchmarks for how deeply inventory was being discounted. One report framed the pricing as roughly $14,000 per vehicle on average compared to a ~$70,000 starting price for a new Ocean at launch TechCrunch coverage of Fisker seeking approval to sell remaining vehicles. Another described a more granular schedule based on vehicle condition and status, including prices ranging from roughly $2,500 to $16,500 per vehicle Car and Driver summary of the bulk sale pricing.

Execution risk: why “connected services” became a bankruptcy issue rather than just an owner complaint. By October 2024, the sale and liquidation plan intersected with operational disputes about what data, systems, and server support were required to transfer or maintain functionality for vehicles being distributed and for owners already on the road. Reporting described emergency objections and concerns raised by the buyer about whether vehicle information could be transferred to a new server environment, creating late-case friction in what was otherwise a sale-and-liquidate structure TechCrunch coverage of the October 2024 “speed bump” and buyer objections.

This is a restructuring-relevant point because it shows how “operational dependencies” can become gating items for asset value. If a bulk buyer cannot reliably access vehicle configuration data, software support, or the systems needed to enable features and repairs, then the value of inventory can deteriorate quickly. In that sense, the connected-services dispute functioned like a collateral value dispute: it threatened the price realization on the estate’s main monetization asset at a moment when the plan structure was being finalized.

Plan of liquidation: two trusts, two constituencies, and an equity wipeout. The Confirmed Plan created two primary post-effective-date vehicles. First, a liquidating trust was established for the benefit of general unsecured creditors, which receive beneficial interests (trust units) rather than immediate cash distributions. Second, an IP/Austria assets trust was established for the secured notes class, designed to hold and monetize specified intellectual property and Austria-related assets with distributions flowing to that secured class. In practical restructuring terms, the trust split reflects two key realities: (i) the bulk of remaining liquid value was concentrated in the inventory sale proceeds and recoveries driven by claims administration and causes of action, and (ii) certain assets and rights were treated as a secured-creditor lane administered separately from the general unsecured pool.

Why a liquidation plan instead of a conversion: “best alternative” framing. One of the strategic questions in a liquidation case is whether the debtor should remain in chapter 11 long enough to confirm a plan (and thereby control trust formation, releases, and administrative timing) or be converted to chapter 7 with a trustee appointed to liquidate and administer claims. Later filings in the Fisker case referenced conversion-date concepts and highlighted how the case’s negotiated architecture was positioned as superior to a conversion outcome for general unsecured creditors. In other words, the liquidation plan did not claim to “save” the company; it claimed to preserve recoveries and process control compared to the alternative liquidation forum.

Trust governance and control points: who ran the trusts after confirmation. The confirmation framework described distinct selection mechanics: the committee selected the liquidating trustee, while the secured noteholder selected the IP/Austria assets trustee. In the revised liquidating trust agreement filed with the second plan supplement, the liquidating trustee was identified as Matthew Dundon of Dundon Advisers LLC. Post-effective-date service lists in the case identified Uzzi & Lall (including attention Colin Adams, Partner) as the IP/Austria assets trustee. In a liquidation, these governance details are not cosmetic: they influence claim reconciliation posture, litigation strategy, settlement risk tolerance, and the pace at which remaining value is realized and distributed.

What the trusts actually do (day-to-day). For readers who do not routinely work with liquidation plans, it helps to translate “trust structure” into operational tasks. A liquidating trust typically (i) receives residual estate assets and assigned causes of action, (ii) reconciles and objects to claims, (iii) pursues collections and litigation where value exists, (iv) settles disputes and obtains court approvals where required, and (v) makes periodic distributions to trust beneficiaries after reserving for administrative costs, disputed claims, and post-effective obligations. The IP/Austria assets trust is conceptually similar but narrower, focusing on the specific asset pool designated for the secured notes class. Fisker’s choice to split trusts mirrors the underlying stakeholder split: general unsecured creditors on one side, and a secured class with specific collateral lanes on the other.

Releases and exculpation: the plan's "deal paper" backbone. The Confirmation Order approved a package of debtor releases and third-party release provisions framed as consensual for releasing parties, paired with exculpation and an injunction designed to implement the plan's settlement structure. For restructuring professionals, the key point is the functional role of these provisions: they are the mechanism that trades litigation risk and process certainty for finality, especially when the estate’s remaining value is being administered through trusts rather than an ongoing operating business.

Claims administration: bar dates and post-effective deadlines that shaped recoveries. The Bar Date Order established the framework, including a general bar date (September 11, 2024), a government bar date (December 16, 2024), and an administrative claims bar date keyed to the effective date (November 18, 2024). For a consumer-facing debtor with a large potential owner population, bar dates are particularly meaningful: they determine whether warranty, service, buyback, and other owner-related assertions become allowed claims, disputed claims, or are excluded from distributions due to late filing.

Why bar dates matter for consumer products: claim volume can become the “hidden” cost. Consumer-facing bankruptcies can generate large claim volumes even when individual claims are modest. Each proof of claim increases administrative overhead: claims must be processed, categorized, potentially reconciled against schedules, and either allowed, settled, or objected to. In Fisker’s case, the claims and noticing agent’s role was not incidental. The court-appointed claims agent’s duties included maintaining the official claims register and facilitating proof-of-claim intake and public access—an infrastructure function that becomes critical when thousands of owners, vendors, and counterparties may seek to assert claims of varying types.

Owners and vehicles: what the bankruptcy did (and did not) solve for consumers. Fisker’s bankruptcy raised an unusually practical question: what happens when a consumer product’s functionality depends on ongoing software support, connected services, parts logistics, and a servicing network, but the manufacturer is liquidating. At the time of plan approval, reporting described the bankruptcy plan as “favoring car owners” and stated that American Lease agreed to maintain connected services for private owners—suggesting a negotiated attempt to prevent an immediate loss of essential functionality Detroit News report on plan approval and owner-facing implications. Separate owner-facing guidance emphasized uncertainty around warranty coverage, service availability, and parts supply even if the vehicles remained drivable MotorTrend owner FAQ and practical guidance.

The post-confirmation reality described in later reporting was more mixed. One year after the filing, owners were reported to still be experiencing degraded functionality and loss of premium features tied to connected services, even though vehicles remained usable in a basic sense AutoEvolution follow-up on owner impacts one year later. For restructuring professionals, the broader takeaway is that “consumer impact” in a liquidation is not just a reputational issue—it can affect claim volumes, administrative burden, and the operational feasibility of asset transfers when software access and data transfer are prerequisites to monetizing inventory.

A restructuring professional’s lens on the owner problem: it’s a “continuity of operations” question without an operating debtor. A normal chapter 11 case uses DIP financing and a business plan to preserve operations and, ideally, create a path for the reorganized debtor to keep servicing customers. Fisker’s case inverted that: it liquidated the operating platform while customers still depended on the platform’s services. That dynamic is why the case generated owner-focused reporting and why plan and sale negotiations appeared to include elements aimed at preserving some level of service continuity. From an estate perspective, preserving continuity can reduce value leakage (vehicles become harder to sell if features break) and may reduce claims pressure (owners may assert claims if functionality materially degrades), but it requires counterparties—buyers, service providers, technology vendors—to assume obligations that are not typical in a “sell the inventory” transaction.

Contested dynamics and investigative overlay. Reporting around confirmation also described an SEC investigation into possible securities violations covering the period before the bankruptcy filing, adding a regulatory dimension to an already creditor-driven wind-down CBT News coverage noting SEC investigation context. Earlier coverage framed the case as one in which the secured stakeholder sought conversion to chapter 7 while the debtors and others pushed to keep the case in chapter 11 through a sale-and-plan path, underscoring how creditor control disputes can shape liquidation timing and available options InvestorPlace report on conversion pressure and lender conflict; Davis Polk’s case update referencing confirmation and plan consummation.

Key professionals and roles (selected). The debtors were represented by Davis Polk & Wardwell as lead counsel, with Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell serving as Delaware counsel, as reflected in case notices and public matter descriptions Davis Polk’s filing announcement page. The case also involved a typical committee-side advisor stack: filings show Morrison & Foerster as committee lead counsel, Cole Schotz as Delaware co-counsel, and M3 Advisory Partners as committee financial advisor. On the restructuring advisory side, reporting described the company engaging FTI Consulting in early 2024 as it moved toward a restructuring track Bloomberg Law item noting FTI engagement context.

Claims agent infrastructure (and why it matters in a high-volume case). The court appointed Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC dba Verita Global as claims and noticing agent, authorizing it to act as the repository for proofs of claim and to maintain the official claims register. The retention materials in the case included a detailed fee schedule covering both hourly professional support and per-unit charges (for example, printing and data storage). In a consumer-facing liquidation, those mechanics matter because noticing and claims processing are not a one-time cost: they persist through bar-date outreach, claim intake, and claim objection waves administered by the trusts post-effective date.

Case timeline: liquidation milestones. Fisker’s Delaware case progressed from filing to confirmation in roughly four months, with the value realization largely driven by cash-collateral stabilization, execution of the inventory sale, and negotiation of a liquidation plan that could reduce conversion risk. The timeline below highlights the milestones that most directly affected estate value and creditor recoveries.

Frequently Asked Questions

When did Fisker file for chapter 11 bankruptcy?

Fisker’s lead debtor filed in the District of Delaware on June 17, 2024, and additional U.S. affiliates filed on June 19, 2024, with the cases jointly administered under Case No. 24-11390 (TMH) SEC 8‑K bankruptcy announcement.

Where was Fisker’s bankruptcy case filed and what was the case number?

The case was filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and was jointly administered under Case No. 24-11390 (TMH) SEC 8‑K.

Why did Fisker file—what were the immediate catalysts described in bankruptcy filings?

Bankruptcy filings described a liquidity constraints driven by declining EV demand and failed strategic alternatives, with the filing timeline accelerated by a June 17, 2024 notice from a mission-critical software vendor terminating essential services as of June 18, 2024 TechCrunch filing coverage.

Who was Fisker’s primary secured creditor in the case?

Court filings and reporting identified CVI Investments, Inc. (often referred to as “Heights”) as the key secured stakeholder whose collateral position and cash-collateral rights shaped the case’s liquidity and leverage dynamics TechCrunch on Heights/CVI’s secured posture.

Did Fisker obtain DIP financing?

Fisker proceeded under cash collateral orders rather than a traditional new-money DIP facility in the early case record, using budgeted cash-collateral authority to maintain short-term liquidity while it executed the inventory sale and negotiated a liquidation plan.

What happened to Fisker’s remaining Ocean SUVs in bankruptcy?

Fisker sold thousands of finished vehicles in bulk to American Lease LLC through a court-approved section 363 sale designed to monetize inventory quickly and avoid value erosion TechCrunch on the court-approved fleet sale.

How much was the American Lease fleet sale worth and how were vehicles priced?

The maximum consideration described in the sale materials was approximately $46.25 million, with reporting describing steep per-vehicle discounts relative to original pricing, including a schedule of condition-based prices in the low thousands up to the mid-teens Car and Driver pricing breakdown.

What did the confirmed plan do with creditor claims and equity?

The confirmed plan was a liquidation plan that established trust vehicles for creditor administration and distributions, with equity interests canceled on the effective date and no equity recoveries Davis Polk plan confirmation update.

What happened to Fisker Ocean owners’ warranties and connected services?

Owner-facing coverage emphasized uncertainty around long-term warranty and service support in a manufacturer liquidation, while reporting at confirmation described commitments intended to maintain connected services for private owners; later reporting described ongoing owner impacts and loss of premium features tied to connected services MotorTrend owner guidance; Detroit News on plan approval/owner implications; AutoEvolution one-year follow-up.

Who is the claims agent for Fisker?

Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC dba Verita Global serves as the claims and noticing agent. The firm maintains the official claims register and distributes case notifications to creditors and parties in interest.

For more chapter 11 case research and restructuring analysis, visit the ElevenFlo bankruptcy blog.