Maverick Gaming: Poker Player's Casino Empire Crumbles Under $306M Debt

RunItOneTime LLC, doing business as Maverick Gaming LLC, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 14, 2025, after accumulating approximately $306 million in secured debt, falling behind on a $17.8 million annual sale-leaseback rent obligation, and facing intensifying competition from tax-exempt tribal casinos in the Pacific Northwest. Founded in 2017 by high-stakes poker player Eric Persson and COO Justin Beltram—veterans of Las Vegas Sands, Bellagio, and Marina Bay Sands—the regional gaming operator had built a portfolio of 26 properties across Washington, Nevada, and Colorado featuring approximately 2,500 slot machines, 320 table games, 1,200 hotel rooms, and 30 restaurants before its capital structure became unworkable.

The chapter 11 case in the Southern District of Texas, supported by a June 25, 2025 transaction support agreement with lenders holding approximately 78% of First Out Term Loans and 70% of Second Out Term Loans, proceeded through a multi-segment sale process that yielded over $119 million in aggregate value across nine transactions. In an unusual outcome, co-founder Eric Persson's entity won the $28 million bid for select poker operations—effectively repurchasing a portion of the company he founded through the bankruptcy process.

Case Snapshot

The Poker Player's Casino Empire

Maverick Gaming's origins trace to the gaming industry expertise and entrepreneurial ambitions of its high-profile founder. Eric Persson and Justin Beltram founded RunItOneTime LLC (doing business as Maverick Gaming) in 2017, bringing over 30 years of combined experience from Las Vegas Sands, Bellagio, and Marina Bay Sands—three of the world's most iconic gaming destinations. Persson is also known as a high-stakes poker player, lending a unique perspective—and personal brand—to the company's casino and cardroom operations. The founder served as both majority owner (holding 57.9% of the parent company's common stock) and CEO, a concentration of control that would later draw scrutiny from credit rating agencies.

The company's strategy centered on acquiring underperforming gaming assets and implementing operational changes to improve profitability. In Nevada, the Wendover properties that Maverick acquired had previously generated approximately $4 million in annual EBITDA; under Maverick's ownership, these properties produced in excess of $17 million in annual EBITDA. The company also doubled EBITDA at its Elko properties within the first year of ownership. These early turnaround successes fueled an aggressive expansion financed through $306 million in debt across multiple loan facilities.

Property portfolio. By the petition date, Maverick Gaming had built a diverse portfolio spanning three states and multiple gaming formats. The Nevada holdings included the Wendover Nugget Hotel & Casino and Red Garter Hotel & Casino in West Wendover, along with Maverick Casino & Hotel Elko, Gold Country Casino, and High Desert Inn in Elko. The Wendover Nugget alone featured 73,000 square feet of casino space, 574 slot machines, 23 table games, and 489 hotel rooms. Colorado operations centered on Black Hawk and Central City, including the Grand Z Casino & Hotel (28,933 square feet, 576 slots, 118 rooms), Dragon Tiger Casino, and Z Casino. Washington operations comprised 17 operating cardrooms—licensed poker and table game facilities operating under state card room regulations—plus eight non-operating properties that had been closed to consolidate gaming revenue.

EGads! fabrication business. Beyond gaming operations, Maverick's portfolio included EGads!, a Las Vegas-based casino fabrication business acquired in 2020 for approximately $11 million. Opened in 1988, EGads! designs, manufactures, installs, and services displays, themed elements, specialty fabrications, and architectural treatments for casinos and other gaming operations throughout the United States and abroad. The company operates from a 200,000-square-foot Las Vegas headquarters with four additional service and installation facilities in California, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Nebraska, employing approximately 150 people. EGads! proved to be one of Maverick's more profitable segments: net revenue grew from $22.1 million in 2022 to $33.2 million in 2024, with EBITDA rising from $4.9 million to $10.6 million over the same period.

Sale-Leaseback Transactions: Liquidity at a Cost

A significant portion of Maverick's capital structure stemmed from sale-leaseback transactions that generated liquidity but created fixed-cost obligations that would prove fatal when revenues declined.

Blue Owl Master Lease. Between 2022 and 2023, Maverick executed a series of sale-leaseback transactions with affiliates of Blue Owl Capital Inc., selling multiple Washington and Nevada properties for approximately $205 million in aggregate and leasing them back under a master lease arrangement. The transactions occurred in four tranches:

The Blue Owl Master Lease carried an initial 40-year term with optional 20-year renewal periods. As of the petition date, total rent payments under the lease were approximately $17.8 million annually—a fixed obligation regardless of revenue performance.

Angelo Gordon Lease. Separately, in September 2021, Maverick sold the land under the Wendover Nugget Hotel & Casino, Red Garter Hotel & Casino, Grand Z Casino Hotel, and Johnny Z's Casino to affiliates of Angelo, Gordon & Co. for approximately $93 million, entering into a 20-year sale-leaseback arrangement with four optional seven-year renewal terms. Annual rent payments under the Angelo Gordon Lease totaled approximately $8.5 million.

Capital gains tax liability. The sale-leaseback transactions also generated approximately $26 million in capital gains taxes for tax years 2022 and 2023. The company sought to address these liabilities through an offer-in-compromise submitted to the IRS in October 2024, making eight payments prior to the petition date. The outstanding tax liability would be addressed as part of the bankruptcy process.

The Collapse: Tribal Competition, Fixed Costs, and Operational Setbacks

Multiple factors converged to make Maverick's capital structure unworkable, with tribal gaming competition, sale-leaseback obligations, and a series of operational setbacks at the center of the company's financial distress.

Tribal gaming disadvantage. Maverick's Washington cardrooms faced intensifying competition from tribal casinos that enjoy significant structural advantages under federal law. Tribal casinos in Washington operate with tax-exempt status and fewer gaming restrictions, allowing them to invest heavily in facilities and promotions while non-tribal operators like Maverick bear full tax burdens and regulatory constraints. State gaming restrictions on card rooms—prohibiting slot machines, roulette, craps, sports betting, and consumer credit—do not apply to tribal casinos, making tribal facilities a more attractive option for many customers. Since 2020, several key tribal casino competitors expanded operations into parts of Washington where Maverick operated. The competitive dynamic was significant enough that Maverick filed a lawsuit against the federal government challenging aspects of tribal gaming regulation, reflecting the company's view that the regulatory environment structurally disadvantaged non-tribal operators.

COVID-19 impacts. The pandemic and associated restrictions hampered Maverick's growth during its critical early expansion phase. Washington cardrooms were closed for multiple months following shelter-in-place mandates. When allowed to reopen, the company was required to operate outdoors in parking lot tents. Once indoor operations resumed, 25% of casino walls were required to remain open-air for circulation—conditions that substantially reduced customer traffic and revenue.

Colorado operational setbacks. Beginning in 2022, a series of operational problems in Colorado compounded the company's challenges. A botched slot system upgrade derailed slot machine operations for weeks. The company inadvertently rolled out excessive "free play" offers under its customer loyalty rewards program, severely impacting profitability for four to five months. A newly created sports betting operation experienced volatile payouts, generating nearly $1 million in losses before the program was terminated. The March 2022 reopening and expansion of competitor Monarch Casino Resort Spa in Black Hawk diverted higher-end business that had accounted for much of Maverick's slot and table game revenue.

Minimum wage pressure. The Tukwila, Washington market experienced minimum wage increases of 46% between 2022 and 2025, compared to only 15% for the remainder of Washington State. This disproportionate labor cost increase added pressure to Maverick's key revenue-generating Washington properties.

EBITDA decline. These operational and competitive challenges had a dramatic impact on earnings. EBITDA fell from $52.1 million in 2021 to $18.5 million in 2022, declining further to $16.5 million in 2023—a 68% decline over two years.

S&P downgrade and governance concerns. S&P Global Ratings characterized Maverick's capital structure as "unsustainable" and flagged corporate governance concerns, including the absence of an independent board and Persson's combined roles as majority owner and CEO. The company experienced multiple ratings downgrades, including a downgrade to 'D' from 'CCC' in May 2024, which further impacted operating relationships.

Rent default. By April 2025, Maverick ceased rent payments under the Blue Owl Master Lease. As of the petition date, the company owed approximately $5.9 million in unpaid rent to Blue Owl, with an additional $1.5 million coming due on August 1, 2025.

Prepetition Capital Structure

The company's debt load at filing comprised multiple tranches with varying priority levels—a structure resulting from a broad restructuring in April 2024.

The prepetition credit facility was secured by a first priority security interest in substantially all of the debtors' assets. In addition to secured debt, trade claims outstanding as of the petition date totaled approximately $14.7 million.

April 2024 restructuring. The April 2024 Fourth Amendment to the prepetition credit agreement had attempted to address the company's financial challenges by: (a) converting the existing $55 million revolver into fully funded First Out Term Loans, plus $10 million new money and $12 million consideration for lenders' agreement; (b) exchanging the then-$258 million term B loan into Second Out Term Loans at a 15% discount and Third Out Term Loans at a 10% discount; (c) permitting paid-in-kind (PIK) interest on Second Out and Third Out Term Loans through December 2024; (d) loosening financial maintenance covenants; and (e) extending maturities to June 2028. Approximately $14 million in existing term B loans held by non-consenting lenders retained their existing position behind the Priority Term Loans.

Path to Chapter 11: Negotiations and Default

The company's deteriorating financial position accelerated restructuring discussions with lenders in early 2025.

Negotiations with the ad hoc group of secured lenders began in earnest in January 2025. Simultaneously, Maverick's management pursued third-party financing opportunities. The ad hoc group delivered a term sheet proposal on February 23, 2025, but the company's financial position continued to deteriorate. Events of default occurred in May 2025, and standstill agreements allowed negotiations to continue until the parties reached agreement on June 25, 2025.

In June 2025, the company formed a special committee comprising two recently appointed independent directors—Lawrence Perkins and Tobias Keller, both with substantial restructuring experience—to evaluate all available strategic alternatives. The special committee concluded that no viable third-party capital sources were available on the timeline necessary to maintain operations as a going concern.

Cardroom closures. Simultaneously with the bankruptcy filing, Maverick announced immediate closure of four Washington cardrooms: Dragon Tiger Casino (Mountlake Terrace), Palace Casino (Lakewood), Silver Dollar (Renton), and Roman Casino (Seattle). The closures signaled management's assessment that these locations were not viable going concerns.

Transaction Support Agreement and DIP Financing

The chapter 11 filing was supported by a comprehensive transaction support agreement and committed DIP financing from the company's secured lenders.

TSA terms. The June 25, 2025 transaction support agreement between Maverick, its majority shareholder (Eric Persson), and lenders holding approximately 78% of First Out Term Loans and 70% of Second Out Term Loans outlined terms for a pre-negotiated restructuring. The TSA segmented the company's business into three categories:

The agreement also contemplated a licensing arrangement where Persson's entity would receive a non-exclusive license for certain intellectual property in exchange for $100,000 plus a revenue-sharing arrangement entitling the debtors to 25% of adjusted EBITDA from poker partnerships using the IP for three years.

DIP facility. Members of the ad hoc group provided $22.5 million in DIP financing, structured as $7.5 million in new money DIP loans plus $15 million as a roll-up of First Out Term Loans on a 2-to-1 basis. Key terms included:

The interim DIP order was entered on July 16, 2025, with a second interim order on August 6, 2025, and the final order on August 27, 2025.

Adequate protection. Prepetition secured parties received replacement liens, a superpriority administrative claim (junior to DIP), and cash payment of professional fees as adequate protection for the use of cash collateral.

Multi-Segment Sale Process and Auction Results

The sale process divided Maverick's assets into distinct segments to maximize aggregate recovery through tailored marketing to different bidder pools.

Sale motion and bidding procedures. The August 1, 2025 sale motion outlined a comprehensive bidding process that culminated in a September 19, 2025 auction—approximately 67 days after the filing. The compressed timeline reflected the urgency of maximizing going-concern value for operating gaming properties while managing the DIP budget.

Auction results. The September 2025 auction produced winners across multiple asset tranches:

Founder buyback. The auction produced an unusual outcome: Eric Persson's entity won the $28 million bid for PokerCo assets plus the $1.4 million bid for the EGads business—effectively repurchasing a subset of the company's casino and cardroom operations through the bankruptcy process. Having participated in the TSA as majority shareholder, Persson's ability to acquire certain poker-focused operations while relinquishing the company's broader debt-laden portfolio illustrates how founders can sometimes retain significant assets through credit bidding and restructuring dynamics.

Core asset sale approval. The bankruptcy court approved the $62.5 million core asset sale to existing lenders. Secured lenders and unsecured creditors reached a tentative deal allowing the transaction to proceed, with sale orders entered through November 2025.

Sale order timeline. Final sale orders were entered in multiple tranches: PokerCo assets (September 24, 2025), Z Casino and additional assets (November 13, 2025), EGads assets (November 19, 2025), and final asset sales (November 25, 2025)—approximately 134 days after the filing date.

Professional Retentions

On the lender side, Ropes & Gray LLP and Porter Hedges LLP represented the ad hoc group of secured lenders, which held over 80% of the company's term loans.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

The U.S. Trustee appointed an official committee of unsecured creditors on July 25, 2025—eleven days after the petition date. The committee represented the interests of trade creditors and other unsecured claimants in connection with the sale process and potential recoveries.

Key Timeline

Lessons from the Maverick Gaming Collapse

The Maverick Gaming bankruptcy offers several instructive lessons for gaming industry participants and restructuring professionals.

Sale-leaseback risks. The Blue Owl sale-leaseback transactions generated $205 million in liquidity but created $17.8 million in annual fixed-rent obligations that proved unmanageable when revenue declined. Combined with the $8.5 million Angelo Gordon lease payments, the company faced over $26 million in annual lease obligations regardless of property performance—a burden that left no cushion when tribal competition and operational setbacks eroded revenues.

Tribal gaming competitive dynamics. Non-tribal gaming operators in Washington face structural disadvantages that are difficult to overcome through operational improvements. Tax-exempt status, fewer gaming restrictions, and the ability to offer a full range of casino games give tribal operators inherent advantages in marketing, investment, and customer attraction. Maverick's lawsuit against the federal government highlighted these dynamics but did not resolve them prior to bankruptcy.

Governance concentration. S&P's concerns about Persson's combined roles as majority owner and CEO, and the absence of an independent board, reflected broader questions about oversight in a company where founder control and operational execution were tightly coupled. The June 2025 formation of a special committee with independent directors came only as the company approached bankruptcy.

Founder buyback dynamics. The auction outcome—where Persson's entity acquired PokerCo assets for $28 million plus EGads for $1.4 million—demonstrates how founders can sometimes retain portions of their companies through bankruptcy processes. The structure allowed Persson to shed the broader debt burden while retaining select poker-focused operations where his expertise and personal brand may have continuing value.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did Maverick Gaming file for bankruptcy?

Maverick filed after accumulating approximately $306 million in secured debt, falling $5.9 million behind on a $17.8 million annual sale-leaseback rent obligation to Blue Owl, and facing intensifying competition from tax-exempt tribal casinos in Washington. EBITDA declined from $52.1 million in 2021 to $16.5 million in 2023. S&P Global Ratings characterized the capital structure as "unsustainable," and the company was unable to make debt service payments starting in May 2025.

Who is Eric Persson?

Eric Persson is a high-stakes poker player who co-founded Maverick Gaming in 2017 with Justin Beltram. Both had experience at Las Vegas Sands, Bellagio, and Marina Bay Sands. Persson held 57.9% of the parent company's stock and served as CEO, a concentration of control that S&P flagged as a governance concern. Through the bankruptcy auction, his entity acquired select poker operations for $28 million plus the EGads fabrication business for $1.4 million.

What is the transaction support agreement?

On June 25, 2025, Maverick executed a TSA with its majority shareholder and lenders holding approximately 78% of First Out Term Loans and 70% of Second Out Term Loans. The agreement segmented the company's business into PokerCo, LeaseCo, and MainCo, with different disposition paths for each segment. The TSA established a framework for DIP financing, sale procedures, and professional retentions.

How were assets divided in the sale process?

Assets were segmented into three primary categories: PokerCo (select poker operations including Aces Poker locations and Caribbean Casino/Cardroom), LeaseCo (properties under the Blue Owl Master Lease), and MainCo (remaining businesses and assets). This segmentation allowed different bidders to target specific asset pools, maximizing aggregate recovery through tailored marketing to casino operators, real estate investors, and financial creditors.

Did the founder buy back part of the company?

Yes. Eric Persson's entity won the $28 million auction for PokerCo assets, outbidding TIL Gaming Bidco's $27 million offer. Persson's entity also acquired the EGads fabrication business for $1.4 million and certain intellectual property. This outcome allowed the founder to retain poker-focused operations while shedding the broader debt-laden portfolio through the bankruptcy process.

What is the total value of the sales?

Aggregate sale value exceeded $119 million across nine transactions. The largest transactions were the $61.1 million credit bid for core assets, the $28 million PokerCo acquisition, and the $26.25 million credit bid for Z Casino. Additional transactions included sales of Washington cardrooms, the EGads business, intellectual property, and other assets.

What was the sale-leaseback situation?

Between 2021 and 2023, Maverick sold properties to Blue Owl ($205 million) and Angelo Gordon ($93 million) and leased them back. The Blue Owl lease required $17.8 million in annual rent; the Angelo Gordon lease required $8.5 million. By April 2025, Maverick stopped making Blue Owl rent payments, accruing $5.9 million in arrears by the filing date. The sale-leasebacks also generated $26 million in capital gains tax liability.

How did tribal gaming competition contribute to the bankruptcy?

Tribal casinos in Washington operate with tax-exempt status and fewer gaming restrictions. They can offer slot machines, roulette, craps, sports betting, and consumer credit—all prohibited for state-licensed cardrooms like Maverick's. Since 2020, tribal competitors expanded into key Washington markets where Maverick operated, drawing customers to facilities with broader gaming options. Maverick filed a federal lawsuit challenging aspects of tribal gaming regulation but did not obtain relief prior to bankruptcy.

Which cardrooms closed?

Four Washington cardrooms closed simultaneously with the bankruptcy filing: Dragon Tiger Casino (Mountlake Terrace), Palace Casino (Lakewood), Silver Dollar (Renton), and Roman Casino (Seattle). These closures signaled management's assessment that these locations were not viable as going concerns. Later in the sale process, Norwest Gaming Group acquired four Washington cardrooms for $500,000 and Roman Casino separately for $1 million.

What happened to EGads?

EGads!, the Las Vegas-based casino fabrication business acquired by Maverick in 2020 for approximately $11 million, was one of the company's more profitable segments with EBITDA growing from $4.9 million to $10.6 million between 2022 and 2024. Eric Persson's entity acquired EGads through the bankruptcy auction for $1.4 million, retaining the fabrication business alongside the PokerCo poker operations.

---

For more bankruptcy case analyses and restructuring insights, visit ElevenFlo's bankruptcy blog.