First Brands Group converts to Chapter 7 after court denies its liquidation plan
ElevenFlo ·
First Brands Group is in Chapter 7 liquidation. The court denied confirmation of the earlier plan and entered the conversion order on September 1, 2026 Dkt. 3748 · pp. 1, 2. Chapter 7 trustee Eva Engelhart has proposed bidding procedures for equipment, machinery and inventory at the McHenry, Illinois facilities Dkt. 4020 · p. 1.
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The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied confirmation of the proposed First Brands liquidation plan at the August 24, 2026 hearing. Its September 1 order converted the remaining Chapter 11 cases to Chapter 7 upon entry Dkt. 3748 · pp. 1, 2. Four Patterson and Starlight debtors had already converted on April 9 Dkt. 3748 · p. 2.
Eva S. Engelhart is the Chapter 7 trustee for the First Brands estates. Her November 2 notice proposed bidding procedures and an auction for inventory, machinery and equipment at the McHenry, Illinois facilities under the prior wind-down order. The notice describes a proposed process following a competing offer and an increased bid by JessCo Brakes Inc. Dkt. 4020 · pp. 1, 2.
First Brands Group, LLC and 75 affiliated debtors filed chapter 11 petitions on September 24 and 28, 2025, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas Dkt. 51 (lead case 25-90399, Hon. Christopher M. Lopez), centered on allegations of fraud at the global aftermarket automotive parts supplier and owner of brands including FRAM, Raybestos, Autolite, and Cardone. The company filed with approximately $9.3 billion in total obligations bloomberg.com: $9.3 billion in total obligations (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) amid allegations of fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and billions of dollars in missing funds.
Within weeks of filing, the U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation reuters.com: U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), founder and CEO Patrick James resigned and was subsequently sued by the company for "grievous misconduct," and an examiner was appointed with a $7 million budget to investigate alleged factoring fraud totaling $2.3 billion. The company secured a $4.4 billion DIP financing facility approved in the Final DIP Order Dkt. 608, including a $3.3 billion roll-up of prepetition debt that DIP lenders themselves characterized as having an "impossible to price" risk profile.
By mid-May 2026 the case had resolved into a wind-down architecture. The debtors filed a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dkt. 2678 on May 15, 2026 and a Disclosure Statement Dkt. 2692 on May 18 — but the plan is a liquidating plan for a single debtor, Premier Marketing Group, LLC, built on a "Global Settlement" that routes estate claims into a Litigation Trust while all other First Brands debtors are slated to convert to chapter 7. The U.S. Trustee responded with a motion to convert or dismiss Dkt. 2670 the cases, calling the settlement an "artifice" that strips the estate of its most valuable assets, and Judge Lopez approved a section 363 sale of the Toledo Molding & Die business line for an expected $80 million.
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston Division) |
| Case Number | 25-90399 (lead case) |
| Judge | Hon. Christopher M. Lopez |
| Petition Date | September 24 & 28, 2025 (staged filing) |
| Type | Freefall Chapter 11 with Fraud Investigation |
| Debtor(s) | 75 affiliated entities |
| Employees | about 26,000 worldwide; about 6,000 in U.S. |
| 2024 Revenue | about $5 billion |
| On-Balance Sheet Debt | about $6.1 billion |
| Off-Balance Sheet Obligations | about $2.3 billion |
| Alleged Factoring Fraud | about $2.3 billion |
| DIP Facility | $4.4 billion ($1.1B new money + $3.3B roll-up) (agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB) |
| Former CEO | Patrick James (resigned October 13, 2025) |
| Interim CEO | Charles M. Moore (Alvarez & Marsal) |
| Plan Status | Liquidating chapter 11 plan filed May 15, 2026 for one debtor (Premier Marketing Group, LLC); confirmation hearing targeted for June 17, 2026 |
| Current Posture | Global Settlement wind-down; all FBG debtors other than the Plan Debtor slated to convert to chapter 7 |
| Table: Case Snapshot |
Company Background and the First Brands Enterprise
First Brands Group emerged as an aftermarket automotive parts supplier prod.crainsdetroit.com: aftermarket automotive parts supplier (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) in North America through a debt-fueled acquisition strategy. The company assembled a portfolio of brands that supply both do-it-yourself consumers and professional automotive repair facilities worldwide, generating approximately $5 billion in annual revenue and employing roughly 26,000 workers globally.
The Brand Portfolio.
The First Brands portfolio includes FRAM filters thebrakereport.com: FRAM filters (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), Autolite spark plugs since 1935 autolite.com: since 1935 (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), Raybestos brake components, and Trico windshield wipers.
| Brand | Category | Heritage |
|---|---|---|
| FRAM | Oil & Air Filters | Since 1934 |
| Autolite | Spark Plugs | Since 1935 |
| Raybestos | Brake Components | Brand |
| Trico | Windshield Wipers | Brand |
| Cardone | Remanufactured Parts | Largest remanufacturer |
| StopTech | Performance Brakes | Performance segment |
| Centric | Brake Products | Professional market |
| Luber-finer | Heavy-Duty Filtration | Commercial fleet |
The acquisition strategy extended beyond consumer-facing brands. Cardone became the largest remanufacturer of automotive parts in North America, while StopTech focused on the performance brake segment. The company's heavy-duty filtration brand Luber-finer served commercial fleet operators, and Centric supplied professional brake products to repair shops nationwide. This diverse portfolio made First Brands a supplier in the automotive aftermarket supply chain motortrend.com: supplier in the automotive aftermarket supply chain (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo).
Growth Through Acquisition.
First Brands' business model centered on acquiring established aftermarket brands and consolidating them under one corporate umbrella. The strategy produced revenue growth but accumulated significant debt with each transaction. The company's corporate structure eventually encompassed 75 affiliated entities, multiple special purpose vehicles, and off-balance sheet financing arrangements that later became central to the fraud allegations.
Patrick James founded and led the company through its acquisition strategy, serving as CEO until his October 2025 resignation. The ownership structure included private equity sponsors and institutional investors who provided capital for the roll-up strategy. The complexity of the corporate structure—particularly the SPV arrangements and factoring facilities—is a focus of the fraud allegations and related analysis in the private debt market commentary k2-partners.com: private debt market commentary (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo).
The Fraud Allegations
At the center of First Brands' chapter 11 case are allegations of fraud involving fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and billions of dollars that cannot be accounted for. The allegations have drawn comparisons to the Greensill Capital collapse luther-lawfirm.com: Greensill Capital collapse (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) in supply chain finance markets in 2021.
Fabricated Invoices and Double-Pledged Receivables.
The core fraud allegations center on approximately $2.3 billion in factoring liabilities funderintel.com: $2.3 billion in factoring liabilities (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) that the company accrued through what court filings describe as fabricated invoices and double-pledging of receivables. In supply chain financing, companies sell their accounts receivable to factoring counterparties at a discount in exchange for immediate cash. First Brands allegedly created invoices for goods or services that did not exist and pledged the same receivables to multiple factoring parties—collecting cash multiple times on the same (or fictitious) underlying transaction.
The allegations extend to multiple SPV structures within the First Brands corporate family. As factoring counterparties attempted to collect on their purchased receivables, they discovered that the underlying invoices either did not correspond to actual transactions or had already been pledged to other parties. The reconciliation of these claims has become a central issue in the bankruptcy case, with factoring procedures motions seeking to establish a framework for sorting legitimate from fraudulent claims.
DOJ Criminal Investigation.
The U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal inquiry in October 2025 reuters.com: U.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), with the Southern District of New York leading the investigation. The DOJ investigation runs parallel to the bankruptcy proceedings.
CEO Resignation and Lawsuit.
Patrick James resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025 bloomberg.com: resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025 (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), approximately two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The resignation followed reports of pressure bloomberg.com: pressure (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) from creditors and board members as the scope of the alleged fraud emerged.
The company moved quickly from accepting James's resignation to suing him. On November 3, 2025, the debtors filed an adversary proceeding against James and related entities asserting claims for fraud, misappropriation of funds, turnover, and fraudulent transfer. The court granted a temporary restraining order dandodiary.com: temporary restraining order (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) against James that same day, though a preliminary injunction was subsequently denied on November 12 after the court found insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.
The lawsuit against James alleges "grievous misconduct" fortune.com: "grievous misconduct" (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) that damaged the company and its stakeholders. Reports indicate allegations that more than $700 million was transferred to insiders prior to the bankruptcy filing. Those were allegations described during the Chapter 11 proceedings.
Examiner Investigation.
The court appointed Martin De Luca of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP as examiner on November 19, 2025, with a $7 million budget to investigate the factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions. The court approved the examiner's Work Plan Dkt. 1819 in January 2026. The examiner's appointment followed motions from Raistone and the U.S. Trustee seeking independent investigation of the alleged fraud.
The scope of the examiner's investigation has itself become a contested issue. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors seeks a broader inquiry than the debtors originally proposed, arguing that a comprehensive investigation is necessary to understand the full extent of potential claims against insiders and third parties. Discussions regarding information sharing between the examiner and governmental agencies, including the DOJ, remain part of the record.
Pre-Petition Capital Structure
First Brands' capital structure included on-balance sheet debt, off-balance sheet obligations, and factoring liabilities.
On-Balance Sheet Funded Debt.
The company's disclosed funded debt totaled approximately $6.1 billion at the petition date according to the First Day Declaration Dkt. 51, distributed across multiple secured facilities:
| Debt Instrument | Amount Outstanding |
|---|---|
| ABL Facility | $227 million |
| First Lien Term Loan | $3,886.9 million |
| Additional First Lien Term Loan | $763 million |
| Second Lien Facility | $540 million |
| Side-Car Term Loan (accelerated) | $276 million |
| Total On-Balance Sheet | about $6.1 billion |
The first lien term loans alone exceeded $4.6 billion, reflecting the company's reliance on leveraged lending to fund acquisitions. The side-car term loan had already been accelerated prior to the filing, adding to the company's liquidity crisis. The First Day Declaration Dkt. 51 describes annual debt service costs exceeding $900 million alongside the operational issues that preceded the filing.
Off-Balance Sheet Obligations.
Beyond the disclosed funded debt, First Brands had accumulated approximately $2.3 billion in off-balance sheet obligations Dkt. 22 through its SPV structures:
| Obligation Type | Amount |
|---|---|
| Onset Master Leases (accelerated) | about $1.9 billion |
| Evolution Facilities | about $230 million |
| CarVal Facilities | $159 million |
| Aequum Facilities | $77.8 million |
| Total Off-Balance Sheet | about $2.3 billion |
The Onset master leases represent the largest single off-balance sheet exposure at approximately $1.9 billion. These obligations were accelerated prior to the bankruptcy filing, converting what had been structured as periodic payments into immediate claims against the estate. The Evolution, CarVal, and Aequum facilities Dkt. 51 together contributed roughly $470 million more. The filing lists approximately $800 million in unsecured supply chain financing liabilities separately from the off-balance sheet total.
The alleged factoring fraud added another layer of obligations. The company accrued approximately $2.3 billion in third-party factoring liabilities funderintel.com: $2.3 billion in factoring liabilities (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo)—though the legitimacy of these claims is precisely what the examiner has been appointed to investigate. The double-pledging allegations mean that multiple parties may have claims to the same underlying receivables, and fabricated invoice allegations suggest some portion of the factoring liabilities may be disputed.
Major Creditor Exposure.
Several major financial institutions face exposure from the First Brands case:
- UBS: Exposure exceeding $500 million finews.com: $500 million (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) through its O'Connor hedge fund unit
- Jefferies: Approximately $715 million via Leucadia/Point Bonita investment vehicles
- Onset Financial: about $1.9 billion in master lease obligations
- Bank of America: ABL facility agent with exposure
- SouthState Bank: Working capital lending facilities
The UBS exposure through O'Connor has drawn attention. The fund reportedly held 30% concentration swissinfo.ch: 30% concentration (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) in First Brands-related financing, prompting UBS to announce it would wind down the O'Connor funds advisorhub.com: wind down the O'Connor funds (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo).
Liquidity Crisis and Filing Triggers
The immediate trigger for the bankruptcy filing was a liquidity crisis precipitated by multiple pressures. New U.S. tariffs implemented in April 2025 increased First Brands' landed inventory costs, with court filings indicating approximately $99 million in additional costs Dkt. 51 between April and August 2025. The tariff announcement forced First Brands to pre-buy inventory before higher rates took effect, accelerating cash outflows and exacerbating working capital challenges.
These pressures escalated when Bank of America, acting as agent under the ABL facility, refused a draw request and established a $200 million reserve Dkt. 51 for what it alleged was an overadvance on the facility. The bank also threatened to implement cash dominion remedies, which would have given it control over the company's cash receipts. Simultaneously, SouthState Bank exercised setoff rights against approximately $27 million in First Brands' working capital deposits. The combined effect created an immediate cash crisis that left the company unable to meet payroll and vendor obligations without filing for bankruptcy protection.
Before resorting to bankruptcy, First Brands attempted to address its capital structure through out-of-court refinancing Dkt. 51. The company marketed a global refinancing process seeking $6.2 billion in new financing to address debt maturities and liquidity needs. The process failed as potential lenders, confronted with the complex capital structure, limited unencumbered assets, and emerging concerns about the factoring arrangements, declined to participate. A subsequent bridge financing marketing process also proved unsuccessful. With refinancing options exhausted and lenders taking adverse action, First Brands secured a $24.5 million pre-petition bridge loan to fund payroll and vendor payments while preparing for a bankruptcy filing.
Compounding these challenges, the company's growth-through-acquisition strategy had created ongoing integration costs that burdened operations. Court filings indicate nearly $160 million in upfront integration costs Dkt. 51 over the twelve months preceding the filing. Combined with the leverage burden, these integration costs reduced liquidity flexibility when tariff pressures and lender actions created acute liquidity stress.
$4.4 Billion DIP Financing
The DIP financing secured by First Brands reflects the scale of the enterprise and the risk profile created by the fraud allegations.
Facility Structure.
The senior secured superpriority DIP credit facility Dkt. 289 totals $4.4 billion, structured as a combination of new money and roll-up debt:
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Total Facility | $4.4 billion |
| New Money DIP Loans | $1.1 billion |
| Roll-Up Obligations | $3.3 billion (creeping roll-up) |
| DIP Agent | Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB |
| DIP Lenders | Ad Hoc Group of First/Second Lien Cross-Holders |
| Maturity | 270 days from initial funding (extendable) |
The new money component provides $1.1 billion in fresh liquidity. At the interim stage, $500 million was available—$175 million immediately accessible and $325 million held in escrow under the Interim DIP Order Dkt. 217. The remaining $600 million became available upon entry of the final DIP order. These funds support ongoing operations, professional fees, and the restructuring process.
The $3.3 billion roll-up Dkt. 289 converts prepetition first and second lien debt into superpriority DIP obligations, implemented through a "creeping" structure: $1.5 billion rolled up upon entry of the interim order, with the remaining $1.8 billion rolling up under the final order. This approach, rather than rolling up all prepetition debt simultaneously, provided some accommodation to objecting parties while improving the DIP lenders' position in the capital structure.
Pricing and Premiums.
The DIP facility pricing reflects the risk profile of lending to an enterprise under fraud investigation:
| Component | Rate/Amount |
|---|---|
| New Money Interest | SOFR + 1.55% cash + 8.45% PIK |
| Roll-Up Interest | SOFR + 7.0% PIK |
| Anchor Premium | 10.0% PIK |
| Upfront Premium | 5.0% PIK |
| Exit Premium | 5.0% cash |
| Carve-Out Cap | $25 million |
The combined pricing on new money—SOFR plus 10% (split between cash and PIK)—plus the anchor, upfront, and exit premiums, reflects the terms approved in the Final DIP Order Dkt. 608. The DIP lenders justified the pricing by characterizing the facility as "wholly unprecedented" with an "impossible to price" risk profile given the fraud allegations and complex collateral disputes.
DIP Financing Objections.
The DIP facility faced objections from the Unsecured Creditors Committee and SPV lenders including CarVal, Aequum, Evolution, and Onset. Key objections centered on:
- The $3.3 billion roll-up, which improved the DIP lenders' position at the expense of other stakeholders
- Fees and premiums that objectors characterized as excessive
- Priming liens that subordinated existing creditors' collateral positions
- Broad releases and waivers that limited the estate's ability to pursue claims against the DIP lenders
After negotiations and stipulations, the court approved the DIP facility with some modifications in the Final DIP Order Dkt. 608. However, certain disputes—particularly regarding SPV collateral—remain unresolved. The $24.5 million pre-petition bridge loan that funded payroll and vendor payments in the days immediately before filing was repaid from DIP proceeds upon interim funding. At the First Day hearing, counsel described the filing as a "mad dash into Chapter 11" that left the company with virtually no cash on hand. The bridge loan allowed First Brands to make payroll and fund vendor payments before filing.
SPV Collateral Disputes
The special purpose vehicle structures that facilitated First Brands' off-balance sheet financing have become a source of litigation in the bankruptcy case. Multiple SPV lenders assert claims to collateral that the debtors and DIP lenders also claim, creating priority disputes in the case.
Complex SPV Structure.
First Brands utilized multiple SPVs to structure its off-balance sheet financing arrangements. Each SPV typically held specific assets—inventory, equipment, or receivables—that secured the SPV-level financing. The SPV lenders, including CarVal, Aequum, Evolution, Onset, and UMB Bank, assert that their collateral remains separate from the debtors' estates and should not be available to satisfy DIP or other creditor claims. The debtors and DIP lenders take a different view, arguing that the SPV structures were part of an integrated enterprise and that alleged fraud in the SPV transactions may invalidate the SPV lenders' claims to priority. These disputes involve questions of corporate separateness, fraudulent transfer, and lien priority.
The Onset master leases Dkt. 51 represent the largest SPV dispute at approximately $1.9 billion. Onset has filed motions for stay relief, asserting that its collateral should be released from the automatic stay so it can pursue its remedies. The debtors have opposed these motions, arguing that the lease collateral is essential to ongoing operations and that Onset's claims may be subject to challenge based on the fraud allegations. Multiple SPV-related motions remain pending, including stay relief motions seeking to lift the automatic stay and permit SPV lenders to pursue collateral, trustee appointment motions seeking independent trustees for certain SPV debtors, enforcement actions that were automatically stayed upon filing, and professional retention objections based on conflicts from simultaneous representation of FBG debtors and SPV debtors. The court has suggested appointment of independent conflicts counsel for the SPV debtors to address the conflicts in having the same professionals represent both the parent debtors and the SPV entities whose interests may diverge.
April 2026 Sale Process, SPV Conversion, and Wind-Down
The case shifted into an active sale and wind-down phase in April 2026, with three material orders Dkt. 2396 entered in eight days.
Evolution SPV Debtors converted to Chapter 7 (April 9, 2026). Judge Christopher M. Lopez signed Order (I) Converting Chapter 11 Cases of Evolution SPV Debtors to Cases Under Chapter 7 Dkt. 2396 at docket 2396 on April 9, 2026, granting Evolution Credit Partners' March 11 emergency motion for conversion of certain SPV debtors. The order followed an agreed settlement among the debtors, Evolution, and the SPV Conflict Manager memorialized in the debtors' April 8 emergency settlement motion Dkt. 2372 and supported by Charles Moore's declaration Dkt. 2373. That April order moved only the Evolution-related SPV entities to Chapter 7. The September 1 conversion order covers the other cases that remained in Chapter 11 Dkt. 3748 · p. 2. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Ad Hoc Group of Lenders, and the SPV Conflict Manager all filed responses or joinders in the run-up to the order.
Intellectual property sale to PGI Northstar approved (April 10, 2026). The court entered the Order (A) Authorizing and Approving Sale of Certain of Debtors' Intellectual Property Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests Dkt. 2399 at docket 2399 on April 10, 2026, granting the debtors' emergency motion at docket 2236 Dkt. 2236 for the IP sale transaction. Buyer PGI Northstar LLC, a subsidiary of Premium Guard Incorporated, acquired intellectual property from the filters, plugs, wipers, and Strongarm business lines for $25 million plus additional payments tied to net sales just-auto.com: $25 million plus additional payments tied to net sales (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo). On April 8, Judge Lopez had given competing bidder NOCO 48 hours to put a competing bid on the table truckpartsandservice.com: given competing bidder NOCO 48 hours to put a competing bid on the table (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), arguing it had not been given prior notice that an IP-only sale was being contemplated. NOCO withdrew its objection on April 9 truckpartsandservice.com: withdrew its objection on April 9 (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo), allowing the sale to proceed.
Wind-down assets sale via Hilco consulting agreement (April 16, 2026). The court entered the Order Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (I) Approving and Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into and Perform Under the Consulting Agreement; (II) Authorizing the Sale of Wind Down Assets Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, and Encumbrances; and (III) Granting Related Relief Dkt. 2454 at docket 2454 on April 16, 2026, granting the debtors' emergency motion at docket 2216 Dkt. 2216 for a section 363 sale and consulting agreement with Hilco Global to monetize wind-down inventory and receivables. Hilco was already retained as the debtors' appraiser since October 2025 under a retention order Dkt. 898 at docket 898; the April 16 order expanded Hilco's role from valuation to active sale agent for the wind-down estate.
Jefferies stock falls 7.9% on $715M Point Bonita exposure (April 15, 2026). Jefferies Financial Group's shares lost 7.9% in a trading session finance.yahoo.com: shares lost 7.9% in a trading session (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) after fresh disclosure of its 6% equity interest in the Point Bonita fund, which carried roughly $715 million in exposure to First Brands. Jefferies had previously taken a $30 million pre-tax loss bankingdive.com: taken a $30 million pre-tax loss (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) tied to First Brands in its January 2026 quarterly earnings, and a Point Bonita fund investor lawsuit bloomberg.com: Point Bonita fund investor lawsuit (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) was filed in February 2026 over the disclosures Jefferies made around the time of the bankruptcy.
The proposed Premier Marketing Group plan and Global Settlement
This section describes the Chapter 11 proposal filed in spring 2026. The court denied confirmation on August 24, 2026 Dkt. 3748 · p. 1.
The case moved from an open-ended wind-down to a defined plan structure in late April 2026. The debtors filed an initial Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dkt. 2544 on April 28, 2026 and a Disclosure Statement Dkt. 2545 the following day, then filed a further Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dkt. 2678 on May 15, 2026 alongside a Notice of Filing Revised Chapter 11 Plan Dkt. 2680 attaching a redline against the prior version. Despite being filed under the First Brands Group lead-case caption, the plan is a liquidating plan for a single debtor — Premier Marketing Group, LLC, case number 25-90420 — and not a reorganization of the operating business. It provides for the wind-down and dissolution of Premier Marketing Group and routes estate assets into three liquidating trusts. Following the plan's effective date, all First Brands debtors other than the Plan Debtor are slated to convert to chapter 7 know.creditsights.com: slated to convert to chapter 7 (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) liquidation cases.
The plan is built on a "Global Settlement" among the debtors, the Ad Hoc Group of lenders, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Disclosure Statement Dkt. 2692 filed May 18, 2026 frames the settlement as the only path to any recovery for junior creditors: absent the settlement, the debtors state, administrative, priority, and general unsecured creditors might receive zero recovery because senior secured obligations — DIP claims and prepetition term loans — total approximately $7.5 billion and hold senior liens on the estate claims.
Class structure. The plan classifies claims and interests in eight classes. Class 1 (Other Priority Claims) and Class 2 (Other Secured Claims) are unimpaired and presumed to accept. Class 3 (Roll-Up Claims), Class 4 (First Lien Claims), Class 5 (Second Lien Claims), Class 6 (ABL Claims), and Class 7 (General Unsecured Claims) are impaired and entitled to vote. Class 8 (Plan Debtor Interests) is impaired and deemed to reject.
The three trusts. The Litigation Trust Dkt. 2678 holds estate claims and causes of action and is to be funded with at least $75 million — $25 million in cash from the First Brands debtors' balance sheet plus $50 million in Initial Litigation Trust Funding Commitments from Class 1 Funding Contributors. The plan also authorizes up to $37.5 million of Additional Class 1 Litigation Trust Funding, raised by majority vote of the Litigation Trust Oversight Board. Distributions follow a Litigation Trust Waterfall under which holders of administrative, priority, and general unsecured claims — excluding "Ineligible Creditors" — receive distributions before the new-money DIP A claims are paid in full; after aggregate distributions reach $400 million, holders of Roll-Up, First Lien, Second Lien, and Eligible Creditor claims begin sharing. The ABL Collateral Trust holds ABL Priority Collateral where no bona fide dispute exists over the ABL Secured Parties' perfected lien, amounts in the Factored Receivables Account subject to court determination, and certain insurance rights, with the ABL Agent or its designee as trustee. A DIP Collateral Trust completes the structure.
Eligible versus Ineligible Creditors. Under the plan, administrative, priority, and general unsecured creditors of the First Brands debtors are collectively defined as "Eligible Creditors" and receive Class 3(b) Litigation Trust Interests. Participation does not discharge or compromise the underlying claims, which remain preserved against the First Brands debtors. Parties named in the "James Complaint" or "Onset Complaint," and parties found to have engaged in "Adverse Conduct," are designated Ineligible Creditors and excluded from the Global Settlement benefits. The revised plan redline Dkt. 2680 defines the $37.5 million Additional Class 1 Litigation Trust Funding and a separate Additional Waterfall Litigation Trust Funding, restructures the DIP Collateral Trust into three classes with a $500 minimum participation threshold for DIP A and Roll-Up claim holders, ties the Ad Hoc Group steering committee to the case Mediation Order rather than a plan support agreement, and deletes the former Article IX Direct Claims Trust entirely.
During Chapter 11 the debtors pursued a conditional disclosure statement approval approach, seeking an order that conditionally approves the Disclosure Statement under section 1125, sets a combined hearing on final approval and plan confirmation, and establishes solicitation and voting procedures. The disclosure statement hearing originally set for May 13, 2026 was adjourned to May 20, 2026 Dkt. 2630. The Amended Declaration of Charles M. Moore Dkt. 2696 supporting the proposed confirmation schedule, filed May 18, sets a compressed timeline: a voting and election record date of May 19, 2026; a conditional disclosure statement hearing on May 20; a voting deadline and release opt-in deadline of June 10, 2026 at 5:00 p.m. Central Time; a combined disclosure statement and plan objection deadline of June 10; and a confirmation hearing on June 17, 2026, subject to the court's availability. Moore states the case must move expeditiously because the debtors rely on week-to-week funding from OEM customers expected to cease within weeks of the closing of the Horizon North America sale, with available liquidity projected to be exhausted less than two weeks after OEM funding ceases — without confirmation on this schedule, the debtors say they would be forced into a value-destructive conversion to chapter 7.
A separate Premier Marketing Group disclosure statement track drew an objection from Total Quality Logistics, LLC, which asserts an administrative claim of $268,499.20 for 114 unpaid post-petition logistics invoices. Total Quality Logistics objected Dkt. 2647 that the disclosure statement fails to provide adequate information under section 1125 — it lacks any valuation of the Litigation Trust or recovery estimate for administrative claims, violates the DIP Order's requirement to pay DIP loan parties' administrative expenses collectively, contains contradictory language about the effect of creditor inaction, and improperly requires irrevocable opt-out elections before the plan's confirmability is determined. A revised Premier Marketing Group disclosure statement Dkt. 2694 was filed May 18, 2026.
U.S. Trustee Motion to Convert or Dismiss
On May 13, 2026, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to convert or dismiss Dkt. 2670 the cases under 11 U.S.C. section 1112(b), seeking an order converting the cases to chapter 7 or dismissing them. The U.S. Trustee argues that the debtors are administratively insolvent and cannot confirm a plan that satisfies the Bankruptcy Code, citing section 1112(b)(4)(A) — substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate combined with the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation — on the grounds that the debtors have negative cash flow, cannot pay current expenses, and have sold or intend to sell all marketable businesses.
The U.S. Trustee characterizes the Global Settlement as an "artifice" and a "sleight of hand" Dkt. 2670 designed to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code. The motion argues the settlement strips the estate's most valuable remaining assets — the Estate Claims — by transferring them to the Plan Debtor without consideration, leaving the First Brands debtors with liabilities but no assets; that the DIP Secured Parties are improperly attempting to credit bid for Estate Claims despite holding liens only on the proceeds of such claims; and that the structure forces administrative claimants into an opt-out procedure that makes them share pari passu with other creditors in violation of the strict priority of section 1129. The U.S. Trustee states the debtors propose to pay over $245 million in professional fees while roughly $223 million in other administrative claims remain unpaid, and that the $3.3 billion of DIP Roll-Up Obligations are subordinated to about $200 million of undisputed administrative claims.
TMD Sale and Wind-Down Expansion
The debtors pursued a section 363 sale of the Toledo Molding & Die business line, an automotive plastics and components operation. SB360 Capital Partners, LLC, marketing the wind-down assets, began contacting potential bidders and stakeholders in late January 2026; by February 5, 2026 the debtors had received roughly 40 non-binding indications of interest across several business units, including five going-concern indications specifically for Toledo Molding & Die. After negotiations with a previous lead bidder stalled, the debtors reengaged the eventual buyer in April 2026, and in mid-April SB360 re-contacted 42 parties that had previously expressed interest, none of which submitted a proposal exceeding the value of the proposed transaction. SB360 concluded Dkt. 2652 that the sale represented the highest or otherwise best available alternative for the business and that an auction was unlikely to yield a better result.
A sale hearing was held on May 13, 2026, and Judge Lopez entered the TMD sale order Dkt. 2675 on May 14, 2026, authorizing the sale of the Toledo Molding & Die assets free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests to TNJ Ohio LLC, with WMC – KSA Holdings LLC as guarantor under the asset purchase agreement. The order approves the assumption and assignment of executory contracts, unexpired personal-property and non-residential real-property leases, and customer purchase orders, and authorizes assumption and assignment of two collective bargaining agreements. The closing notice reports an aggregate purchase price of approximately $80 million and confirms the parties closed on May 15, 2026 Dkt. 2684 · pp. 1, 2.
The debtors also expanded the slate of wound-down brands. A Notice of Expansion of Wind Down Brands Dkt. 2686 filed May 15, 2026 adds the Filters and Plugs unit — Champion Laboratories, Fram Group Operations, Framauto Holdings, and Jasper Rubber Products — the Trico unit of Pylon Manufacturing, Trico Products, and Trico Technologies, the Pumps unit of ASC Industries and Carter Fuel Systems, and Hopkins Acquisition, Inc., implemented under the court's April 16, 2026 wind-down order.
First Brands bankruptcy timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| April 2025 | New tariffs implemented; about $99M additional costs |
| September 2025 | Bank of America refuses draw; SouthState exercises setoff |
| September 24 & 28, 2025 | Petition dates (staged filing for 75 debtors) |
| October 1, 2025 | First Day Hearing; Interim DIP Order approved ($500M access) |
| October 9, 2025 | DOJ opens criminal investigation |
| October 13, 2025 | CEO Patrick James resigns; Charles Moore named Interim CEO |
| October 29, 2025 | Original Final DIP/Second Day Hearing date |
| November 3, 2025 | Adversary proceeding filed against James; TRO granted |
| November 6-7, 2025 | Final DIP Hearing |
| November 7, 2025 | Final DIP Order entered ($1.1B full access) |
| November 12, 2025 | Preliminary injunction denied in adversary proceeding |
| November 17, 2025 | Examiner Appointment Hearing |
| November 19, 2025 | Examiner Appointment Order entered ($7M budget) |
| December 8, 2025 | Professional Retention Hearing; SPV stipulations |
| December 16, 2025 | U.S. Trustee files application to approve examiner |
| December 22, 2025 | Factoring Procedures Motion hearing |
| January 9, 2026 | Adjourned Carnaby motions; UCC retention applications |
| January 26, 2026 | Adjourned UMB Bank motions |
| March 11, 2026 | Evolution files emergency motion to convert SPV cases to Ch 7 |
| March 23, 2026 | Wind-down sale / Hilco consulting motion filed |
| March 26, 2026 | IP sale motion filed |
| April 8, 2026 | Debtors file emergency settlement motion on agreed SPV conversion |
| April 9, 2026 | Order converting Evolution SPV Debtors to Chapter 7 entered |
| April 10, 2026 | IP sale to PGI Northstar approved |
| April 15, 2026 | Jefferies discloses $715M Point Bonita exposure; stock falls 7.9% |
| April 16, 2026 | Wind-down assets sale order with Hilco approved (consulting agreement) |
| April 28-29, 2026 | Initial chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement filed (Global Settlement) |
| May 13, 2026 | U.S. Trustee files motion to convert or dismiss; TMD sale hearing held |
| May 14, 2026 | Section 363 sale of TMD business line to TNJ Ohio LLC approved |
| May 15, 2026 | Further chapter 11 plan, revised plan redline, wind-down brand expansion, and TMD sale closing filed |
| May 18, 2026 | Disclosure statement for the Premier Marketing Group plan and amended confirmation-schedule declaration filed |
| May 20, 2026 | Conditional disclosure statement hearing scheduled |
| June 17, 2026 | Confirmation hearing targeted (subject to court availability) |
| August 24, 2026 | Court denies confirmation of the proposed liquidation plan Dkt. 3748 · p. 1 |
| September 1, 2026 | Entered order converts the remaining Chapter 11 cases to Chapter 7 Dkt. 3748 · p. 2 |
| November 2, 2026 | Chapter 7 trustee gives notice of proposed bidding procedures for McHenry wind-down assets Dkt. 4020 · p. 1 |
UBS and Financial Institution Fallout
The First Brands case has created losses for financial institutions that provided capital through supply chain financing structures. The UBS situation has drawn comparisons to Greensill.
UBS O'Connor Fund Impact.
UBS's exposure to First Brands through its O'Connor hedge fund unit exceeds $500 million finews.com: $500 million (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo). The O'Connor funds had concentrated capital in First Brands financing arrangements, with reports indicating approximately 30% exposure swissinfo.ch: 30% concentration (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) to the company. Following the bankruptcy filing and fraud allegations, UBS announced it would wind down the affected O'Connor funds advisorhub.com: wind down the O'Connor funds (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo).
Private credit market implications. The supply chain financing model abfjournal.com: supply chain financing model (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) that First Brands utilized—selling receivables through SPVs and factoring arrangements—resembled the structures that led to Greensill's collapse.
Labor and Operational Continuity
Despite the fraud allegations and financial distress, First Brands has continued operating its business throughout the chapter 11 case, maintaining employment for its approximately 26,000 global workers. The company employs roughly 6,000 workers in the United States, with the remainder distributed across global manufacturing and distribution operations. The DIP financing has provided liquidity to maintain payroll and vendor payments.
First Brands supplies parts for routine maintenance and repairs. Two UAW locals—Local 1181 and Local 9699—represent portions of the workforce, and the company has negotiated collective bargaining agreement extensions through stipulations approved by the court.
Professional Roster
The First Brands case includes a professional roster reflecting its size and complexity.
Debtors' Professionals.
| Role | Firm |
|---|---|
| Lead Counsel | Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP |
| Financial Advisor/CRO Provider | Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC |
| Interim CEO | Charles M. Moore (A&M) |
| Co-Chief Restructuring Officers | Daniel Jerneycic and Gaurav Malhotra (A&M) |
| Investment Banker | Lazard Frères & Co. LLC |
| Appraiser | Hilco Global, LLC |
| Tax Advisor | Ernst & Young LLP |
| Claims & Noticing Agent | Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC |
Charles Moore, the Alvarez & Marsal managing director serving as Interim CEO, brings restructuring experience to the role, including involvement in the City of Detroit chapter 9 case. Moore replaced Patrick James following the founder's October resignation and has overseen the company's stabilization efforts during the initial months of the case.
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
| Role | Firm |
|---|---|
| Counsel | Brown Rudnick LLP brownrudnick.com: Brown Rudnick LLP (outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo) |
| Local Counsel | Cole Schotz P.C. |
| Financial Advisor | M3 Advisory Partners, LP |
The UCC has been active in the case, filing objections to the DIP financing, seeking an expanded examiner investigation, and advocating for unsecured creditor interests in the various collateral disputes.
Examiner.
| Role | Details |
|---|---|
| Examiner | Martin De Luca |
| Firm | Boies Schiller Flexner LLP |
| Budget | $7 million |
| Scope | Investigation of factoring and off-balance sheet financing |
Chapter 7 administration and wind-down sales
The conversion order governs the cases that remained in Chapter 11. It set procedures for final Chapter 11 professional-fee applications and for certain expenses of the transition to Chapter 7. The order gives the conversion date and identifies the previously converted estates separately Dkt. 3748 · p. 2.
The trustee continued to invoke the April wind-down order in October and November. Her McHenry notice identifies the property as inventory, machinery and equipment. It describes JessCo Brakes Inc. as the proposed buyer and explains how a competing offer led to the revised bid and proposed auction procedure Dkt. 4020 · pp. 1, 2.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did First Brands file for bankruptcy?
First Brands filed chapter 11 due to a combination of factors: alleged $2.3 billion factoring fraud created unplanned liabilities; Bank of America refused funding and SouthState Bank exercised setoffs, triggering an immediate liquidity crisis; total obligations of approximately $9.3 billion could not be serviced; April 2025 tariffs added approximately $99 million in costs; and failed refinancing efforts left no out-of-court alternatives.
What is the alleged fraud?
The fraud allegations center on fabricated invoices submitted to factoring counterparties and double-pledging of the same receivables to multiple lenders. The allegations involve billions of dollars that cannot be accounted for. The DOJ opened a criminal investigation in October 2025, and an examiner with a $7 million budget is investigating the factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions.
What happened to CEO Patrick James?
Patrick James resigned as CEO on October 13, 2025, approximately two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The company subsequently sued James in an adversary proceeding alleging fraud, misappropriation of funds, and "grievous misconduct." A temporary restraining order was granted against James, though a preliminary injunction was later denied. Reports indicate allegations of more than $700 million transferred to insiders.
How large is the DIP financing?
The DIP facility totals $4.4 billion. It includes $1.1 billion in new money and a $3.3 billion roll-up of prepetition first and second lien debt. DIP lenders characterized the facility as "wholly unprecedented" with an "impossible to price" risk profile given the fraud allegations.
Will FRAM and other brands continue operating?
The September 1 order converted the remaining debtor cases to Chapter 7. For the status of a particular brand or facility, the relevant sale or wind-down filing establishes which assets and operations are covered. The trustee's November 2 notice addresses the McHenry, Illinois wind-down assets Dkt. 3748 · p. 2 Dkt. 4020 · p. 1.
Who is exposed to losses?
Major financial institution exposures include: UBS with more than $500 million via O'Connor funds (prompting fund wind-down); Jefferies with approximately $715 million via Leucadia/Point Bonita vehicles; Onset Financial with approximately $1.9 billion in master lease obligations; and Bank of America and SouthState Bank through lending facilities. Additional factoring counterparties and trade creditors face exposures.
What is the examiner investigating?
Examiner Martin De Luca of Boies Schiller Flexner is investigating factoring and off-balance sheet financing transactions with a $7 million budget. The investigation will examine the alleged fabricated invoices, double-pledged receivables, and missing funds. The UCC has sought a broader investigation scope than originally proposed.
How does this compare to Greensill?
The First Brands case shares similarities with the 2021 Greensill Capital failure: both involved supply chain financing structures, alleged fabricated invoices, and concentrated fund exposures.
Is there a reorganization plan?
The debtors proposed a Chapter 11 liquidation plan involving Premier Marketing Group, LLC. The court denied confirmation at the August 24 hearing and entered the September 1 conversion order. The remaining estates are in Chapter 7 Dkt. 3748 · pp. 1, 2.
What are the implications for private credit markets?
The case has focused attention on off-balance sheet financing structures used in supply chain finance.
Who is the claims agent for First Brands Group?
Kroll Restructuring Administration LLC serves as the claims and noticing agent. The court-authorized role in this case anchors creditor notices and claims-register administration to the filed retention and noticing record.
Sources
- Dkt. 22Declaration Supporting First Brands Chapter 11 PetitionsFiled Sep 29, 2025Sep 29, 2025
- Dkt. 51Declaration Supporting First Day ReliefFiled Sep 30, 2025Sep 30, 2025
- Dkt. 217DIP Financing Interim OrderFiled Oct 1, 2025Oct 1, 2025
- Dkt. 289Final DIP Credit AgreementFiled Oct 6, 2025Oct 6, 2025
- Dkt. 608Final DIP Financing OrderFiled Nov 9, 2025Nov 9, 2025
- Dkt. 898Order Authorizing Retention of Hilco Global as AppraisersFiled Dec 8, 2025Dec 8, 2025
- Dkt. 1819Order Approving Examiner's Work PlanFiled Jan 29, 2026Jan 29, 2026
- Dkt. 2216Hilco Wind-Down MotionFiled Mar 23, 2026Mar 23, 2026
- Dkt. 2236Motion to Approve Intellectual Property SaleFiled Mar 26, 2026Mar 26, 2026
- Dkt. 2372Motion to Approve Conversion SettlementFiled Apr 8, 2026Apr 8, 2026
- Dkt. 2373Declaration Supporting SPV Chapter 7 ConversionFiled Apr 8, 2026Apr 8, 2026
- Dkt. 2396Order Converting Evolution SPV Debtors to Chapter 7Filed Apr 9, 2026Apr 9, 2026
- Dkt. 2399IP Asset Sale OrderFiled Apr 10, 2026Apr 10, 2026
- Dkt. 2454Hilco Consulting Agreement and Asset Wind Down OrderFiled Apr 16, 2026Apr 16, 2026
- Dkt. 2544Chapter 11 Plan of ReorganizationFiled Apr 28, 2026Apr 28, 2026
- Dkt. 2545Disclosure Statement for Global Settlement PlanFiled Apr 29, 2026Apr 29, 2026
- Dkt. 2630Notice of Disclosure Statement Hearing AdjournmentFiled May 12, 2026May 12, 2026
- Dkt. 2647Objection to PMG Disclosure StatementFiled May 12, 2026May 12, 2026
- Dkt. 2652Witness and Exhibit List for TMD SaleFiled May 13, 2026May 13, 2026
- Dkt. 2670Motion to Convert or DismissFiled May 13, 2026May 13, 2026
- Dkt. 2675Sale of Toledo Molding & Die AssetsFiled May 14, 2026May 14, 2026
- Dkt. 2678Chapter 11 Plan of ReorganizationFiled May 15, 2026May 15, 2026
- Dkt. 2680Revised Chapter 11 PlanFiled May 15, 2026May 15, 2026
- Dkt. 2684Notice of TMD Sale ClosingFiled May 15, 2026May 15, 2026
- Dkt. 2686Notice of Expansion of Wind Down BrandsFiled May 15, 2026May 15, 2026
- Dkt. 2692First Brands Group Disclosure StatementFiled May 18, 2026May 18, 2026
- Dkt. 2694Revised Disclosure StatementFiled May 18, 2026May 18, 2026
- Dkt. 2696Amended Declaration Supporting Confirmation ScheduleFiled May 18, 2026May 18, 2026
- Dkt. 3748Chapter 7 Conversion RequestFiled Sep 1, 2026Sep 1, 2026
- Dkt. 4020Proposed McHenry AuctionFiled Nov 2, 2026Nov 2, 2026
- Web$9.3 billion in total obligationsbloomberg.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- WebU.S. Department of Justice opened a criminal investigationreuters.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webaftermarket automotive parts supplierprod.crainsdetroit.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- WebFRAM filtersthebrakereport.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Websince 1935autolite.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Websupplier in the automotive aftermarket supply chainmotortrend.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webprivate debt market commentaryk2-partners.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- WebGreensill Capital collapseluther-lawfirm.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Web$2.3 billion in factoring liabilitiesfunderintel.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webresigned as CEO on October 13, 2025bloomberg.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webpressurebloomberg.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webtemporary restraining orderdandodiary.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Web"grievous misconduct"fortune.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Web$500 millionfinews.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Web30% concentrationswissinfo.ch · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webwind down the O'Connor fundsadvisorhub.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Web$25 million plus additional payments tied to net salesjust-auto.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webgiven competing bidder NOCO 48 hours to put a competing bid on the tabletruckpartsandservice.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webwithdrew its objection on April 9truckpartsandservice.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webshares lost 7.9% in a trading sessionfinance.yahoo.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webtaken a $30 million pre-tax lossbankingdive.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- WebPoint Bonita fund investor lawsuitbloomberg.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Webslated to convert to chapter 7know.creditsights.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- Websupply chain financing modelabfjournal.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo
- WebBrown Rudnick LLPbrownrudnick.com · Outside source, not verified by ElevenFlo